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THE EDITOR'S PAGE 
Ipargazdasági Szemle (Struktúrák-Szervezetek-Stratégiák), the quarterly review 
on industrial economics of the Research Institute of Industrial Economics of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, is pleased to publish this first special issue in 
English, entirely devoted to a roundtable conference with the participation of dis-
tinguished experts from the U.S. and Hungary. The name of the quarterly means 
"Review of Industrial Economics - Structures, Organisations and Strategies" and 
typically focuses on issues of management, industrial policy, technological de-
velopment and problems of industrial adaptation in general - all addressed at this 
conference. This special issue therefore reflects not only the theme of the confer-
ence but it also conveys a correct impression of the focus of our quarterly. We feel 
our research results are much more known in Hungary than abroad and it is in-
cumbent on us to make them available to the international scientific community. 
We greatly appreciate the help from our American partners and friends at the 
National Academy of Sciences in preparing this special issue. We hope the ex-
panding network of international cooperation of our Institute will make it possi-
ble to publish further special issues in the near future. Hopefully these will report 
on conferences and/or international research projects as fruitful and rewarding as 
the current meeting was between the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 
Editor-in-Chief 
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PREFACE 
This special issue of Ipargazdasági Szemle contains the papers presented at the 
workshop on "Industrial Strategies and Policies for Economic Growth in the 
1990s," which was jointly sponsored by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
(MTA) and the National Academy of Sciences of the United States (NAS) and 
was held in Budapest, Hungary from April 22-26, 1991. The topic is one of great 
interest throughout the world, including industrial leaders and government offi-
cials searching for effective and wise choices in both Hungary and the United 
States. 
Hungary is experiencing a tumultuous period of social and economic transi-
tion. New laws and policies are being formulated, affecting its economy over a 
wide range, including taxes, property rights, unemployment, banking, anti-trust 
policy, and foreign investment. Industrial managers are learning to deal with a 
host of new tasks and issues, such as developing strategies to compete in new 
markets and forging new relationships with research organizations, universities, 
and foreign firms. 
U.S. managers and policy makers have been facing a different set of problems. 
Rapid scientific and technical developments are straining traditional methods of 
management. The globalization of markets is forcing U.S. companies to reexa-
mine their products and processes to develop new competitive advantages, which 
often includes forming international strategic alliances. The success of industrial 
policies in Western Europe and Southeast Asia has stimulated an intensive public 
debate in the United States on the proper role of government in influencing indus-
trial development. This workshop was based on the assumption that in spite of the 
vast and often fundamental differences between the two economies, Hungarian 
managers and officials could benefit from discussions with Americans on the 
successes and failures of U.S. experiences. 
The workshop had five plenary sessions, each focusing on different aspects of 
government policies, industrial economics, and technological innovation and de-
velopment. The first session set the context of the workshop, addressing recent 
global changes in industrial management and specific aspects of the U.S. and 
Hungarian economies. During session two, the American and Hungarian par-
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ticipants shared ideas on the role of the government in supporting industry. Ses-
sion three examined the issues of government fiscal policy, firm-level innovation, 
privatization, and employment. Options of financing industrial innovation was 
the focus of session four. The workshop concluded with the presentation of four 
case studies, allowing the participants to examine the issues of the previous ses-
sions at a concrete, practical level. Appendix II lists the NAS and MTA delega-
tions, while Appendix III list all who attended the workshop. 
In addition to the workshop sessions, the American participants visited rele-
vant government and industrial institutions in Budapest. These visits provided 
opportunities for the NAS delegation to gain insights into Hungarian industrial 
management and government industrial policies. For a complete list of site visits, 
please see Appendix I. 
The ideas presented in this publication are those of the authors. The book does 
not represent the official views of any organization or agency. 
The American and the Hungarian editors of this volume would like to express 
their appreciation to the staff of the MTA Research Institute of Industrial Eco-
nomics and the NAS Office of Soviet and East European Affairs, particularly 
Stephen G. Deets and Angela Dredden, for their valuable contributions in or-
ganizing the workshop and assisting in the preparation of this publication. 
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GENERAL OVERVIEW 
Perspective Changes of U.S. Industry, 
Including Increasing Development 
of Global Markets 
and International Business Alliances 
• 
MEL HORWITCH 
Theseus Institute 
OVERVIEW 
An issue that is increasingly challenging managers throughout the world is the 
growing need to develop a Global Technology Strategy. A top-level and stra-
tegic perspective are the most appropriate for dealing with this matter, because 
managing and directing a modern enterprise increasingly means viewing tech-
nology as a strategic variable. 
Consequently, technological innovation—or more appropriately, the accessing 
of innovative capabilities by an enterprise-has become a matter of importance 
not only to scientists, engineers and other technical people, but also to a diverse 
array of general and functional managers. Indeed, technological innovation is no 
longer a specialization confined to particular units of a company. For example, 
in the modern corporation, innovation is now also the responsibility of people in 
marketing and finance. New forms of finance—such as internal venture capital 
and high-technology project finance—are being practiced by state-of-the-art cor-
porations around the world in order to stimulate innovation. Technological inno-
vation is also important in manufacturing and distribution. The accessing of in-
novative capabilities has also emerged as a critical general management task. 
THE PATH TOWARD TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY 
There has been an evolutionary path toward modern Technology Strategy. But 
this evolution is not linear or sequential. Ideas, concepts, and practices have been 
successively developed and tend to coexist, often laid on top of one another. The 
diverse and richly textured corporate practices in firms derive their heritage from 
various sources. 
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Until about the mid-1970s, strategy and technology never had much to say to 
one another. In U.S. corporate strategy and, to a lesser extent, in Europe (but sig-
nificantly not in Japan), the field of strategy at first reflected mostly a "general 
management" tradition, which stressed such factors as sensitive and effective 
leadership, an emphasis on qualitative styles and goals, and an ability to run com-
panies by viewing the enterprise as a whole. During the late 1960s and 1970s 
strategy entered a very rich and complex period known as a "Golden Age of Stra-
tegic Planning". All kinds of professional tools to help in enterprise planning 
were developed—including various portfolios and statistical-based techniques. 
Indeed, this was a "Golden Age" not just of strategic planning, but also of busi-
ness schools (first in the United States and then in Europe) and strategic consult-
ing firms (many of which are now global service organizations). It was, and re-
mains, an age of professionalism. Strategic planning itself became a profession. 
Now, of course, planning and professionalism permeate modern business enter-
prises. 
From the point of view of technology management, until very recently 
research and development (R&D) professionals never considered general 
management issues. Instead, the key issues in R&D involved such matters as im-
proving the research task and managing small groups. There was a great deal of 
discussion on defining innovation and on delineating the process of innovation all 
the way from invention to development to production and diffusion into the mar-
ketplace. Attention was paid to technology's effect on organizational structure, 
the "product life cycle", and the sources of innovation, ranging from so-called 
"technology push" to "market pull". 
One particularly critical aspect concerning accessing an enterprise's innova-
tive capabilities was identified in the traditional management of technology 
literature-the enduring importance of entrepreneurs and risk-takers. Techno-
logical innovation clearly does not simply require a technical ability to achieve 
novel scientific or engineering developments, such as genetic engineering or 
redesigning semiconductor chips. The act of innovation also necessitates altering 
a certain culture, a way of life, a way of doing business, and a structure of an en-
terprise. Therefore, risk-takers and an environment encouraging risk-taking and 
exploration are often needed in order to create novel products, processes, and 
services and to produce new value. Innovative companies paradoxically often 
must be able to "destroy" in order to reconfigure themselves if they are going to 
be innovative—what the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter called "creative 
destruction". 
The split between the world of strategy and the world of technology manage-
ment is now over. One of the first ways strategy and technology began to interact 
was by incorporating professional managerial techniques into technology plan-
ning. The field of technology strategic planning is expanding with a growing 
number of consulting firms and professionals promoting various methods. 
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The attraction of technology strategic planning for firms is, in part, due to the 
real problem of selecting technology in the midst of technological diversity and 
a complex set of choices. All multi-technology companies (and almost all multi-
business companies are now multi-technology companies) must choose among a 
diverse range of purely technological options—such as new materials, electronic 
hardware, and software. There is also the issue of what kind of innovation 
process firms emphasize: incremental innovation—i.e. slow gradual change, 
which is a very important part of innovation—or radical leaps that can redefine or 
create entire fields or industries? Examples of the latter type include the in-
troduction of the first plain paper copier by Haloid (later Xerox) or, in the 
automobile industry, the Ford Taurus, the hugely successful car on which Ford 
spent billions of dollars developing in the early 1980s. This vehicle once again 
transformed Ford into an effective competitor in the U.S. automobile market. On 
the other hand, radical leaps have also resulted in failures, such as the RCA 
videodisc. There is also the issue of selecting the kind of technology to develop: 
product, process, or service? 
Technology Strategy, therefore, requires varied choices from a diverse array of 
options. Planners argue that just as the traditional strategic portfolio was deve-
loped in the 1970s to assist strategic managers in allocating resources among 
diverse businesses, similar approaches can be applied in making technology 
resource-allocation decisions. Consulting firms around the world are developing 
and disseminating such methodologies, using such planning and analytical tools 
and schema as matrices, S-curves, benchmarking approaches, and statistical-
oriented methods, surveys, and databases. 
Still, the actual efficacy of strategic planning in stimulating and promoting real 
and continuous technological innovation deserves careful analysis. To be innova-
tive is not necessarily to be systematic and rational. Perhaps there is a contradic-
tion in planning rationally for the "creative destruction" caused by innovation. In 
other words, can systematic planning, which tends to flourish in an relatively 
orderly and stable environment, encourage radical risk-taking and change? Inno-
vation often requires taking risks; it often necessitates tapping the skills of diverse 
kinds of people; it often means operating in very peculiar kinds of cultures; and 
it often entails going outside as well as inside for needed talent. 
MODERN TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY 
Therefore, a much broader conceptualization of Technology Strategy is required. 
One such perspective has three dimensions. The first dimension is termed Com-
petitive Strategy, which conceptually has two extremes: competition and 
cooperation. Firms can compete against rivals and cooperate with them at the 
same time. A typical example is the relationships between General Motors and 
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Toyota. While General Motors and Toyota have a joint venture, the Nummi ven-
ture, to manufacture automobiles in Fremont, California, they also compete 
vigorously against each other. 
Another dimension is termed Domain. Basically, this variable is concerned 
with where innovative activity takes place and where firms search for accessing 
innovative capabilities. Domain might be internal, such as corporate or division-
al laboratories. The locale might also be external. Some firms place great em-
phasis on buying knowledge. Obviously, several companies today must make and 
buy innovative capabilities. Perhaps the stronger the firms are internally, the eas-
ier it is for them to make sound external choices as well. The issue of domain is 
a very critical matter in today's world, and, indeed, it is becoming even more sig-
nificant and complex as globalization takes place. 
The final dimension is Structure. In corporate strategy, the role of structure is 
generally accepted as key and controversial. Significant Technology-Strategy 
structures include corporate R&D and industrial R&D, which has been the tradi-
tional and most widespread approach for developing technology in large corpo-
rations. Corporate R&D emerged during the twentieth century as a venerable ac-
tivity. Various labs, such as Bell Laboratories, the DuPont Labs, and the General 
Electric Labs, have developed important innovations over the years. However, 
some large corporations are also increasingly finding it necessary to replicate or 
mimic other kinds of innovative structures— specifically those associated with 
flatter organizations and high-technology entrepreneurialism in small and 
medium-size companies. Finally, there are also networks of organizations of 
companies, made up of alliances, joint ventures, a variety of research agree-
ments, contract research, and licensing agreements. Therefore, companies have 
to make complex structural choices. They tend to have some blend of structures 
and a certain amount of requisite variety in structures for Technology Strategy 
today. 
We can begin to delineate most of the various key approaches for Technology 
Strategy that exist today. There are at least eight different categories. Two are in-
ternal and five are external. The internal ones are classical corporate R&D and 
novel kinds of internal structures, such as "internal venturing", entrepreneurial 
subsidiaries, independent business units, and decentralized small units. In a 
sense, this latter type of internal approach tries to instill within the large corpora-
tion much of the legendary "Silicon Valley model" of technology development. 
But is such an approach possible? Can large firms effectively operate like small 
firms? Or are large firms too hierarchical and bureaucratic with embedded 
strengths and weaknesses? There are some examples of large firms that seem to 
succeed in an entrepreneurial setting, such as 3M. However, such instances are 
few in number. Also, the success of such an operating style may be tied to certain 
cultures, such as in the United States, where individualism, labor, and capital 
mobility are valued. 
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There are also specific external approaches for Technology Strategy, such as 
contract research. Eli Lilly has a huge share in the traditional insulin market for 
treating diabetes, but Eli Lilly also wanted a genetically engineered insulin 
product. Even though Eli Lilly has a huge R&D lab facility outside Indianapolis, 
Indiana, it still went to Genentech, a well-known biotechnology company in 
California, to develop a DNA-based insulin product called Humulin. Firms can 
also make acquisitions of firms for primarily technology-acquisition purposes. 
For example, General Motors acquired Hughes Aircraft and EDS partially for 
their technical expertise. Hoffmann-La Roche acquired a majority stake in 
Genentech partially for the same reason. Firms also can become a licensee of 
another firm's in order to learn about technology. In Japan, Komatsu was a licen-
see of International Harvester during the 1960s and learned a great deal about 
technology in the heavy equipment industry. Firms can have joint ventures to de-
velop technology, such as the Fanuc-GM joint venture, GMF, which is the largest 
robotics company in the United States. 
Large firms can also have minority equity in small firms as part of their Tech-
nology Strategy. This is perhaps the most controversial vehicle for technology 
development. Monsanto has minority equity in a number of small biotechnology 
companies, such as Biogen. Japanese companies have minority equity in some 
U.S. and European companies. These arrangements function as so-called "stra-
tegic windows" on the technology and are not conventional business investments. 
But is this the way to learn about a new technology, by merely sitting on the Board 
of Directors and trying to understand how technology is being developed in a 
small company? A great deal of research is needed in order to understand 
whether this approach is actually an effective for large companies. 
There are other approaches as well, including joining government-backed pro-
grams, such as MITI programs in Japan, Defense Department programs in the 
United States, or ESPRIT programs in Europe. Companies can also join multi-
firm consortia, such as MCCor Sematech in the US, and they can link up with 
universities as a matter of strategy. 
Research clearly shows that technology as a whole is now strategically more 
important than a decade ago and that approaches for accessing innovative capa-
bilities are becoming more diverse. Data from both the public domain and from in-
depth interviews of firms tends to confirm this (Figures 1 and 2). Corporate R&D is 
the largest Technology-Strategy option in terms of budget, but the same data indi-
cates that the newer approaches-internal venturing and all the external approaches-
have become important during the 1980s in terms of relative significance. 
Therefore, there is a real question as to where in the firm the Technology-
Strategy decisions should take place. Should the head of R&D be responsible for 
Technology Strategy? Or is it necessary for a wider group of decision makers to 
be deeply involved in Technology Strategy as firms reach outside as well as in-
side and as firms experiment and test various kinds of internal structures? The 
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answer is clearly that the incorporation of a wider group of people is critical. 
New kinds of managers and new kinds of functions are needed in order for this 
to be successful. 
Figure 1. 
Technology Development Activity of Selected 16 Firms 1978 and 1983 
(Number of Publicly Reported Major Instances of Technology 
Strategy Activities) 
Approach 1978 1983 
1. Industrial R & D — 1 
2. Internal Venturing 0 4 
3. Contracted Research 1 7 
4. Acquisition of Firms 10 18 
5. Licensee 5 9 
6. Joint Venture 1 16 
7. Equity Participation 0 8 
8. Other (Market Another's Product) 
Totals 22 77 
Source: Wall Street Journal Index. 1978 & 1983 
Figure 2. 
Directional Change in Relative Significance for the Eight Approaches 
for Ten Companies 1978-1984 
Approach Increase Decrease 
1. Industrial R & D 0 5 
2. Internal Venturing 4 0 
3. Contracted Research 2 0 
4. Acquisition Firms 6 1 
5. Licensee 4 1 
6. Joint Venture 5 0 
7. Equity Participation 3 1 
8. Other 3 0 
(Market Another's Product) 
Source: Personal Interviews 
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On a related point, technology planning and decision making at the strategic 
level is increasingly taking place throughout the organization. It is occurring at 
headquarters, group and division levels, business levels, labs, and elsewhere. 
For example, for at least one large corporation, the Director of Planning at its 
corporate laboratories does technology strategic planning for the whole compa-
ny. Therefore, another critical aspect of Technology Strategy is making sure 
that relevant information throughout the enterprise and across the various busi-
nesses is disseminated in useful ways. In fact, the whole issue of technology 
transfer, which has always been an important concern in the management of 
technology, is even more complex and critical in today's world where technolo-
gy transfer involves many different kinds of constituencies and many different 
kinds of people, organizations, and units within an enterprise. This situation 
presents a great challenge and opportunity for information technology. 
A new industrial-structure pattern typifies much of modern Technology 
Strategy. The need for seemingly opposites to coexist-such as small and large, 
control and freedom, and professional and entrepreneurial—increasingly is 
required in a competitive environment where practicing modern Technology 
Strategy is a high priority. 
In this regard, the structure of innovation-producing activities associated with 
large corporations around the world is becoming increasingly complex, exem-
plified by such companies as AT&T, NEC, Hoffmann-La Roche, and General 
Motors (Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6). Even AT&T, with perhaps the finest set of cor-
porate laboratories in the world, Bell Laboratories, goes outside as well as inside 
for certain innovative capabilities. Similarly, the Swiss chemical-pharma-
ceutical company Hoffmann-La Roche has a variety of relationships around the 
world in the area of biotechnology, including its recent majority stake in Genen-
tech. In Japan, NEC also has a very complex web of relationships around the 
world. In the U.S., General Motors exhibits a more extreme version of the same 
pattern. In addition to its special Saturn Project, GM has minority equity in vi-
sion systems and artificial intelligence companies and, as previously mentioned 
it acquired EDS and Hughes. It also has joint ventures, GM-Fanuc and the 
NUMMI joint venture with Toyota. Finally, GM has relationships with univer-
sities and other companies around the world. 
Small and medium-size companies are also key participants in this dramatic 
emergence of modern Technology Strategy. Such firms often now exhibit an 
array of innovation-related relationships and alliances with large enterprises. 
The U.S. biotechnology company Cetus has had a web of relationships 
with large firms, including Kodak, WR Grace, Weyerhaeuser, and Nabisco 
(Figure 7). 
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Figure 3. 
AT & T Joint Ventures and Equity Positions 
Analysis of Motivations 
Form of Alliance 
Market Cooperative Technology 
Expansion Development Acquisition 
Joint Venture 
Goldstar Semiconductor (1980) X 
Goldstar Fiber Optic (1984) X 
AT & T Taiwan Telecom. (1984) X 
AT & T Philips Telecom. (1983) X 
AT & T Microelectronica Espana (1984) X 
AT & T Rioch (1985) X 
Lycom A/S (1986) 
Western Electric Saudi Arabia (1979) X 
Japan ENS Corp. (1985) X 
Covidea (1985) 
Equity Position 
Sun Microsystems (1958) 
Olivetti (1983) 
Mitek 
Intermetrics 
Strategic Partnerships 
Western Digital 
X X 
X X X 
X 
X 
X 
Source: Moore, E.S.: "The Emerging Role of Strategic Alliances: AT & T in 
the Eighties" (Sloan School Mastar of Science in Management Thesis. 
May 1988.) 
While large companies are trying to fragment and flatten in order to combat the 
problems of bureaucracy and excessive professionalization, small and medium-
size companies, while maintaining an innovative and entrepreneurial style, are 
also trying to acquire both additional resources and a certain amount of profes-
sionalism by selectively joining forces with larger organizations. In fact, much 
of the entire Interleukin-2 biotechnology sector exhibits such a situation (Fi-
gure 8). 
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Figure 4. 
NEC-New Linkages: Selected Examples (1980—1985) 
# 
Sony Corp. 
Fufitsu 
Electrotechnical Labs 
Hitachi E 
Fujitsu 
Kyocera 
Sumitomo 
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Honda 
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INTERNATIONAL 
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© 
Intel 
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Honeywell-Bull 
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China I 
Brazil 
New Zealand 
Malaysia 
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3M 
General Electric 9
 m • 
ZUog Motorola 
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Burroughs 
LEGEND / \ Consortium 
© ) Large Firm 
0 Small Firm 
1 I Govt, or other Institution 
• Extend Existing Vblue 
= | Targeted VWue 
Creation/Transformation 
Broad Milue 
Creation/Transformation 
Figure 5. 
Hoffman La-Roche: Selected Linkages with Biotechnology Focus 
Basel Institute of f 
Immunology 
DOMESTIC 
INTERNATIONAL Roche Institute of 
Molecular Biology 
Vega 
Biotechnology 
Techniclone 
BTC Diagnostics 
i l Centocor 
Genentech 
Tkkeda Damon 
LEGEND 
Consortium 
Large Firm 
Small Firm 
Govt, or other Institution 
Extend Existing Value 
Targeted Value 
Creation /Transformation 
Broad Wlue 
Creation /Transformation 
® COPYRIGHT 1990 BY Mel Horwitch 
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Figure 6. 
General-Motors: Selected New Linkages with Technology Focus 1980—1985 
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Figure 7. 
Cetus' Joint Ventures and Major Contract R&D Agreement 
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Figure 8. 
Interleukon—2—Related Agreements 
f Johnson \ I 
& • AMGenl 
V Johnson 
Collaborative 
Research 
Inc. 
Yoshiton \ 
^ ^ ^ Pharmac. I 
research agreement 
22 G E N E R A L OVERVIEW 
GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY 
The most recent stage of evolution in Technology Strategy is globalization. The 
varied approaches for accessing innovative capabilities are now increasingly 
practiced on a worldwide basis, which makes the Technology-Strategy process 
even more complex and more difficult than before. 
There are some fundamental reasons why globalization of Technology Strate-
gy is taking place. First, the traditional strength of large corporations is not in 
speedy and continuous radical innovation, as large companies do not usually 
react quickly. GE invested millions of dollars in synthetic diamonds before that 
technology became a real product. Speed becomes more and more important as 
economies become increasingly advanced and value-intensive. Rapid innova-
tion increasingly requires the linking up of different kinds of enterprises. 
Another, almost paradoxical, reason for globalization is the fact that high 
technology demands softer skills. In high technology, people are key assets and 
brain power is critical. Talented individuals are extremely mobile and flexible, 
as they travel and work throughout the globe. Education in technology is also 
globally dispersed. In addition, there is also a worldwide recognition of the need 
for diverse skills and perspectives for accessing innovative capabilities effec-
tively. Finally, the cost of R&D is rising. Firms, therefore, often join forces 
with other enterprises if only to share the economic and technological risks. 
What might be termed Global Technology Strategy is manifested in diverse 
ways. Clearly it encompasses more than simply indicating a firm possesses 
R&D laboratories throughout the world. International R&D is not the same as 
Global Technology Strategy. Worldwide continuous searching for innovative 
capabilities requires a committed corporation-wide effort. 
Global Technology Strategy embraces different models, different ap-
proaches, and different pathways to success. There is no single road to competi-
tive technology-intensive achievement. One model—perhaps the prevalent 
approach-practiced by many companies can be termed revitalized corporate 
R&D. The emphasis here is explicitly on keeping or reinvigorating the R&D 
function, which includes the laboratories, teams of scientists and engineers, the 
process of technology transfer from R&D to the other operations, and coordina-
tion and cooperation between R&D and the others functions and businesses. 
Another approach is division-based or business-centered. Under this model, 
the ongoing operating structure—usually based on groups, divisions and 
businesses—defines much of the key technology development activity. Innova-
tion is frequently under the direction of such units. Motorola, to some extent, 
functions like this. 
The use of diverse forms of projects is a very important tool for Global Tech-
nology Strategy. At least three types of projects can be identified. First, there is 
a kind of bubbling-up and distributed-project approach. A number of flowers 
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are permitted to bloom until one is obviously successful. Selection of projects to 
develop into commercial products or services is purposely delayed. Firms like 
3M operate at times in this fashion. Another approach is to target a relatively few 
salient projects from the very beginning. Firms create a limited portfolio of key 
projects. From beginning to end large amounts of resources are allocated to 
them along with a great deal of high-level corporate sponsorship, encourage-
ment, and attention. This method has also been quite effective at times. Canon 
developed the AE-1 Program Camera and the personal copier (which then 
evolved into the basis for a laser printer) in such a fashion. Similarly, JVC deve-
loped the VHS-C and VHS-Super videotape formats. Finally, there are what 
may be termed Transformational Projects, where some explicit activity is 
more or less purposefully established with the goal of changing the firm in a fun-
damental fashion in the direction of making the enterprise significantly more in-
novative. Examples of such a radical shift or possible revitalization are rare but 
might include the development of the Ford Taurus or the Fiat Uno. In both 
cases, an entire firm was transformed due, at least in part, to the success of a 
major product-development initiative. 
Another kind of global model-termed the orchestrator—is to go outside and 
depend extensively on the external acquisition of knowledge. In this case, the 
firm acts primarily as the nerve center or brain for coordinating the largely ex-
ternal activities established to obtain innovative capabilities. In the "make or 
buy" tradeoff, such a firm often opts to buy knowledge-based assets. Olivetti 
has frequently operated along these lines. 
Effective Global Technology Strategy also avoids over-emphasizing asym-
metries (that is an over-dependence on apparent comparative advantages) and 
does not strictly differentiate on the basis of geographic or national differences. 
Purposeful high-value redundancy can be advantageous in a world where 
there is a growing globalization of high-value talent. In the end, human capital 
is the critical asset for effective technological innovation. 
Political considerations in Global Technology Strategy also encourage a cer-
tain amount of selective duplication around the globe. One reason for major in-
vestment in R&D facilities in Europe, for example, is increasing political pres-
sure for expanding high-value local content in products sold in that region, 
which includes demands for more R&D and advanced manufacturing. 
It is also, therefore, quite important today to have very advanced global scan-
ning of technology in an enterprise. The high-level scanner is a new and com-
plex function in a company. 
Still, determining the appropriate amount of such "purposeful redundancy" 
in Global Technology Strategy is a delicate matter. It must be weighed against 
a concurrent need to avoid obvious imbalances. Multiple centers of excellence 
are also required. Even as a firm becomes global, it should maintain that which 
makes it distinctive and great. Therefore, a subtle issue in Global Technology 
Strategy is to differentiate while becoming truly internation 
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THE GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY-INFORMATION 
SYSTEM CONNECTION 
There is a growing opportunity in Global Technology Strategy for the incorpo-
ration of sophisticated information systems. Thus far there has been surpris-
ingly little discussion on the relationship between Global Technology Strategy 
and information systems. One reason for the limited exploration of this connec-
tion is the great complexity of both areas. For example, Global Technology 
Strategy can be viewed as a progression of complex "levels" in terms of com-
plexity for accessing innovative capabilities (Figure 9). 
Figure 9. 
The Progression of 'Levels' for Accessing Innovative 
Capabilities in Large Corporations 
Level I: Direct Innovation within Firms - The Primary Objective of Local Work 
is the Development of New Technology (Specialized Discrete) 
— Direct R and D Activity in Corporate Technology Centers and Labora-
tories by Individuals and Small Groups 
— Identifiable Specialized Technology Development Activity 
Level II: Multi-Member, Multidimensional Innovative Activities within Firms 
(Distributed Discrete) 
— Formal Innovation Teams at the Business Level 
— Formal Multifunctional/Multibusiness Projects or Programs as Stand-
Alone Activities 
— Formal Multifunctional Teams at Laboratories and Technology Centers 
Level III: Formal Relationships with Institutions External to the Firm to Access 
Specific Innovative Capabilities (External Targeted) 
— Joint Ventures 
— Contract R and D 
— Some Acquisitons 
— Formal Technology Development with Suppliers 
— Formal Technology Development with Customers 
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Level IV: The Promotion and Encouragement of a Selective Corporate Business 
Strategy Anchored on the Accessing of Targeted Innovative Capabilities (Selec-
tive Set Internal) 
— Building Up Innovation-Intensive Segments of a Corporate Portfolio 
— Increased Funding о R and D in Selected Technology Fields 
— Promoting a Specific Configuration of External Relationships 
Level V: The Installation of a Broad-Based Continuous Commitment for 
Accessing Innovative Capabilities Throughout the Firm (Broad-Based Firm-
Wide) 
— Top-Level Strategic Commitment Communicated Throughout Firm 
— An Embedded Culture Supporting Innovation 
— An Innovation-Intensive Human Resources Policy and Set of Practices 
— Systems and Producers for Monitoring and Assessing Innovative Ac-
tivities 
Level VI: The Installation of a Broad-Based Continuous Commitment for Ac-
cessing Capabilities Distributed Throughout a Network of Interorganization 
Relationships (Broad-Based Network-Wide) 
— Purposeful Education/Communication Programs for Inside/Outside 
Participants 
— Interorganization Rotation of People 
— Strategic Use of Consortia. Universities, etc. 
— Multiorganization Executive Dec. Effort 
Similarly, there are varied ways information technology can be used for in 
firms for accessing innovative capabilities, including various off-the-shelf appli-
cations in: word processing, statistics, and spreadsheets; localized use of simu-
lations and CAD within R&D; firm-wide electronic mail and VoiceMail; fax 
and Internet among researchers and colleagues anywhere; interactive simula-
tions and CAD/CAM with suppliers, customers, and partners; teleconferenc-
ing, electronic firm-wide bulletin boards, interactive firm-wide electronic bulle-
tin boards, and asynchronous conferencing; video conferencing for firm-wide 
R&D, new product development, seminars, training, and executive develop-
ment; advanced "groupware"; and distributed "virtual" networks for teams, 
projects, programs, and joint ventures within or among organizations. 
Conceivably, these two highly complex variables can mutually reinforce one 
another in assisting an enterprise in its search for greater and greater innovative 
capabilities. 
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Perhaps ultimately an innovation-oriented "simultaneous information sys-
tem" can be created. Among its key attributes, such a system enhances innova-
tion as well as "control" in a firm. On a global basis, it should also facilitate 
smooth and continuous access to diverse sources of data and knowledge inside 
and outside the firm, including quantitative data, head-hunter files, and direct 
links to selected sets of people. Another possible feature might be an ability to 
communicate with diverse kinds of groups. Also, such an information system 
must have a large capacity. It also should be flexible and should employ different 
kinds of media, including voice, visual, and data. The system should respond 
quickly and also be distributed. Therefore, the interface has to be easy and 
friendly. Finally, such a system must "learn" so that it can reconfigure itself 
and become even better in promoting high-value collaboration throughout 
different levels of the company. 
There is clearly a mutually reinforcing relationship developing between 
Global Technology Strategy and information systems. Certainly, there are some 
obvious impacts, including closer links with other parts of the enterprise, en-
hanced speed and accuracy in decision making, broader types of communica-
tion, a growing need for new skills, and a build-up of the corporate "memory" 
in innovation. Moreover, in the longer term, as information technology itself 
becomes more ubiquitous, accessible, multifaceted, and flexible, perhaps at 
some point a significant threshold will be reached. Information technologies per 
se may actually accelerate the development of Global Technology Strategy 
toward Levels V and VI by offering easier pathways for disseminating diverse 
incentives for continuously accessing innovative capabilities. 
THE "SIMULTANEOUS CORPORATION" 
Technology Strategy, like modern strategy generally, is more distributed and 
more complex than ever before. It is a part of a dynamic, changing network con-
sisting of the R&D facilities, other units within an enterprise, separate firms, 
and other kinds of institutions. The relationships and linkages characterizing 
such a network can be stable or fragile and strong or weak. They are local, 
domestic, and global in scope. In effect, there are also countless on/off switches 
in this structural maze. The entire network often acts like some kind of organic 
structure that is continually evolving and changing (Figure 10). Such an entity 
also characterizes what is termed the Simultaneous Corporation. 
High-level decision making in this enterprise reflects a quality termed 
"Simultaneity," which encompasses the ability of a large company to exploit 
market power, economies of scale and scope, and vertical integration along with 
an ability to have high-tech entrepreneurialism and smaller kinds of units in ord-
er to have variety, creativity, and risk-taking. Today, alert technology-intensive 
companies are increasingly aiming toward such a complex blend. 
Figure 10. 
New Linkages for Technology Development 
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Such a system also requires a certain amount of professionalism and targeted 
systems and procedures. Technology decisions are systematically reviewed 
where appropriate. Skills, such as leadership and support from the top, are also 
required. Special interfunctional projects often stimulate innovation in such a 
situation. Task forces can manage and monitor the spider's web of relationships 
that are created. Culture is a key vehicle for management to bind diverse consti-
tuencies in an adaptive and flexible way. External training is desirable in order 
to expand managers' mindsets. Complex and sophisticated information systems 
might be used. But, thus far, though a key threshold may be in the wings, infor-
mation technology is still an undeveloped opportunity in Global Technology 
Strategy. 
There is a paradox required for practicing Global Technology Strategy effec-
tively. On the one hand, technological innovation is the apparent focus. But de-
pending on classical corporate R&D and a technocracy of experts is hazardous. 
Expertise and specialists are not enough in this new world. The earlier tradition 
in strategic management, known as "general management", which emphasizes 
people, leadership, and viewing the company as a kind of a living organic being, 
is just as important now. The general management tradition, therefore, albeit in 
a very different way, is being resuscitated. 
This startling development is due to an exigency for a management apparatus 
based on the assumptions and strengths that underlie the emergence of the 
Simultaneous Corporation and Global Technology Strategy as major and distin-
guishing features of the modern competitive environment—the key driving force 
being an overpowering and growing strategic necessity for corporations to ac-
cess innovative capabilities in diverse ways on a continuing and high-priority 
basis. 
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The Division of Labor Among Universities, 
Government and Industry in Supporting Innovation 
in the United States 
• 
A. GEORGE SCHILLINGER 
Polytechnic University Brooklyn, New York 
INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, both universities and industrial organizations operate large-
ly independent of the federal government. While both must obey federal laws (for 
example, regulations against racial discrimination in hiring and against certain 
kinds of environmental pollution), the federal government cannot prescribe or 
even guide any of their activities, including whether and how they should con-
tribute to technological innovation. Rather, each institution contributes to the in-
novative process by pursuing its own distinct objectives: the university pursues 
new knowledge and trains the labor force, industry strives to be an effective inno-
vator in order to survive and to compete with products and processes, and the fed-
eral government, through its many agencies and laboratories, does its own share 
of innovation, or provides funds and incentives for others to carry out the work. 
Despite these different objectives, the term "division of labor" in the title is in-
tended to imply that there is also a shared commitment in the relationships 
among the federal government, industry, and the universities in supporting and 
nurturing innovation. This "joint venture" reaches back to the early nineteen-
hundreds, but has never been as cooperative, intense, and diverse as it is today. 
This new initiative to cooperate can be attributed to a broadly held belief in the 
United States that for the United States to maintain or reestablish its competitive 
position in a number of technological markets worldwide, government, industry, 
and universities must reexamine past practices and policies and seek a more col-
laborative relationship that will encourage and support scientific discovery, tech-
nological development, and rapid commercialization in the national interest. 
An early but important example of such cooperation evolved from the Land-
Grant College Act of 1862. The Act granted approximately 100 square kilometers 
of federal land to every state for each of its two senators and several representa-
tives in Congress. The land was to be sold and the proceeds used to maintain a 
я 
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public college to teach "agriculture and the mechanic arts." Better farming 
methods had to be developed and, together with the mechanical arts (engineer-
ing), had to be taught to a growing rural population on the western frontier. Be-
sides teaching, these colleges maintained experiment stations, undertook scien-
tific research, and diffused their discoveries to farmers through agricultural 
extension programs. Eventually, private firms seeking to innovate in the areas of 
farm machinery, farm chemicals, animal nutrition, and seeds began to provide 
research grants to these state institutions. Close public-private cooperation over 
the years led to today's food production system where about 2 % of the labor force 
feeds the entire country and part of the world relatively inexpensively on a cons-
tantly diminishing land area. 
This effective pattern of agricultural cooperation illustrates the cultural context 
in which the present "division of labor" in the United States must be understood. 
The idea of the university as a service agency to society dates back to before the 
days of the land-grant colleges and has become ingrained in American higher 
education. Both state-supported and private universities think of themselves as 
serving the public either through their traditional roles in education and scholar-
ly research or through some ad hoc mission required of them from time to time. 
UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY COOPERATION 
Fifty years ago the scale and variety of academic R&D was extremely limited 
compared to today. Federal support for academic R&D soared from a few million 
dollars annually before World War II to about 9 billion by 1990. At the same time, 
the number and size of science and engineering departments increased signifi-
cantly. Scientific discoveries and technological innovation entered a period of ex-
plosive growth and R&D became institutionalized. As most major universities 
became "research universities," a new emphasis on graduate training emerged. 
Undergraduate education remained important, but now had to compete for 
resources. 
Accompanying this radical change, cooperative undertakings between univer-
sity and industry increased both in numbers and in form. While industry had 
treated universities only as a source of manpower and the source of expert con-
sultants, it now recognized them as a major source of high quality research. 
While professors remained dedicated to the high standards of excellence and in-
tegrity that scientific research required, they also became more aware of and sen-
sitive to the imperatives of the marketplace. The developing communication and 
cooperation between the two institutions benefitted both. 
While some scholars questioned the value of building research universities, it 
was broadly accepted that they had become essential contributors to the competi-
tive strength of the United States in science and in high technology fields. 
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Universities also recognized that the close relationship with industry need not 
threaten academic freedom or organizational independence, but could in fact 
lead to synergies in the work of both. As a wide ranging relationship between the 
two institutions developed, industry became a welcome new source of R&D 
funds at a time when the federal government's share in relative terms was declin-
ing. Today many corporations make large research grants to universities, usually 
without any strings attached. 
Some of the most rewarding relationships center on so-called liaison pro-
grams, which are now established at approximately forty universities and include 
almost three thousand corporations. The principal objectives of these programs 
are to enable industry to stay abreast of recent developments and directions in 
various areas of research; to establish communication and cooperation between 
faculty, staff, students and professionals in industry; and to foster long-term and 
in-depth relationships between universities and industry. For example, while few 
companies can afford to maintain extensive research facilities and staff for basic 
or exploratory research, many find it possible to sponsor such work at a universi-
ty. Graduate students who work on such projects and subsequently take jobs in 
industry are among the most effective means of transferring knowledge from 
universities to industry. 
The benefits of bringing together the perspectives, insights, and expertise of 
university and industrial investigators from many fields are also recognized by 
the federal government. Many federal funding sources encourage joint research 
proposals by academic and industrial researchers. On an increasing scale, the 
federal government provides funds for costly equipment and facilities for col-
laborative research. The National Science Foundation, for example, has had a 
major initiative establishing engineering research centers and industry research 
cooperative centers on university campuses. These centers have a formal but in-
dependent organization and a typical annual budget of 1 million or more. Here 
academic and industrial researchers can work together in interdisciplinary set-
tings on problems for which the academic or industrial setting alone would not 
suffice. 
COOPERATIVE R&D: INDUSTRIAL CONSORTIA 
Most industrial firms must overcome two major impediments to innovation: stee-
ply escalating costs of developing and producing the next generation of product 
after each level of scientific or technological breakthrough and a short supply of 
properly trained and skilled research personnel. This shortage is largely due to 
the competition for the limited number of Ph.D.s, as companies duplicate each 
other's research efforts. Some such duplication may be beneficial as alternative 
pathways are explored simultaneously, but on the whole this use of R&D 
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resources is not efficient from a national point of view, and large sums of R&D 
expenditures could be saved through shared research where appropriate. 
Until recently, however, corporations were unable to resolve the problems of 
shared research because anti-trust laws prohibited cooperation between firms. 
Originally anti-trust laws were intended to curb the growth of monopolies and 
other improper restraints on competition in free markets. But now, laws intended 
to protect the public in a rapidly growing domestic market handicap American 
firms competing in an interdependent global economy. As a result, new laws 
passed during the past decade attempt to ease anti-trust barriers for some indus-
tries and encourage firms to form cooperative ventures in what has been defined 
as the pre- competitive R&D phase of product development. As a result an in-
creasing number of industrial consortia are being formed to share the costs of the 
expensive initial research phase. 
For example, the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation 
(MCC) was among the first such consortia to be formed. MCC, an independent, 
for-profit R&D corporation, was launched with capital and research staffs from 
nineteen participating companies, including IBM, Digital Equipment Corpora-
tion, and Control Data. It now has its own research projects and full-time staff. 
Participating companies can sponsor one of MCC's projects, qualifying it for a 
license of the research results. Companies expect to recover 8 to 10 times their 
original investment. 
Cooperation, however, is carefully restricted to the earliest phase of the inno-
vation process. The development of the licensed research results into a commer-
cially viable product must be done by the companies acting in competition. 
Cooperative R&D ventures, therefore, can complement, but not substitute for, 
in-house R&D. 
As a rule the federal government does not financially support industrial 
research. The conclusions of a recent study are well understood: the U.S. govern-
ment usually does poorly when it attempts to specify research products that 
would be useful in commercial markets. By contrast, when the government itself 
is the customer, as in military or space projects, and has a professional staff with 
the requisite competences, it operates successfully as a purchaser of R&D. It also 
does well in sponsoring research with broad "pre-competitive" objectives. For 
example, the U.S. government recently set a precedent by making an outright in-
vestment in Sematech, an R&D consortium established with the well-defined, 
but industry-wide, mission of developing state-of- the-art semiconductor manu-
facturing processes. 
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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM GOVERNMENT 
NATIONAL LABORATORIES 
The government has long endeavored to transfer the results of its expensive and 
often esoteric research to industry for the benefit of the public. As early as 1962 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) established a tech-
nology utilization office to publicize and transfer its discoveries and develop-
ments in space technology to the private sector. While NASA's dramatic develop-
ments in remote sensing and other satellite technologies had a major impact on 
the commercial sector, the transfer of more mundane technologies turned out to 
be considerably more difficult. In general, federal to private technology transfer 
has not worked well for two major reasons. First, companies considered it a bad 
risk to invest in product development and marketing research for an invention 
that would be, because of its public support, in the public domain—such inven-
tions could not be protected by patents and thus would be available to all competi-
tors. Second, to identify a problem to fit an available solution was at best a 
difficult and inefficient process. 
Both of these hurdles are being lowered. In the 1980s Congress passed a series 
of laws to facilitate and encourage technology transfer from national laboratories 
to industry. The first such law, enacted in 1980, made technology transfer a 
specific mission of national laboratories and required them to establish a technol-
ogy transfer office to deal with this task. Addressing the intellectual property is-
sue, a 1984 law authorized many national laboratories to take title to their inven-
tions and to make exclusive licensing arrangements with private sector 
companies. The law also mandated that the scientists whose inventions were be-
ing licensed receive at least 15 % of the net income from these licenses. 
Subsequent laws continued to refine the technology transfer process. Pilot 
centers were established where national labs and private firms could undertake 
joint research and development involving the free exchange of data but not 
money. Through cooperative research agreements the government now may even 
guarantee the confidentiality of research results and give exclusive rights to all in-
tellectual property to participating firms. As experience builds, subsequent laws 
will further simplify rules and foster incentives for all parties in order to make 
technology transfer a smooth and rewarding process. 
But even with the new legal framework in place, change is slow. This is partly 
due to the very different organizational cultures and objectives of public and pri-
vate research organizations. Career scientists and engineers working in govern-
ment laboratories are civil servants and more like academic researchers in that 
they think of their work in a long time-frame. They want to publish their research 
results at the earliest moment, not considering it worthwhile to delay publishing 
until the corporation has secured its patents. Many of them also consider it un-
worthy to pursue R&D with commercialization as the only object. 
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On the positive side, perhaps the most important lesson for increasing the 
likelihood of successful technology transfer has been that the earlier cooperation 
in the research process begins, the greater the chance for success. Both parties 
develop a shared understanding of the work as it proceeds and there are no com-
munications barriers. Also, commercial applications often do not have the same 
stringent requirements as space or military applications. Meeting 25 % of the fed-
eral technical specifications may be more than adequate for the corporate partner 
to start commercializing a new product for the civilian market. The final product 
that ultimately complies with full federal specifications may have obscured its 
market potential and may also be much too costly to make. 
In sum, industrial consortia and technology transfer programs are beginning to 
show reasonable progress, but patience is still needed to work out the details. 
However, most people familiar with these relatively recent experiments are 
generally optimistic about their future. 
MAINTAINING THE SKILLS OF THE TECHNICAL WORK FORCE 
While successful innovation depends on all managerial functions in the firm, 
scientists and engineers are among the principal participants in the process. 
There were more than 4.6 million employed scientists and engineers in the Unit-
ed States in 1986, the number having approximately doubled every ten years since 
the mid-1960s. Of these, more than 1.2 million were engaged, at least part-time, 
in R&D (800,000 full-time equivalent). With research and development institu-
tionalized worldwide, a growing pool of R&D professionals is increasing the rate 
of scientific discovery and technological change. 
The implications of these developments are clear. Assuming an active profes-
sional life of 35-40 years and accepting recent findings that the half life of 
knowledge and skills in engineering disciplines is in the range of 2.5 - 7.5 years, 
one must conclude that technical obsolescence may threaten the livelihood of a 
majority of scientists and engineers, as well as the survival of companies and the 
competitive strengths of nations. 
To deal with these challenges, a complex institutional network has gradually 
developed in the United States. It consists of universities, government, and indus-
try as well as commercial training organizations, professional societies and other 
groups. Together, albeit with an untidy division of labor, they provide career-
long opportunities for extending, up-dating, and improving the knowledge and 
skill of scientists and engineers. The means employed in this continuing educa-
tion of the work force range from the traditional degree programs at leading 
universities and short courses tailored to the specific needs of a corporate staff 
to televised lectures via satellites to industrial locations nationwide. 
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While many agencies of the federal government make use of continuing educa-
tion programs, the government itself does not provide leadership for maintaining 
and developing a high quality system. Rather, the federal government's support 
comes indirectly through the large sums of money it appropriates for R&D to 
mission- oriented agencies (such as NASA), which usually include funds for 
education and training. The demand and expenditures for continuing education 
has been steadily increasing since the 1950s. According to one estimate, in 1983 
industry spent 30 billion on education and training while the federal government 
spent 10 billion. 
Universities are preeminent in providing continuing education in a variety of 
ways. For the convenience of working scientists and engineers, they routinely 
schedule advanced degree programs in the late afternoon and evening. An in-
creasing number of universities also televise classes live to specially equipped 
classrooms at industrial locations that have two-way voice communication. Best 
known is Stanford University's pioneering effort in televising its courses to Sili-
con Valley companies. 
Revolutionizing segments of the continuing education system is the National 
Technological University, which offers Master's degree programs in engineer-
ing, management, and computer science. NTU contracts almost forty universi-
ties to beam a selection of their courses, day after day, via satellites to Fort Col-
lins, Colorado, where NTU's transponder then retransmits these courses to over 
160 corporations nationwide. NTU provides this service for a basic fee plus tui-
tion. It also advises the company on the telecommunications equipment it needs, 
and it serves as the academic administrator on behalf of the participating univer-
sities. Without ever leaving his place of work, a graduate of NTU could have 
qualified for his degree by taking courses at the Universities of Arizona, Min-
nesota, and Maryland. 
Industry, of course, is the principal consumer of continuing education. Corpo-
rations use a wide range of suppliers, program styles, and organization for their 
programs. Some large companies, such as IBM, publish elaborate catalogues 
listing hundreds of educational opportunities each year; others provide no sup-
port at all. Many special programs are organized by the companies themselves. 
Prominent among these are courses incorporating advanced research results and 
taught by their leading researchers. These courses can be as advanced as graduate 
courses at leading universities and have the added value of including the latest 
discoveries or innovation in the field. In fact a large science- and technology-
intensive corporation, such as AT&T Bell Laboratories, may offer enough unique 
courses in a new field to qualify for a state license to offer an advanced degree. 
Companies, however, usually elect not to do so, as education is not what industry 
does best. Most companies depend on a competent, well-functioning system of 
external sources and avoid competing with universities in order not to weaken 
them. 
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INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
It would appear from the above that the United States has a piecemeal and ad hoc 
way of making decisions affecting innovation and industrial policy issues. This 
has been and continues to be the case. There was an extensive public debate in 
the 1980s about whether the United States should adopt an "industrial policy" 
similar to those of Japan and Korea, i.e. adapting its governmental structure in 
order to distinguish among industrial sectors and corporations, supporting one 
and restraining another, in an effort to strengthen the innovative technological 
capability as well as the overall performance of the national economy. Propo-
nents of such an industrial policy argued it would make the United States more 
competitive if, among other measures, the federal government, like the Japanese, 
selectively subsidized innovative high-tech growth industries, and through tax 
laws, tariffs and other measures helped either to modernize or to accelerate the 
collapse of mature industries with obsolete technologies and inefficient produc-
tion processes. They further argued that the economy cannot depend on market 
forces alone to guide investment into desirable areas of technological innovation 
of national interest, for even venture capital may be averse to investing in R&D 
with high potential payoff if the risks of failure are too high. 
While the United States does not have a coherent industrial policy, in the past 
it has indirectly promoted certain industrial sectors. Encouraging the develop-
ment of railroads and airlines, subsidizing water for the West, establishing the 
space program, and passing environmental legislation have clearly affected 
selected industrial sectors in each instance. More recently the Department of 
Defense has aided the semiconductor industry through investments, research, 
and procurement contracts. The federal government has also prevented certain 
large companies, such as Lockheed and Chrysler, from going bankrupt when it 
would have resulted in a major loss to the technological resources of the country. 
Also, in times of crises, such as the depression in the 1930s and during World 
War II, federal bureaucracies did acquire rule-making and prosecutory powers 
which were equivalent, at least temporarily, to what we consider today to consti-
tute an industrial policy. 
Those opposed to formulating a comprehensive industrial policy argue that it 
could not be designed in a way to guarantee an overall improvement of the U.S. 
competitive position. They believe business decisions are best left to the corpora-
tions, where people are much closer to the details of the market in which they 
work. In other words, market mechanisms are preferable to the centralized impo-
sition of rules based on objective rational analysis, technological studies, and 
professional judgement by a bureaucracy. This preference derives from a deep-
seated preference of the American electorate for the Federal government to inter-
vene as little as possible in the citizens' affairs more than from a negative evalua-
tion of the analytical ability and general competence of the federal bureaucracy. 
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This preference extends not only to putting the market above government deci-
sions, but also to preferring legislation to administrative policy-making. 
Pressed for a more precise definition, one might say the federal government 
does have a de facto industrial policy considering the aggregate of separate pieces 
of legislation by Congress and the administrative decisions implemented by the 
various cabinet departments and regulatory agencies at different times in 
response to different objectives or exigencies. What this aggregate of policies 
lacks in coherence and consistency it gains in differentiation and diversity. In 
many ways this diversity is its strength. 
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Barriers to Privatization in Hungary 
MIHÁLY LAKI 
MTA Institute of Economics 
All political parties in the new Hungarian Parliament have declared their support 
for a new economic order based on the dominance of private ownership. The 
Hungarian government has also proclaimed its willingness to reduce the share of 
the state sector. Accordingly, the governments economic program states: "One of 
the central elements of our economic policy is the permanent and vigorous de-
velopment of private ownership and of private initiative, the permanent protec-
tion and development of the private sector and... to diminish the weight of the 
oversized administration."1 
Does this mean that if the government possessed sophisticated techniques for 
privatization, the dominance of the private sector could be achieved in Hungary 
in a relatively short period of time? Indeed, this is the essence of the present polit-
ical debate about privatization, as the opposition blames the government for us-
ing inefficient methods for privatization and for the delay in presenting workable 
privatization programs. 
There is no doubt that political forces and the present government play a deci-
sive role in the development of the Hungarian private sector. Yet the speed of 
privatization (measured in the yearly change of the private sector's share in the 
overall economy) is also influenced by non-institutionalized social forces. 
This paper will cover some of these social forces, namely the barriers to 
privatization: physical, financial, ideological, and educational. There are feed-
backs and trade-offs between these factors, of course, but we do not yet have 
enough empirical and analytical results to present them. Several examples from 
Western Europe show that these barriers even have a remarkable impact in the 
1
 A Nemzeti Megújhodás Programja, (Program of the National Renewal) Budapest, Sept, 
1990. pp. 13. 
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privatization processes in market economies. Compared to the West, Eastern 
Europe must pay much more attention to these barriers and brakes, because the 
investment activity and institutional framework followed from the rules of the 
centrally planned economy. 
PHYSICAL BARRIERS 
In Hungary, setting up new private firms is hampered by a shortage of machinery, 
equipment, raw materials, and services. For example, buying the small tractors, 
animal feeding technologies, and transport equipment needed for household 
plots and small farms is very difficult. This situation is identical in several other 
industrial branches, such as construction trade. 
Another important impediment to privatization is the uselessness under the 
new political circumstances of many fixed assets owned by legal and illegal pri-
vate entrepreneurs. The brilliant technical solutions and forced innovations.2 
produced by the actors of the second economy are often not competitive in a mar-
ket economy. Excellent machinery and equipment created and produced by the 
workers and engineers of illegal firms were highly efficient and profitable in the 
socialist economy. If foreign entrepreneurs replace inefficient state-owned firms 
as the market competitors, the advantages of the relatively higher efficiency of 
the second economy may diminish quickly. 
The infrastructure of these businesses is susceptible to similar tendencies. 
Many in the second economy are successful because they illegally use the (albeit 
unsophisticated) infrastructure of the state-owned firms where they are em-
ployed. They conduct business on their telephones, use their electricity, water 
and gas, take part in extensive training courses organized by these firms, and use 
their libraries and information networks. The new small business class has no tel-
ephone lines and must make a significant investment for the extension of gas and 
electricity lines. Due to high prices, they also cannot engage in information net-
works. Indeed, the miserable infrastructure will hamper new Hungarian en-
trepreneurs for decades. 
The public recognizes these physical barriers to privatization. However, most 
state-owned assets can and will be sold easily and without any additional investment. 
In such instances, the new owner can quickly make a large profit. This form of 
privatization is also very advantageous for the employees of these firms, because in 
a majority of cases they may convert their local knowledge into capital.3 
2
 Laki, Mihály: Kényszerített innováció. (Forced innovations) Szociológia 1984-85/ 
No. 1-2. pp. 45-53. 
3
 Neumann, László: Small Business Off-Shoots from Large Manufacturers - A Privatiza-
tion Option. Acta Oeconomica Vol,42. No. 1-2. pp. 23-41 (1990). 
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These considerations, though, are only valid in some cases, as some state-
owned fixed assets are unmarketable. There are two sub-groups in this category. 
The first and the smallest is the propaganda and prestige projects of the com-
munist regime, which were useless and irrational even in a centrally-planned 
economy. In the second group, there are fixed assets following the logic of the 
centrally-planned economy: machinery and equipment able to consistently 
produce output on a large scale for a long time is either impossible or very costly 
to adapt into new product lines because of their inflexible technology and rigid 
organization. For example what will happen to the large, centralized clothing fac-
tories which can only produce a large quantity of outmoded clothes? 
There are also activities in which the costs of privatization to the state exceed 
its benefits.4 In some cases the expected income of the buyer will not cover the 
investment costs of transformation and, therefore, he or she will not buy the as-
sets offered by the privatization agency. In this case, as well as the cases when 
these negative incomes will accumulate, a large part of these assets will remain 
in the hands of the state. This will also be true in cases when specialized and 
profit-oriented agencies or companies are responsible for privatization. (In these 
cases the share of unsalable assets is expected to be much smaller than the 
bureaucrat's.) 
No one knows how big the share of these unsalable "bubbles" of state property 
will be. In the recent privatization measures, one could distinguish between those 
parts of the firm that the buyer really wanted and those parts that were obtained 
merely because they were linked to the desirable pieces. Buyers will make this 
kind of selection in the future as well. A possible consequence is that the share 
of unsalable assets will increase and, therefore, the speed of the privatization 
process will decrease. 
FINANCIAL BARRIERS 
The second frequently discussed barrier to privatization is the lack of capital. Es-
timates reveal that the population's savings represents only 10-20% of the value 
of Hungarian state property. This ratio illustrates the seriousness of the monetary 
barriers to rapid privatization. However, to accurately define real demand, we 
have to measure the stock of property owned by the population as well. We must 
consider the property of households not only as a source of investment, but 
perhaps as an attractive goal of investment as well. 
A large percentage of a Hungarian household's property consists of real estate 
(i.e., houses, second residencies, land). Their property also may consist of sig-
nificant gold and hard currency reserves, and considerable forint savings. Hun-
4
 Except the case of capital with negative price. 
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garian and foreign investors buy and sell these goods in addition to state bonds, 
stocks, and fixed assets offered for privatization. These markets are already large 
and the number of transactions is growing constantly. One reason for this is the 
negative savings rate. Although holding hard currency is a very profitable, low 
risk investment because of the growing difference between the Hungarian and 
West European inflation rates, buying real estate is also advantageous and of 
limited risk, since the rise in real estate prices is higher than the rate of inflation. 
In this market situation, Hungarians and foreigners will buy state property or 
will start new businesses only if the expected profit is higher than in real estate 
or hard currency markets. Therefore, liquid money and the population's savings 
will not automatically be invested into the state-owned fixed-assets or securities 
now floated by government, state-owned firms, and banks. If the rates of profit 
differ significantly, we can not exclude the possibility that part of the preferential 
loans for buying state property will go into the money and/or real estate markets. 
Another advantage of these markets is that transactions are based on well-
established and accepted rules. As few people know the rules of the stock and 
bond market, many people will buy hard currency or real estate even though the 
profit share is lower than purchasing state-owned assets. Even in the advanced 
capitalist countries few individuals are especially knowledgeable about invest-
ment activity, but there is a broad network of investment banks and brokerage 
agencies to serve people's investment needs. In Hungary the number of these 
banks and agencies has grown very rapidly, but their actual market share is mar-
ginal. Lacking expertise and hardware, the number of them will increase only 
gradually. So, the speed of privatization will also be regulated by the velocity of 
banking knowledge. 
IDEOLOGICAL BARRIERS 
Although the communist propaganda of the last four decades was totally ineffi-
cient in some respect, it was successful in linking itself to other traditions. The 
communist ideas of personal enrichment and acceptable degrees of social ine-
quality are deeply related to influential Hungarian ideologies, including ones that 
are conservative, right-wing, and middle-of-the-road. The relative popularity of 
these anti-capitalistic ideologies demonstrates that several social groups are not 
attracted to the aims and conditions of the market economy. We know from em-
pirical research that only a minority of the Hungarian population is oriented to 
success and upward mobility. Not only do traditions slow down the diffusion of 
the entrepreneurial spirit, but new political forces and personalities that declare 
anti-entrepreneurial sentiments and reservations do as well. A significant 
prejudice remains against the "middleman businesses" and other non-productive 
activities. In other cases the anti-capitalistic sentiment is combined with a 
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nationalist character. The representatives of these ideas do not argue directly 
against business activity, but they focus on the dangers of the growing influence 
of foreign capital. 
Although it would be misleading to underestimate the influence of political 
propaganda, an expanding entrepreneurial spirit has been more effectively un-
dermined by the negative effects of those already active Hungarian private ven-
tures (small legal and illegal businesses). As János Kornai wrote: 
"I am fully aware of how common it is to find private entrepreneurs who 
greedily want to make money hand over first, even by cheating their 
costumers or by defrauding the state. Instead of striving firmly and sober-
ly to establish their business for the years or decades to come, they con-
sider it their priority to make the largest profit on the shortest possible 
terms. This kind of entrepreneur forgoes productive investment and set-
tles instead for conspicuous, prodigal consumerism. Such entrepreneurs 
also tend to be impolite toward their costumers, and adopt a 'Take it or 
leave it' attitude akin to the high-hat behavior created by the shortage 
economy in the state sector. Together, these abuses turn public opinion 
against the private sector."5 
In short, the present behavior of several small firms is not a positive model. 
EDUCATIONAL BARRIERS 
The behavior characterized by Kornai is indeed a consequence of the superior 
market position of the seller, but the lack of entrepreneurial skill and knowledge 
has also played an important role in its diffusion. Some entrepreneurial skills can 
be acquired in schools, while others are attainable only through practical ex-
perience. Decades of socialism have not been favorable for the latter. 
Institutionalized teaching of market skills did not exist in the communist era. 
Instead, public education spread knowledge applicable only to centrally-planned 
economies: a huge number of plan-statisticians, purchasing agents, and, of 
course, apparatchiks were trained during this period. 
In some cases, the structure of the curricula was harmful from the point of view 
of entrepreneurship. In secondary schools and in vocational training, there was 
no instruction in business fields. It was impossible to learn marketing in technical 
universities and high schools, and marketing courses were not even formally 
adopted at the Budapest University of Economies until the late 1960s. 
5
 Kornai, János: The Road to a Free Economy. Shifting from a Socialist System: The Ex-
ample of Hungary. W.W. Norton and Company New York London, 1991. pp. 55. 
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The practical experience or learning-by-doing cases can be considered a 
shrinking process. This process started with the Holocaust, continued with the 
deportation of the Germans after the Second World War, and had a new impetus 
in 1956. It was impossible to learn entrepreneurial skills because of the lack of 
experienced indigenous entrepreneurs. The transmission of familiar traditions 
was often interrupted and it was impossible to collect entrepreneurial knowledge 
from abroad. 
The lack of understanding markets and entrepreneurial skills will limit the 
speed of privatization for a long time. The appearance of foreign investors and 
joint ventures on the Hungarian market, the spread of courses on entrepreneurial 
skills, and the pressure of market competition will permanently increase the en-
trepreneurial knowledge of the Hungarian population-but not suddenly. 
INTERESTS AND COUNTERINTERESTS 
Experts waiting for rapid progress toward a market economy in Hungary regard 
the second economy as an effective illustration of the population's entrepreneuri-
al skills. They argue that in a business-friendly economic environment, actors in 
the second economy will quickly start up a large number of small businesses. Is 
it really obvious that the experience people received in the second economy will 
translate into entrepreneurial knowledge? If the answer is yes, are they interested 
in such a transformation? 
The second economy consists of economic activities and organizations with 
different aims from the first economy. These activities are common in one 
respect: they oppose the promised Utopias of the communists, who tried to ar-
range people into big organizations with no market contact. Just as entrepreneurs 
in market economies, people involved in second economy activities enter mar-
kets, sell and buy goods and services, and compare costs and benefits. This 
similarity supports the argument of those who see the development of the second 
economy as a result of the increase of the economic autonomy6 and the re-
emergence of civil society, which was part of the silent revolution against the 
communist regime7 in the last two decades in Hungary. Emphasizing a destruc-
tive character of the second economy, these experts also point out three charac-
teristics of the actors of the East European second economy. First, unlike 
Western businessmen, they do not expand their business activity and minimize 
6
 Juhász, Pál: Társadalmi csoportok együttműködése az első, a második és a harmadik 
ökonómiában. (Cooperation of different social groups in the first second and third 
economy) Fogyasztói Szolgáltatások 1981. No.4. 
7
 Kemény, István: The Unregistered Economy in Hungary, Soviet Studies, 1982. No.3. 
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investment activity. For example, they do not substitute labor with capital even if 
the return of capital is higher than of labor. 
A second characteristic of players in the second economy is that they operate 
within the state sector. As previously mentioned, this grants them attractive 
benefits. They pay no taxes and social security on the income resulting from their 
activities and part of their indirect costs is paid by state-owned firms. Another ad-
vantage of this integration is that their use of the informal "system of mutual 
help" within the big organizations means they can obtain inputs cheaper and easi-
er than on the market. 
The third characteristic of Eastern Europe's second economy artisans is that 
they do not compete on the market. As sellers they behave like monopolists. They 
collect orders and select among the buyers, and they are not cost-sensitive. 
The actor of the second economy who is not interested in expanding business 
activity, integrated into the state sector and able to avoid market competition also 
has a conservative character. He or she will change his or her business 
philosophy or strategy only if the alternative is much more profitable. In other 
words, he or she will become competitive and expand as an autonomous 
Western-type entrepreneur only if this decision results in higher income, more 
social security, and prestige. 
Under the conditions of the transitional period a significant number of these 
"conservative" actors will not be interested in starting a new, western-type busi-
ness. On the contrary, many of them are interested in maintaining their bargain-
ing power market share and influencing that obtained earlier in the second econo-
my. Ironically, this means that important forces in the silent denationalization in 
centrally-planned economies will hamper privatization processes in the post-
communist societies. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This list of obstacles shows that the speed of privatization is determined by a 
number of non-institutional factors. In sum, political planners are wrong if they 
estimate that only the techniques underpinning privatization determine the speed 
of the process. An effective privatization program is not only a package of regula-
tions, incentives, and preferences: it must also describe how we can overcome the 
impediments and bottlenecks of privatization. 
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Reflections Concerning the Recent Past 
and the Future of Hungarian Foreign Trade 
• 
Gyula Zeller 
Janus Pannonius University 
Writing a paper on Hungarian foreign trade relations used to be a simple task for 
any economist. Though Hungary experienced some shocks and basic changes in 
many areas of cooperation with the East Bloc countries, the general frameworks 
and patterns remained relatively clear and stable. In this world of almost Newto-
nian foreign trade mechanics, even the major disturbances seemed easy to fore-
cast. The major partners and the commodity patterns of our external trade 
reflected an apparently eternal structure. Being eternal, however, did not neces-
sarily mean being good and profitable. All East Europeans learned how to live 
with the problems of shortages, poor quality, delayed delivery, and delayed or 
almost forgotten payment obligations. They were also accustomed to trade 
without a strict measuring rod of real prices or calculable profitability. Hungari-
ans can be proud that their economists recognized these problems earlier than the 
economists of other CMEA countries, but recognition has never been enough to 
change something. In the maze of political power plays, economic rationality 
could hardly be a motivating factor for all of Hungary's partners. Of course in 
this respect, Hungarian companies were not very different from those in other 
East European countries. 
The political landslide of 1989-90 swept away all of the traditional political and 
economic structures in this part of the world. As a result, the newly democratic 
East European countries are striving to integrate themselves into the family of de-
veloped nations. They have realized that without fully accepting the ideas of the 
market economy, there is little chance of reaching this aim. Although the abstract 
idea of a market economy is clear and readily available in any textbook, the mar-
ket economies in the real world are surprisingly different. We must realize that 
in the market economies, there are divergent patterns of governmental 
philosophies, social traditions, institutional solutions, and legal frameworks; this 
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is easy to recognize by comparing the USA, Japan, Germany and Sweden. Hun-
garians must now decide whether to pursue one of these models or to create a new 
one. Because this decision has not yet been made, governmental measures, the 
parliamentary legislation, and foreign relations are full of contradictions. All of 
these things make the analysis of foreign trade a challenging process, full of sur-
prises and unpredictable events. 
IMPACT OF POLITICAL CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE ON TRADE 
The recent changes in Eastern Europe have had a major influence on Hungarian 
foreign trade in many ways. As the region's economic crisis resulted in shrinking 
market demand and the declining reliability of supplies, a major drop in both ex-
port and import performances became inevitable. In addition, Hungary had been 
accumulating trade surpluses against the Soviet Union and other countries of the 
region. Because of the lack of clear methods for settling liabilities, the govern-
ment was forced to intervene. It froze exports to the Soviet Union, narrowing the 
scope of viable solutions for most companies. Companies either had to find an 
escape route through the Western markets or to decrease, and perhaps eventually 
shut down, any further production. Surprisingly enough, Hungarian companies 
proved to be more flexible and successful than expected. The shift from Eastern 
to Western markets is reflected in Table 1. 
Last year when ruble payments still existed, total imports grew 4.1%, as non-
ruble imports (i.e. hard currency) increased by 19.5% and ruble imports dropped 
by 20.7%. Total imports increased at a significantly slower rate than most Hun-
garian economists had expected, especially considering the broad trade liberali-
zation. Ruble trade has ceased to exist and all importing and exporting is now 
conducted in hard currency. Comparing 1990 trade with different groups of coun-
tries, we find that Hungary's imports from CMEA countries declined by 11.7% 
(slower than the ruble import), imports from EEC countries increased by 11.4%, 
and imports of EFTA countries rose by 15.9%. Not only have these trends con-
tinued in the first three months of this year, but they seem to be getting stronger. 
Exports have also shown several signs of favorable reorientation. Last year ru-
ble exports dropped by 26.4% and hard currency exports increased by 25.1%. To-
tal exports rose by 5.7 %. Looking at exports to Western Europe, it is easy to real-
ize that the growing importance of EEC (+37.1%) and EFTA (+19.1%) regions 
could compensate for the decrease in CMEA (-19.3%) exports. These tendencies 
have also been gaining further strength in this year's first quarter. 
In general we can state: the Hungarian economy has been showing surprising 
flexibility in reorienting its export and import trade. These trends are in accord 
with the general economic policy and help fulfill the balance of payment targets. 
The country's high indebtedness and the relatively high debt service ratio make 
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Table 1 
External trade by groups of foreign exchange and groups of countries 
(current prices) 
Year, Rouble Non-Rouble T n t o l с у р A Of which 
month accounts accounts lOlUl C I V 1 L A EEC EFTA 
Imports (Billion Forints) 
1987 207.8 236.2 444.0 216.1 111.3 49.4 
1988 199.7 261.2 460.9 205.0 118.7 57.1 
1989 200.8 322.7 523.5 207.4 151.8 72.2 
1990 159.3 385.6 544.9 185.2 169.1 83.6 
1991 
J—M 
— — 
110.4 23.1 48.3 22.7 
Corresponding period of previous year= =100.0 
1990 79.3 119.5 104.1 89.3 111.4 115.9 
1991 
J - M 
— — 
108.5 78.4 129.0 156.8 
Exports (Billion Forints) 
1987 211.5 221.1 432.6 227.9 87.1 36.4 
1988 204.9 287.4 492.3 227.6 111.1 48.5 
1989 215.9 355.4 571.3 238.9 141.8 60.8 
1990 158.9 444.7 603.6 192.7 194.5 72.4 
1991 
J—M — — 152.5 25.8 71.4 27.0 
Corresponding period of previous year= =100.0 
1990 73.6 125.1 105.7 80.7 137.1 119.1 
1991 
J—M 
— — 134.3 82.4 163.6 187.4 
Source: Statisztikai havi közlemények. Bp. 1991. KSH. 
the balance of payments and, consequently, the foreign trade balance a central is-
sue. Last year there was a current balance of payment surplus of 130 million. In 
order to appreciate this performance it should be mentioned that the 1989 balance 
of payment deficit was 1.4 billion and that before 1990 the last year with positive 
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the revenues from tourism exceeded the 1.4 billion interest burden of Hungary's 
convertible debts. At the same time, 2.5 billion in new borrowing was needed to 
meet capital claims. Gross convertible debt reached 21 billion in 1990 and the net 
indebtedness of the country totaled 16 billion. In spite of having the highest per 
capita debt in Eastern Europe, Hungary has been able to manage its debt. 
If we were naive positivists, based on the external trade indicators of the last 
five quarters we could easily forecast a very promising and shiny future for the 
Hungarian economy. The only question is whether or not these predictions would 
have a solid basis. The second part of this paper will concentrate on some of the 
problematic features of Hungary's external trade that make accurate forecasting 
nearly impossible. 
COLLAPSE OF THE CMEA 
First, CMEA and its system of payments no longer exist. As a result, there will 
be bottlenecks in exporting to East European countries because of their hard cur-
rency liquidity problems. The related problem of the near collapse of Hungarian-
Soviet trade may prove to be a ticking time bomb. In the first quarter of 1991, 
Soviet exports to Eastern Europe added up to 2 billion while imports from these 
countries barely reached 0.5 billion. This shows that the Soviets are trying to 
keep their balance of payments manageable by accumulating more and more hard 
currency from Eastern Europe. This behavior might serve as an indirect way of 
tapping Western aid to Eastern Europe. At the same time, these small countries 
are forced to export on credit in order to avoid a major recession and rocketing 
unemployment. Though the statistical data and the highly optimistic statements 
on our foreign trade administration speak of a very quick and successful shift 
from Soviet markets, the situation is far from rosy. 
The bulk of Hungary's problems emerging from the collapse of the CMEA, es-
pecially with regard to Soviet trade, have not really been solved. What Hungary 
has been experiencing is no more than the first layer of serious trouble. There are 
several signs of this; three of them are: 
• In the second half of 1990, Hungary reached a more than 1 billion ruble sur-
plus in Soviet trade. This surplus does not help solve Hungary's trade 
problems, but it is simply an irrational way of granting very risky credits. As 
a result this practice must stop in 1991. 
• The real effects of Hungary's declining exports were cloaked behind the ac-
cumulating stocks of Hungarian companies. Although some experts esti-
mate these goods are worth hundreds of millions of dollars, they are hardly 
marketable anywhere except in the Soviet Union. This practice cannot con-
tinue very long. Moreover, Hungary must not forget that the favorable switch 
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from Soviet to Western markets was done by the rare competitive compa-
nies. The behavior of the best companies does not provide any guarantee for 
the behavior of the others. 
• Many Hungarian companies are bankrupt and have stopped paying their 
debts to other enterprises. This form of involuntary credit is called "queu-
ing". Nobody really knows what proportion of claims are enforceable and 
how many are irrecoverable. The present practice of non- payment simply 
spreads the problem of bankrupted companies over the whole economy. 
Sooner or later this misleading practice should end. 
OTHER EXTERNAL FACTORS INFLUENCING HUNGARY'S TRADE 
The second problem in Hungarian foreign trade is that during the last five quart-
ers, its performance was supported by some unusual occurrences. For example, 
Hungary gained some special allowances from EEC countries because of the re-
unification of Germany. As economic rationality regains its supremacy over po-
litical decisions, this special treatment will surely disappear and bring back the 
old problems of protectionism. The relatively low oil prices in the first quarter 
of 1991 represent another unexpected factor, as does the strengthening of the U.S. 
dollar, which helped ease the debt burden by more than 500 million. In long run 
we cannot count on such fortuitous incidents. 
The unified EC market in 1992 will pose a third difficulty for Hungary. 
Though the Hungarian government hopes to have some partnership agreement 
with the EEC, this agreement will be only an important framework. It will not 
provide Hungary with special advantages, but merely removes some disadvan-
tages. It will not change Hungary's standards, quality requirements, or technical 
level. No provision will allow poor quality, poorly marketed, and technically lag-
ging goods to succeed in the Western markets. It will not be the old CMEA mar-
ket where governmental agreements used to ensure that sooner or later products 
would be bought. In many respects the situation is very similar to Hungary's free 
trade agreement with EFTA. In a highly competitive environment, Hungary 
must remember important trade agreements are not enough, and it is not even 
enough to have a good product. Without marketing skills and financial coverage 
to make Hungary use them, success will be unattainable. 
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FUTURE DOMESTIC FACTORS INFLUENCING FOREIGN TRADE 
A fourth problem is the uncertainties in Hungary's foreign trade policy. Several 
signs prove this statement. For one, Hungary's financial administration and the 
trade administration seem to be in conflict over the future role of government in 
foreign trade. The former is determined to remove the subsidies, supports, and 
different forms of governmental intervention, while the latter largely wants to 
keep them. There are also signs of hesitation in the creation of new company 
forms in the foreign trade sector. The almost complete trade liberalization and 
the removal of legal obstacles has made foreign trade activities very attractive and 
profitable, causing the number of newly founded companies and entrepreneurs in 
this sector to mushroom. In two years their number has increased from several 
hundred to more than 15,000. Most are privately owned, and many operate with 
different international partners. They are successful, active, and very promising, 
but usually rather small. The fact that the big foreign trade companies have not 
even made the first steps in the direction of privatization seems to bring a major 
conceptual conflict within the government to the surface. 
Finally, some question marks exist concerning the future orientation of Hun-
gary. Foreign trade is tied to foreign political commitments. To find the way into 
European integration is one of those rare principles on which most Hungarians 
agree. But there are different views concerning the methods. Shall Hungary go 
alone or shall it form blocs with other countries in order to represent a larger po-
litical commitment? I do not think the economic rationality supports any special 
bloc-forming aspirations. I do not see what kind of major economic advantage 
would come from a Polish - Czechoslovakian - Hungarian joint effort. For Hun-
gary it may be very dangerous to be part of a bloc. The Polish and the Czechos-
lovakian problems are very different from Hungary's. Unlike Poland, Hungary 
has been paying her debts regularly, and Hungary is further ahead in creating a 
market economy than Czechoslovakia. Unless Hungary clarifies the differences 
with all potential partners, Hungary may risk losing all advantages. 
On the other hand, the idea of the so called Pentagonale (the regional accord 
with Italy, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Italy) seems to be much more promis-
ing. The partnership with Austria and Italy may bring Hungary technology, mar-
keting and management skills, and the possibility of cooperation on third 
markets. 
The introductory part of this paper tried to make clear that there are no Ar-
chimedean points in the evaluation of the recent past, present, and future of Hun-
garian foreign trade. All of these statements may have been wiped out by the time 
this text is published. Anyway, this subjective snapshot reflects only one of the 
many possible interpretations of the present situation, a point which should be 
considered during the discussion. 
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DISCUSSION 
During the ensuing discussion, Dr. Zeller made the following points: 
• Convertibility of the forint is important, as it would remove some of the re-
maining obstacles in foreign trade. However, because Hungary has limited 
hard-currency reserves, instituting convertibility now would not have the 
desired effects. 
• Although Hungarian technology lags behind the West, human development 
is also behind. An adjacent problem is the low capital absorption capacity of 
the economy which is partly due to the fact that changed all of Hungary's 
pluses to minuses and vice-versa. Hungarians have grown up in a very differ-
ent culture than that of the Western countries. 
• Where Hungary does have comparative advantages for export, there are no 
sufficient markets. Agricultural products is a good example. After the Hun-
garian government eliminates agricultural subsidies, Dutch milk will be 
cheaper on the domestic market. 
• Privatizing Foreign Trade Organizations (FTOs) sounds rational in the long-
term, especially as their patterns of management and innovation are not ones 
that should survive in a market economy. However, the government has a ra-
tional reason for maintaining some state control. Basically the government 
wants to prevent Hungarian goods from competing against each other on for-
eign markets. Another Hungarian argued that this was absurd, especially 
since the FTOs also still dominate imports. Instead, it is the anti- privatiza-
tion sentiment of the Ministry of International Economics that is preventing 
the privatization of the FTOs. 
ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT 
State Sector Initiatives 
for Improved Global Economic Competitiveness 
and Enhanced Quality of Life 
• 
L. DONALD SHIELDS 
California Council on Science and Technology 
Technology innovation is widely considered one of the essential driving forces 
behind economic and productivity growth. U.S. economists have agreed it ac-
counts for two-thirds to four-fifths of the United States' productivity growth since 
the 1930s. 
Over the past 10 years, U.S. state governments increasingly have taken leader-
ship roles in facilitating the technology innovation cycle: the process which leads 
from technology discovery to technology diffusion into commercial products, 
processes, and services. This technology innovation cycle is not a linear process. 
There are important interactions and feedback opportunities that lead to even 
more and improved innovations. To function effectively, this process must be dy-
namic with strong communication linkages among the work force and the organi-
zations involved. 
In the United States, the principal contributors to the technology innovation cy-
cle are science and technology based industries, public and private universities, 
and national laboratories. The differences in the mission and culture of these in-
stitutional sectors impede the speed and efficiency of interaction and communi-
cation between them. With an increasingly knowledge-based and rapid informa-
tion flow global economy, state governments recognize that future competiti-
veness depends on more effective linkages between these three entities. Acting on 
the principle that the governing body closest to the organizations involved typi-
cally is the most effective broker in achieving cooperative relationships, state 
governments have become proactive in trying to facilitate these linkages. 
Also, most small and medium size science and technology oriented industries 
have little continuing research capability beyond their initial developmental ac-
tivity. In a global economy, these organizations' continuing technical and busi-
ness health and vitality depend upon the regular upgrading of their products, 
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processes and services based on current state-of-the-art technical information 
and best business practices. 
Increasingly in the United States, individual states are serving as catalysts for 
technology innovations that are related to facilitating and maintaining economic 
competitive advantage for the states' businesses and industries. In this regard, a 
number of states support the following initiatives: 
• Collaborative basic and applied research activities between industries and 
universities 
• Technology transfer initiatives from universities to industries that encourage 
further industry applied research and development activities 
• Small business financial capital and business management assistance, in-
cluding sponsorship of technology incubators that often include in the same 
location: 
— Low-priced start-up space - Access to shared technical resources 
— Access to shared business facilities 
— Business management education and counseling 
— Introductions to financial capital resources 
• Technology diffusion or technology deployment programs providing off-
the-shelf technologies to assist small- and medium-size businesses and their 
work forces in a continuing quest to be competitive in productivity, quality, 
cost, flexibility, and timeliness for their customers. 
Essentially all 50 U.S. states now have at least one program designed to stimu-
late technology related economic development, with over 250 such programs na-
tionwide. 
CALIFORNIA PROFILE 
Before presenting two case-studies of California technology innovation pro-
grams, some comparative data will help place the state's many activities in per-
spective. For 1990: California's population was 29.8 million (12.0% of the U.S.); 
its gross state product (GSP) was 730 billion (13.2% of the U.S. GNP); and, 
research and development expenditures in the state totalled 30.1 billion (20.1% of 
all U.S. R&D expenditures). Over the years California has been a leader in 
science and technology innovations. Its strong public and private universities 
have been important resources for developing internationally prominent indus-
tries including aerospace, microelectronics, computers, communications, bi-
otechnology, high value-added services, and agriculture. Like the other states, 
California recognizes that for it and its residents to continue to prosper in an in-
creasingly competitive global economy, it must continue to facilitate technology 
discovery, development, and deployment. 
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CALIFORNIA COMPETITIVE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM (COMPTECH) 
The California Competitive Technology (Comptech) Program was created in 
1989 as a technology innovation initiative. Its mission is to facilitate the more 
rapid transfer of knowledge from research institutions to the private sector 
through an industry/ state matching grant program. In the long-term, Comptech 
aims to create and maintain quality private sector jobs within California and to 
advance the state's competitive strength in the world marketplace. Its motto is "In 
California, the goal is not just to invent the future, but also to manufacture it and 
sell it!" To date the Comptech program has combined 16 million from the state 
with 16 million of private sector funds to support 80 diverse projects involving 
faculty from 17 universities, 4 California-based national laboratories, 11 non-
profit organizations, and 94 California industries. An example of a Comptech 
collaborative project is revolutionary rice. 
REVOLUTIONARY RICE 
Even though rice is one of the most important international agricultural com-
modities, its production methods have not changed significantly over 70 centu-
ries in terms of its large water requirements. Furthermore, traditional rice growth 
also is susceptible to pests and vulnerable to weeds, which in recent times has re-
quired substantial herbicide and pesticide use. As a result, agro-chemicals 
present in water run-off from traditional rice fields contaminate rivers, endanger-
ing fish and fish reproduction. 
A project entitled, "Agro-chemical-Free Rice Production" is a joint-venture 
between an agro-business organization (PureHarvest, Inc.), a public university 
(faculty and students at the University of California, Davis), and the state of 
California (Comptech program). This Comptech collaborative project includes: 
• The development of new agro-technical methods, use of tested varieties of 
rice seedlings, and, ultimately, genetically engineered rice seedlings to grow 
rice in ways that challenge traditional methods used for rice production 
• The integration of rice physiology, breeding, genetics, and biotechnology 
with a new process for growing rice 
• A process for growing rice that includes initially planting rice seedlings be-
low 2 inches of earth with no water flooding 
In this project, a special weeding technology is used, and the germination 
process continues using 25 % less water than traditional methods without herbi-
cides or pesticides. To date tests on rice seeds (100,000-150,000 varieties exist) for 
seedling vigor are complete; productivity of approximately 7,000 lbs per acre is 
now comparable to rice grown by traditional methods. Automatic weeding and 
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systems control features are being refined, and gene splicing experiments to 
produce higher levels of seedling vigor have begun. 
This highly promising and synergistic project between a small, entrepreneurial 
agro-business firm and university research faculty and students is funded by Pure-
Harvest Inc. (118,000) and the State of California (199,000 - Comptech grant). 
MANUFACTURING QUALITY ENHANCEMENT 
AND WORK FORCE DEVELOPMENT 
In a rapidly changing global economy, product lines, manufacturing processes, 
and personnel services and responsibilities often change within organizations. 
New technology developments frequently are factors in these changes and they 
often require work force retraining. In the United States, the states are assuming 
cooperative responsibility with business and industry to provide such opportuni-
ties for work force development. In California, the State Department of Com-
merce, the California Community Colleges, and the State Employment Training 
Panel are cooperating with California business organizations to provide these op-
portunities. An example of this cooperative program is the California Aerospace 
Supplier Improvement Program (CalSIP). 
CALSIP 
The quality of a major manufacturing company's (hereafter referred to as a prime 
contractor) products is directly related to the quality of the components which 
make up its products. In the United States, a significant percentage of such com-
ponents are provided by smaller companies (hereafter referred to as suppliers). 
Large aerospace companies and their suppliers represent an important example 
of this relationship, with suppliers providing approximately 50% of end-product 
components. 
Thirty percent of California manufacturing is aerospace or aerospace related. 
The state has the largest number of major aerospace companies in the United 
States. Ten of these organizations have joined forces with nine suppliers, labor 
representatives, the state's 107 member community college system, the State Em-
ployment Training Panel, and the State Department of Commerce to develop Cal-
SIP. This program provides training in total quality management (TQM) 
philosophy, principles, and procedures. The training covers four topics: TQM 
philosophy, statistical process control, just-in-time inventory systems, and team 
work and communications skills 
The program includes four, eight-hour seminars designed for supplier owners 
and top managers which provide an overview of TQM and other skills. An on-site 
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program—expected to average 120 hours of instruction including on-the-job 
training—is customized to meet each suppliers individual needs. 
The state of California covers much of the training cost, with some cost-
sharing by the participating supplier firms. The training instructors are certified 
to present the curriculum by meeting standards adopted by representatives of the 
CalSIP Advisory Panel (prime contractors, supplier representatives and labor 
representatives). 
The stimulus for developing and implementing the CalSIP program is the issue 
of economic survival for the organizations involved. In this regard, the following 
factors are important: 
• With the end of the Cold War, decreases in federal defense spending are an-
ticipated 
• Increasing international competition for space and commercial aerospace 
markets is expected 
• Prime contractors are reducing their supplier base 
• In this environment, total quality management and the use of related tools 
such as statistical process control are keys to survival for aerospace suppliers 
It is anticipated that suppliers who participate in the CalSIP program can 
expect: 
• Reductions in costs through less rework, shorter process time, and improved 
processes 
• Better product quality by controlling the process and by doing more than just 
meeting particular specifications 
• Increased business from prime contractors - suppliers higher quality 
products mean lower costs to prime contractors 
• Greater competitiveness in entering new markets 
California has committed 7 million to this program for its first six months of 
operation. In January 1991, 6,000 initial notices about the CalSIP program were 
sent to aerospace supplier companies. There have been 650 inquiries and to date 
over 100 companies are involved in the first workshops and on-site training ac-
tivities. Many more participant companies are anticipated as this program con-
tinues. 
CONCLUSION 
The two California case studies discussed above are representative of a large and 
increasing number of U.S. state initiatives directed to facilitate the use of technol-
ogy discovery, technology development, and technology deployment to enhance 
a state's global economic competitiveness and, consequently, to advance the stan-
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dard of living and quality of life of its citizens. Most of these efforts involve an 
active and energetic collaboration of business and industry, educational institu-
tions, labor organizations, government leaders, and government agencies in es-
tablishing meaningful linkages among themselves. The most successful of these 
ventures are those strongly driven by the needs of business and industry. 
DISCUSSION 
Most of the questions probed for more detail about the genesis and development 
of the California Council on Science and Technology. Dr. Shields explained that 
the impetus for the council came out of the business community, which was con-
cerned that the state's R&D resources needed to be better used. After the state 
took these concerns to the universities, it became clear that the state had a role 
to play in promoting links between educational institutions and private firms. 
Responding to a comment that basic research scientists demand absolute free-
dom to choose topics, Dr. Shields noted that too often the problem is that basic 
researchers in universities are not aware of the needs of industry. The California 
Council brings these two groups together to exchange information and discuss 
problems, after which university researchers still have the choice on whether to 
get involved in the problems of industry. 
The California Council is most successful in advising the state government on 
policies which affect science and technology (such as regulatory and tax poli-
cies), in initiating collaborative projects between public and private institutions, 
and in sustaining these projects through monitoring and careful oversight. Role 
of Government in Promoting Technical Innovations. 
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Role of the Government in Promoting Technical 
Innovations 
• 
FERENC NÁDASDI AND ISTVÁN DÁNYI 
Ministry of Industry and Trade 
INTRODUCTION 
Innovation1 has become the most important factor in social and economic de-
velopment during the past decades. It is important to remember that the process 
of industrial innovation (illustrated in Chart 1) is not a one-way street, but a cons-
Chart 1. 
The process of industrial innovation 
1
 Innovation is a broader concept than technical innovation. Considering the subject of 
this presentation, we are going to deal with technical (industrial) innovation, which has 
the following OECD definition: "Innovation is defined as comprising those technologi-
cal, industrial, commercial or other steps which lead to the successful marketing of new 
manufactured products and/or to the commercial use of technically new processes or 
equipment. "Policies for the Stimulation of Industrial Innovation," Analytical Report, 
Vol. П, O.E.C.D., Paris, 1978. 
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tant interdependence of innovations and markets. However, the final goal is 
always to introduce a new product onto the market. This can occur either by soci-
ety demanding ever newer products or by society replacing its former needs with 
newer means. Transistors and computer chips are good examples of an innovation 
gaining a much wider currency than originally planned. 
As most states and governments have recognized the importance of technical 
innovation, they give eminent support to scientific research and technical de-
velopment, and regard their control as one of their priorities. In these countries 
the intentions and even investments are quite high, but the results vary greatly. 
While the OECD countries are very successful in the field of industrial innova-
tions, countries with similar levels of commitment are not. Hungary is one of the 
poor students and change is clearly necessary. Whether Hungary comes out of its 
present predicament depends on how quickly and exactly the problems can be 
diagnosed and whether an effective remedy can be found. 
INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION IN HUNGARY 
What was the gravest error of the former Hungarian regime in industrial innova-
tion? Its biggest mistake was denying the necessity of private property; conse-
quently, fundamentally limiting property's forms of existence. It also underesti-
mated the role of the individual and put heavy constraints on his interests. These 
errors must be grasped clearly. This also explains why the transition to a market 
economy is so sluggish in the former socialist countries.2 Now Hungary must 
perform well in an area that used to be forbidden. 
Chart 2 shows the interdependence of industrial innovation, the government, 
and the business environment. On this basis, Hungary's situation can be charac-
terized relatively well. The starting point of technical innovation is scientific dis-
coveries that can be used to manufacture new, competitive products. In countries 
that manage technical innovation efficiently, the most important players in the 
field are universities and colleges, whose task is to generate and transmit 
knowledge. The most important duty of governments is to maintain proper finan-
cial support for the universities and to encourage their participation in the inter-
national division of labor, while at the same time ensuring their autonomy.3 
2
 In the planned economy even those who had money could not engage in business. He 
could have bought a nice house, line up for a car, and go to the West in every three years. 
Capital was a dead thing, and shortage characterized the system in all areas. This also 
meant that instead of the economy there was a wasteful system of distribution. 
3
 It is characteristic of Hungary's woes that an overwhelming majority of students en-
tering universities and colleges do not speak a foreign language (English, German or 
French). Presently, there is a shortage of about 3,000 English teachers in Hungary's 
elementary and high schools and learning any foreign language abroad is an infinitely 
distant dream for most. 
60 ROLE OF T H E G O V E R N M E N T 60 
Chart 2. 
Factors Influencing Innovations 
With regard to the situation of universities and colleges and higher education 
in general, Hungary's educational shortcomings are significant. This backward-
ness is an impediment to charting a more dynamic road. The most important 
shortcomings and problems in Hungary are the following: 
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• While only 9.6% of the 18-22 years old in Hungary attend institutions of 
higher learning, the corresponding number in Western Europe is 17-22 %. 
• Quotas are determined bureaucratically, and the rigid methods of entrance 
examinations make sure that many gifted students will never get accepted or 
their enrollment will be delayed. 
• The very low pay for university educators deter many gifted professionals 
from starting a university teaching career, and, for this reason, low quality 
instructors usually cannot be replaced. 
• The former regime separated research from the universities, so the conditions 
for research at universities are inferior to those at industrial research institutes 
or institutes associated with the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA). 
• Universities, beside offering graduate and post-graduate training, can only 
confer doctoral degrees, while the candidate of science (Phd) and the doctor 
of science degrees can only be awarded by the MTA. 
The problems and shortcomings listed above indicate that a fundamental 
change must occur in the way Hungarian universities and collages are run. Some 
reforms have begun at the graduate level, but it will be a long time before under-
graduate and high schöol education are restructured. 
Finally, the other producers of new scientific results are the industrial research 
institutes and the MTA institutes. The former strategic and paternalistic behavior 
of the state created a system in which research was isolated from production. This 
too must be changed. 
IMPORTANT INDICATORS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT 
By analyzing the information of the past twenty years on the growth of research 
positions, the number of research projects, and financial support for research, 
the previous statements can be further refined. 
In 1970 there were 1,071 institute research positions in Hungary. In 1989 this 
figure had increased by only 30%, while during the same period research expen-
ditures nearly quadrupled. Unfortunately, the latest available information indi-
cates that a brain-drain of gifted researchers towards the United States and 
Western Europe has already started, pushing the number of researchers back 
down to the 1970 levels. The number of researchers employed by universities 
grew 175% over the last 20 years, a much higher rate than at research institutes. 
Again it must be stressed that there is a still a need for substantially raising the 
quality of university instruction. 
In Hungary there is an excessive number of research projects. With almost a 
one-to-one ratio between researchers and projects, it is nearly impossible to 
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achieve significant results. Important new scientific breakthroughs are produced 
not by individual researchers, but by teamwork. Also, little has been done to cou-
ple Hungarian research with international work. Only 8% of Hungarian research 
activities are carried out with international cooperation. 
Table 1. 
Major data on research and development activities 
Indicators 1970 1980 1987 I988a 1989" 
number of research 
and development units 1071 1442 1310 1323 1312 100.0 
of which: research and 
development units 131 124 69 69 69 5.3 
academic research 737 1078 925 944 933 71.7 
company R&D 203 240 238 235 235 17.5 
other research 
staff, in thousand 64.4 85.4 75.4 72.5 68.2 100.0 
employed at: research 
development inst. 28.8 35.7 19.7 19.2 18.2 26.7 
academic research 12.8 22.2 22.2 22.5 22.4 32.8 
company R&D 22.8 27.5 28.7 26.2 23.3 34.2 
other research 4.8 4.6 4.4 6.3 
scientific researcher. 
innovators, in thousand 23.2 38.7 36.5 35.3 33.8 
assistants, in thousand 29.2 30.8 25.2 23.8 21.6 
current expenditures, 
thousand forints 5,828.8 15,982.6 26,173.6 24,823.9 26,202.9 86.4 
investments, 
million forints 1,663.1 3,046.9 4,734.4 5,131.3 4,031.1 13.3 
expenditures, sum 
total, million Fts 7,491.9 19,029.5 30,908.0 29,955.2 30,955.2 100 
research subjects, 
developmental tasks 
underway 25,410 30,647 31,787 30,005 28,493 100 
of which: within 
the framework 
if international 
cooperation 1,15 2,602 2,790 2,751 2,310 8.1 
a
 Since 1988 less activities than before belong to the category of scientific research and experimen-
tal development. For this reason, total expenditures cannot be compared to expenditures in previ-
ous years. 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1989. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, Budapest 
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These problems are made worse by the scarce financial resources available for 
research purposes. As seen in Table 2, 2- 2.7% of the Hungary's GDP has been 
allocated to basic and applied research, as well as to experimental development. 
Technical research and innovation received only FT 19,619 million, the equiva-
lent of 280 million. In developed countries, developing a single product costs 
over 1 billion. Chart 3 illustrates the present system of financial support for 
R&D. 
Table 2. 
Use of reduced expenditures" 
billion forints 
financial sources, use 1985 1986 1987 1988a 1989a % 
basic research 2 . 6 2.6 3.3 3.5 4.4 
applied research 7.2 7.3 8.3 9.5 9.5 
scientific research 9.9 10.0 11.7 13.1 14.33 42.3 
experimental 
developments 14.5 17.8 20.8 19.6 19.55 57.7 
total expenditures 
on R&D 24.4 27.8 32.5 32.8 33.8 100 
of which: from 
state budget 4.5 4.7 5.2 5.4 6.8 20.1 
expenditures expressed 
in the % of GDP 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.3 2.0 2.0 
* Together with sums used in places other than research and development units: without expendi-
tures on activities (services, production, etc.) in connection with research, experimental de-
velopment. 
a
 See note" in Table 1. 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1989. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, Budapest 
The lack of financial resources has also limited the availability of information 
systems. In developed countries, researchers at any time can sit at their com-
puters and access business or professional information. However, in Hungary 
the possibility of using computer data banks is very small as the number of Hun-
garian data stations is below 70. 
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Chart 3. 
Financing scientific research and technological development 
INSTITUTES 
OF THE ACADEMY 
OF SCIENCES 
INDUSTRIAL 
RESEARCH 
INSTITUTES 
CENTRAL FUND FOR 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
INDUSTRIAL 
COMPANIES 
own technological payment to the Central 
development Fund for Technological 
fund Development 
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THE NEW ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN SUPPORTING 
TECHNICAL INNOVATION 
As a rule in developed countries, the framework of financing technical innova-
tion and coordination is set by the legislature. So, in addition to information 
gathering, analyzing, and decision making, the government is also an important 
factor in the efficiency of technical innovation. 
Hungary is confronted with a unique situation. Although Hungary is attempt-
ing to create a market economy, the processes still reflect the economic logic of 
the old model. Immediately following the changes in Hungary's political system 
in 1989, the government should have created a comprehensive legal framework 
for the market economy. Although a number of laws have been promulgated, the 
following legislation needs to be passed in the near future: 
• Act on Innovation 
• Act on Higher Education 
• Act on Scientific Research 
• Bankruptcy Act 
• Act on Investments 
The overall economic strategy of the Hungarian government is contained in 
the action program entitled "The program for economic transition and develop-
ment in Hungary."4 The relations between the goals and means of the eco-
nomic action program is illustrated by Chart 4. 
Parallel with the new economic laws, establishing a national technology poli-
cy must be a priority. State organs, scientific workshops, and entrepreneurial in-
terest groups are presently participating in formulating this policy. The govern-
ment's goal is for innovation to spur economic development, and vice versa. In 
other words, the government hopes that when it increases its financial support 
for innovation, the resulting economic benefits will allow it to further increase 
its support for innovation. 
The government plans to develop a new institutional and financing system that 
would effectively support innovation. In short, the old system of translating in-
novations into practice has already ceased, while a new system has not yet begun 
working. 
4
 The Ministry for Industry and Trade laid down its own ideas, as part of the overall 
program, in its program concept. 
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Chart 4. 
The relations on the goals and means system of the economic 
action program (detail) 
Primary goal Secondary Tools 
goals 
IMPORTANT INFRASTRUCTURAL FACTORS OF INNOVATION 
In developing an infrastructure for innovation, the government plays a predomi-
nant role. Important infrastructural factors for promoting innovation are value 
engineering, industrial design, and the creation and operation of technical infor-
mation systems. 
Value analysis/value engineering (a recognized approach to design reliable 
products at the lowest cost) is the best known method of improving industrial ef-
ficiency. Hungary began using value engineering 25 years ago, but its industry-
wide application has not yet been carried out. In order to lend moral and finan-
cial support to spread value engineering in Hungary and to help establish a train-
ing system, the National Board for Technology Development conducted two 
competitions during the 1970s related to the use of value engineering, while the 
Ministry of Finance in conjunction with other branch ministries conducted four 
competitions. 
According to analyses, each forint invested in value engineering yielded an ad-
ditional FT 5, largely because of better organization of the intellectual activities. 
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Value engineering makes it possible to improve quality and to reduce expendi-
tures by 10-30%. This not only increases the competitive position of Hungary's 
products, but can also help reduce the rate of inflation. According to previous 
calculations, Hungarian manufacturers used 20% more material and energy 
than their counterparts in industrially developed countries. As Hungarian 
products require 30-40% more inputs, they are at a disadvantage on internation-
al markets. 
Industrial design is supported by governments in economically developed 
countries because this activity also improves product quality and competitive-
ness. Hungary has a number of programs to support industrial design. For 
fifteen years Hungary has had the Industrial Design Prize, which is awarded by 
the Minister of Industry during both the spring and the fall Budapest Interna-
tional Trade Fair. Industrial design policy is coordinated by the Council for In-
dustrial Design and Ergonomics, whose members come from ministries, profes-
sional organizations, and educational institutes. The László Moholy-Nagy 
scholarship also supports innovative industrial designs. Thanks to it, many gift-
ed designers have been working for three years on new concepts that have great 
potential for many industrial areas. 
The efficient allocation of means can only be realized through the possession 
of proper information. In the case of some research and developmental pro-
grams, the Ministry supported with its own resources the gathering of technical, 
scientific and economic information and its dissemination. Company people 
confirmed that the R&D and design activities were quicker and more efficient 
than earlier, which ultimately made possible a quicker marketing of new 
products. 
SUMMARY 
Hungary's tasks are enormous, and its possibilities and knowledge are very 
modest. Hungary has started off on the road leading to a social market economy, 
but the steps are hindered by the burdens of the past. The social and economic 
conditions are becoming more and more favorable both for our present and our 
future partners, and Hungary looks forward to the United States providing it with 
valuable experience and modern means. 
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Monetary Pblicy and the Banking System 
in Hungary in the 1990s 
REZSŐ NYERS Jr. 
National Bank of Hungary 
Over the past few decades, the Western countries have increasingly turned to 
monetary and fiscal policies to manage their economies. As a developed banking 
system is necessary for these tools to be effective, it is not surprising that as Hun-
gary's centralized economy has been dismantled, the banking system and the role 
of monetary and fiscal policy have grown in importance. 
BANKING REFORM OF 1987 
Until 1987, Hungary had a single-tiered banking system. The National Bank of 
Hungary (NBH or Central Bank) was responsible for central banking, foreign ex-
change and commercial banking, as well as clearing turnover transactions. In this 
single-tiered system, central banking activities were subordinate to the govern-
ment, whose primary monetary policy was to satisfy the central plans' estimated 
financing needs of the government and business sector. Simply put, the aims of 
the monetary policy were no more than reflections of the aims determined by the 
central plan. 
With the 1987 banking reform, the banking system again became two-tiered. 
The major part of commercial banking functions were transferred from the NBH 
to three new commercial banks, for which the government contributed the 
majority of initial capital. Now 36 commercial banks and specialized financial 
institutions exist, in addition to 260 savings cooperatives. This reform has creat-
ed the institutional framework for a more effective and vigorous monetary policy. 
Soon the Central Bank Act will be submitted to Parliament and will further define 
the basic tasks of the Central Bank. 
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FORM AND FUNCTION OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKS 
The 1987 banking law states that Hungarian banks may only operate in the form 
of joint stock companies. Shares in banks may be purchased by both private in-
dividuals and legal entities. In most of the banks, the majority of share capital is 
owned by enterprises and private individuals; state ownership exceeds 50% of the 
share capital in only a few banks, and this will be reduced to less than 50% within 
a few years. Shares also may be bought by foreigners. Currently there are 13 com-
mercial banks with foreign participation, and foreign institutions even hold the 
majority shares in some of them (Charts 1-2-3). 
The commercial banks in Hungary are now universal banks; in other words, 
there is no sectorial restriction on their operation. They are also universal in that 
they make no distinction between the household and the business sector; private 
individuals may place deposits and take out loans in the same manner as en-
trepreneurs and business persons. Regarding interest rates, between 1987 and 
1990 the central bank prescribed a ceiling on interest rates for deposits by private 
individuals, but this ceiling was abolished at the beginning of 1991. 
Two other important, commercial bank functions center around foreign trade 
and securities transactions. As there has been a unified exchange rate since 1980, 
it is natural that the commercial banks are gradually taking over convertible for-
eign currency transactions. Export-import financing is also being carried out by 
the commercial banks. Based on the 1990 Act on Securities, they may also deal 
in securities. However, following a three-year period of transition, banks will no 
longer be able to conduct direct security transactions. 
FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY 
A consensus has already emerged in professional circles and between the politi-
cal forces on the basic functions of the Central Bank. The NBH will be granted 
a great degree of autonomy, similar to that enjoyed by the U.S. Federal Reserve 
and the German Bundesbank. Accordingly, the responsibilities of the NBH will 
be reduced to classical central banking functions. 
One function will be to supply refinancing credits to banks. The importance of 
these credits is being gradually reduced as the volume and proportion of short-
term refinancing credits is decreasing rapidly. The re-discounting of bills and 
open market transactions are becoming the main forms of short-term refinanc-
ing. Currently the Central Bank's refinancing credits make up about 20% of the 
banking systems liabilities. The proportion of central bank refinancing is rela-
tively high at the larger commercial banks and in long-term lending. As a conse-
quence, during the banking reform of 1987, the large banks took over company in-
vestment and other long-term credits from the NBH. 
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Chart 1. 
Balance sheets 
by size groups of Hungarian banks 
year 
Chart 2. 
Equity e capital 
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Chart 3. 
Total revenues by size groups of Hungarian banks 
In the short term, the bank's liquidity regulations and open market transactions 
are gaining in significance. NBH systematically organizes treasury bill auctions 
and the sale of central bank issued deposit certificates, and it issues an increasing 
share of the short-term refinancing credit allocation to the banks through inter-
bank auctions. 
The Central Bank also influences the economy by the level of deposit and in-
terest rates. The central bank deposit rate policy effects the liquidity of the banks 
and their profitability. At the moment a deposit rate of 15 % is applicable to short-
term and long- term forint and foreign exchange deposits. The Central Bank in-
terest rate policy is directed towards developing a market rate that encourages 
savings. In 1990, for every FT 100 of income, the population saved FT 5-6, sig-
nificantly behind the savings Western Europe. The Central Bank also supports 
exports, privatization, and the development of small enterprises with refinancing 
credits at favorable interest rates (Chart 4). On the other hand, short-term financ-
ing, which plays a great role in a bank's liquidity and in open market transactions, 
follows the interest levels of the market. 
Finally, with its new autonomy in monetary policy, the Central Bank's tight 
regulations will also restrict the financing of the state budget. The new restric-
tions of central bank financing of the budget can be seen in the indices referring 
to the involvement of central bank sources in the budget and the banking sector 
(Chart 5). One of the great lessons of recent years is that when the central bank 
is subordinate to the short-term views of the government and automatically 
finances large government budget deficits, it is incapable of implementing anti-
inflation efforts or of achieving equilibrium in the current balance of payments. 
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Chart 4. 
Credits to entrepreneurs 
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OBJECTIVES OF HUNGRY'S FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES 
Since the two-tiered banking system was introduced, the NBH has enjoyed in-
creasing independence in forming and executing monetary policy. The broad ob-
jectives of Hungary's current monetary policy are similar to those of countries 
with developed financial systems. One goal is to balance the current balance of 
payments. This is an especially significant task in Hungary, because at the end of 
1990 the country's gross debt in convertible currencies stood at more than 21 bil-
lion and the debt service ratio (debt service in relation to annual convertible ex-
ports) exceeded 50%. Also among the objectives of the monetary policy is, 
naturally, the stability of the national currency, which includes controlling infla-
tion. Finally, the monetary policy must assist the balanced growth and develop-
ment of the economy. 
The National Bank has now identified a number of medium-term aspects of its 
monetary policies. The first is pursuing a tight monetary policy, i.e. limiting the 
growth of the money supply to a rate lower that the growth of the nominal Gross 
Domestic Product, in the interest of improving the current balance of payments 
(Chart 6). Secondly, the bank seeks to stabilize the demand for money by setting 
the interest rates so that they cover liabilities and encourage savings (Chart 7-8). 
Chart 6. 
GDP, Broad Money 
(current prices) 
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Chart 7. 
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In December 1990, the interest rate for deposits was 31% and the rate for credit 
was 34%, up from 17% and 19% respectively in January 1990; inflation for this 
year is expected to be 34-38%. Finally, the NBH will try to set an exchange rate 
for the forint which is stable and also ensures the profitability of export. Nominal 
exchange rate fluctuations and devaluations should aim only to balance the differ-
ence in the domestic inflation rate and the inflation rates in foreign markets, be-
cause continuous devaluations do not support long-term export growth, but 
merely provide temporary improvement in the balance of payments. Devalua-
tions also effect domestic inflation immediately and directly (Chart 9-10). 
It is apparent that the central bank's monetary policies are primarily directed 
at regulating the net domestic credit supply (net domestic assets). The modifica-
tion of the monetary policy can be noted in the rate of growth of nominal GDP, 
the rate of growth of the broad money and the changes in the velocity of turnover 
of money (Chart 6-11-12). From the data, the fluctuations in the velocity of tur-
nover of money in recent years are already evident, especially the significant in-
crease in the velocity in 1989. It should be noted that in the 1989 increase of ve-
locity of money, a great role was played by economic policy decisions falling 
outside monetary policy, primarily foreign exchange purchase by the public and 
the explosive expansion of tourism. 
Chart 9. 
Direct foreign trade fco border, 1989 
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Chart 10. 
Direct foreign trade fco border, 1990 
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Chart 12. 
Velocity of money, semi-annual figures 
(current prices) 
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Chart 11. 
GDP valume, annual growth rate 
(Previous year=100%) 
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BANKING SYSTEM 
With the passage of the Act on Financial Institutions, which may take place in 
1991, the banking system will receive a concrete and modern legal framework. 
The current draft of this bill, which is based on international practices, would 
regulate the activities of the banks and the system of establishment of banks; set 
bank security regulations in harmony with the requirements of the Basel Accord 
and the recommendations of the Bank of International Settlements and the World 
Bank; regulate the classification of the banks' assets according to risk; create the 
necessary reserves to insure banks; and set the minimum risk-weighted capital -
asset ratio at 8%. 
Another problem to be addressed is the ownership profile of banks. Some 
banks are still largely owned by the state, and this needs to be changed. Under 
clearly defined conditions, foreign capital should be allowed into the Hungarian 
banking system. Allowing foreign capital would help draw the banking system 
closer to the international financial world, and the foreigners could also help 
modernize the operation of the banks, improve professional and technical stan-
dards, and, last but not least, increase the capital of the banks. 
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With or without foreign involvement, the Hungarian banking system needs sig-
nificant improvements in technical standard. This includes extending branch net-
works, modernizing clearing turnover operations, broadening the range of bank-
ing services, and increasing the standard of service. 
Currently the Hungarian banking system is also overly concentrated. The four 
largest commercial banks hold more than 80% of the current accounts of enter-
prises and represent more than 80% of the loans and deposits of the business 
sphere. Clearly such a concentration is extremely unhealthy and must be reduced 
in the near future. 
Finally, the foreign exchange transactions will be further decentralized in the 
coming years. Combined with the integration of Hungarian banks into the inter-
national financial networks, this is indispensable to achieving a high degree of 
forint convertibility within a few years. 
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Role of U.S. Government in 
Supporting Industrial Competitiveness 
• 
NAS PANEL DISCUSSION 
In the United States, the role of the federal government in the private sector is 
very controversial. As mentioned in Dr. Schillinger's presentation, Americans 
traditionally have preferred the federal government to intervene as little as possi-
ble in the personal and business affairs of the citizens. However, in light of the 
successful national industrial policies in Europe and Asia, which have resulted in 
increased globalization of markets and growing competitiveness, a broad range 
of voices have begun calling for the U.S. government to devise an industrial 
policy. 
To highlight the different views between those who favor a federal industrial 
policy and those who oppose it, as well as the variances within each of these 
groups, there was a panel discussion on the topic "The Role of the U.S. Govern-
ment in Supporting Industrial Competitiveness." The panel consisted of Dr. L. 
Donald Shields (California Council on Science and Technology), Dr. Karen For-
tin (University of Florida), and Dr. Lowell Steele. After each made some brief 
remarks, the topic was opened to the floor. This is a summary of the remarks and 
discussion. 
The discussion was opened by Dr. Shields, who provided some comparative 
statistics on the U.S and Hungarian economies. Currently the U.S. Gross Nation-
al Product is 5.5 trillion and the federal debt is 3.5 trillion. Hungary, on the other 
hand, has a Gross State Product of 24.4 billion and a debt of 20 billion. So both 
countries have high debt ratios and both are in a recession. To give one more 
comparison, both the U.S. and Hungary spend 2.7% of gross product on research 
and development (R&D). 
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A U.S. TECHNOLOGY POLICY 
The U.S. government has become increasingly aware of the link between R&D 
and economic growth and, consequently, has been examining related issues, such 
as science education at all levels and the role of the government in promoting 
R&D. In March 1990 the U.S. President George Bush announced that the federal 
government would work with industry in the "pre-competitive" phase of R&D 
(the pre-competitive phase is basic research prior to the development of proto-
types). Six months later, Dr. Allan Bromley, Assistant to the President for 
Science and Technology, issued a paper on U.S. Technology Policy. The docu-
ment was significant in and of itself, as the United States had never before had a 
national technology policy. The paper recommended that the federal government 
act as a facilitator and funder to support the private sector with generic technolo-
gy, pre-competitive research, and enabling R&D. In reflecting on this policy 
change, one should ask not only what it means to the United States, but also how 
it might be applicable to Hungary. 
Taking the floor, Dr. Lowell Steele noted that the subject of national technolo-
gy policy has been extremely controversial in the United States. When President 
Bush declared his position, three of his White House advisors openly disagreed 
with him. Regarding having a technology policy, semantics is a major problem, 
as people casually toss around words. "Competitiveness" is an extremely com-
plex word only whose simplest meaning is used, and the word "policy" implies 
a coherence that does not exist. Dr. Steele argued that small policies with specific 
goals are better than trying to impose large, umbrella solutions. 
In the near future, Dr. Graham Mitchell (GTE) stated that the federal govern-
ment would not do anything, adding that they should not do anything. Providing 
some numbers, Dr. Mitchell explained that in 1990 46% of R&D money came 
from industry and 49% came from the U.S. government. The estimate for this 
year is that the industry share will rise to 51.5%. It is not only important to note 
that the government share is declining, but one should also understand that very 
little government funding addresses the issue of industrial competitiveness. It is 
the industrial community which tackles these problems and research managers 
have to fight competitively for company funds. 
Disagreeing with Dr. Mitchell on the role of the government, Dr. Ben Slay 
(Bates College) felt that there are many important things that the government 
could do. It is simply that people are unwilling to pay for them. Dr. Schillinger 
noted that the basic thrust of Dr. Steele's and Dr. Mitchell's comments was that 
we should not focus our energy on the federal government, but rather on the pri-
vate sector. 
Dr. Fortin reminded the audience of the different roles of the state and federal 
governments in the United States. Citing Dr. Shields' presentation, Dr. Fortin 
noted that effective state industrial policies are operating in the absence of a na-
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tional policy, and furthermore these state policies often conflict with the goals of 
the federal government. Dr. Fortin then turned her comments to the importance 
of education in sustaining economic growth. She stressed that Hungary now has 
a tremendous opportunity to revamp its educational system, which has historical-
ly been strong. 
TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT 
Because of the decentralized nature of U.S. industrial policies, the credibility of 
technology management has become critical. Over the last ten to fifteen years, 
technology managers have had to worry less about the technology and more 
about general management questions. There are a number of major issues facing 
research directors today. One is the globalization of R&D. Companies no longer 
have the resources to generate as much research from within the firm, so they 
must be better hunters and gatherers of technology. The rapid commercialization 
of research discoveries has brought product cycles down to one year. And finally, 
the growth of the information industry has had wide impacts of how we think of 
technology. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the federal government only must 
expand R&D activities to increase the competitiveness of American firms. 
CONCLUSION 
Echoing many of the previous thoughts, Dr. Mel Horwitch (Theseus Institute) 
concluded with the following points: 
• In the foreseeable future, our focus must be on the firm level. Linkages are 
very important and although these links may include or be facilitated by the 
federal government, we should not be so concerned with government policy. 
• The area where the government does have a role is in creating human talent. 
In other words, the government should be active in educating and training. 
• Taking one of the messages from Dr. Schillinger's talk, there must be easy 
interaction between government, universities, and industry. This does not 
happen in Europe. In particular, Hungary must consider how to break down 
these barriers. 
• In a broad sense, we must think about the spirit of the times. We have entered 
a period of pessimism and this is not just in Hungary or the United States. 
Again, here it is not government policy that should concern us, but the need 
to recapture a global spirit of optimism. 
APPLIED ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
Fiscal, Tax and Other Financial Policies 
that Affect Jobs and Innovations 
• 
KAREN FORTIN 
University of Miami 
There are two inescapable facts relative to fiscal and tax policy: 1) governments 
must raise money through some form of taxation to provide the services neces-
sary for the orderly conduct of government; and 2) the amount, form, and inci-
dence of this taxation affects the behavior of the populace and can impact the 
government's continuing revenue generation processes. Due to the circularity of 
these concepts, the taxing authorities must carefully consider the form in which 
taxes are to be levied, the ways monies are to be spent, and the objectives of the 
spending in order to ensure that the expenditures are made in the optimum 
manner. 
Taxation systems and fiscal policies play an important role in resource alloca-
tion in all economies. To insure the optimum use of resources, the government 
must identify its most critical functions, identify its economic objectives, and 
place priorities on the use of its tax resources. These three roles are described 
below. 
CRITICAL FUNCTIONS 
There are certain functions usually reserved for the national government, such as 
provision for national defense and administration of a national taxing system to 
provide the revenues necessary for the support of the government. In identifying 
the national government's other critical functions, conflicts often arise between 
it and local units of government. These conflicts center around determining 
which governing body is better positioned to decide exactly how revenues should 
be raised and the most efficient mechanism for spending these funds. Without 
coordination between local and national governments, there will be gaps in 
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services and wasted resources. While there are no easy answers to the questions 
of coordination, an emerging democracy has the opportunity to reexamine its 
entire government structure and establish new patterns of revenue generation and 
spending, which can provide increased benefits to the populace. 
ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES 
How a government raises and spends its resources can have numerous direct and 
indirect effects. Understanding some of these effects requires understanding 
different types of tax levies and a tax system's functions. The different type of tax 
levies include: 
Income taxes: This raises questions about how income is measured, 
and about how the tax is levied. 
Consumption taxes levied on spending: While many regard these tax-
es as regressive, they do tend to encourage saving. 
Wealth taxes: In addition to measurement problems, this form of taxa-
tion creates incentives for wealth-holders to exchange their wealth for 
productive assets. 
Wealth-transfer taxes: While these taxes can encourage consumption, 
they also break up large concentrations of family-held wealth and can 
have a socially-leveling effect. 
With regard to spending money, differences exist in the impact on the economy 
whether the government spends money directly by purchasing goods and serv-
ices or whether it puts money into the hands of the populace through some form 
of welfare-type payment. Government "expenditures" can also include special 
tax provisions to certain classes of taxpayers. Such tax provisions are frequently 
employed to influence the behavior of enterprises. For example, tax preferences 
may be used to spur the long-term goal of promoting research and development 
at the enterprise level. The following are some common tax policies with this 
aim: 
R&D Credits: R&D credits reduce corporate taxes when the firm 
spends money to develop new products and can be tailored to encourage 
research in specific fields. In the United States, one such example is the 
"orphan drug credit," which grants pharmaceutical companies substan-
tial tax breaks to develop cures for uncommon diseases. Without such 
credits, research in this field would not be economically viable. 
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Investment Tax Credits: Investment tax credits, which were removed 
from the U.S. tax code by the 1986 Tax Reform Act, allowed industries 
additional tax write-offs as they expanded plants and equipment. 
Depreciation Allowance: Firms also benefit from depreciation al-
lowances. In Western Europe firms can immediately write-off new 
equipment, but U.S. firms can only deduct the depreciation of 
equipment. 
Credits for ESOP and Pension Funds: Finally, the government has tax 
breaks relating to Employee Stock Option Plans (ESOP) and pension 
funds. Company ESOP programs partially compensate employees with 
stock options, which in turn gives the employees a greater stake in the 
health of the company. Many pensions funds are partially funded by in-
vestments in company stock, tying retirement benefits to stock perfor-
mance. ESOP programs and these types of pension funds increase com-
pany productivity. 
In a newly democratic country with a history of limited private ownership, the 
government must encourage the transfer of ownership from the public to the pri-
vate sector. Tax and fiscal policies can have dramatic effects on privatization, sav-
ings, and investments. Such policies, therefore, play a role in developing new in-
dustries, but they require a critical analysis of the resources already available for 
those industries as well as the possibilities for generating new resources from 
both internal and external sources. In light of limited investment resources, tax 
and fiscal policies must also encourage foreign investment. Hungary, however, is 
competing with every other nation seeking outside investments. The incentives 
must be adequate to make the foreign investment economically sound, while be-
ing of long-run benefit to the nation as a whole. 
Tax policy is also present in formulating industrial and trade policies, since 
changing tax or tariff rates on a given sector can have a strong influence on its ex-
port performance, as well as its ability to attract joint ventures. For example, 
most West European and South American countries have value-added taxes, but 
firms receive tax rebates on goods that are exported. The United States, on the 
other hand, has domestic sales taxes, so exported goods are not taxed domes-
tically. 
SPENDING PRIORITIES 
By far the most difficult task facing Hungary, given the limited resources availa-
ble, is determining its spending priorities. To be a player in the world economic 
markets, Hungary must be competitive with other countries. To do so, it must up-
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grade its industries through capital investment. The government can offer numer-
ous incentives for capital investments through its tax policies, some of which 
were mentioned above, as well as through more direct means, such as the transfer 
of ownership to the private sector. 
But capital is not the only requirement for successful competition in the world 
markets. The other, and probably more important, side of the equation is the in-
vestment in human capital; that is, management and labor. Management must be 
trained in the efficient use of capital resources available to them. Labor must 
willingly become part of a changing industrial society — one which may have 
been very labor intensive — but which to be competitive may become more and 
more capital intensive. Labor must have incentives to grow and change as indus-
tries grow and change. 
Excellent public education has been the lifeblood of industrialized economies. 
Education, both at the management level and at the technical skills level, must be 
encouraged and supported. Innovative management techniques must be en-
couraged; technical education to meet the labor needs of new industries and 
processes must be established. 
Most of all, the people in Hungary must have an incentive to become a major 
factor in its emergence as a competitive economy. To do this, there must be con-
centrated efforts to ensure an increased standard of living as the work force con-
tributes to the economic prosperity of the country. There must be confidence that 
outstanding work will be rewarded. 
THE LONG-TERM VIEW 
The challenges facing Hungary as it moves into the world markets are many and 
diverse. To meet the needs outlined above requires wisdom and dedication. But 
one of the major dangers facing Hungary is one faced by most governments and 
industries: short-run objectives often conflict with long-run goals, and personal 
objectives differ from institutional objectives. Hungary has a grand history-it 
can have a grand future. To meet these challenges, Hungary's political leaders 
cannot be self-serving in their decision processes. They must look to this future-
in ten, twenty, and thirty years—not to the next election. Sound economic policies 
are the means by which Hungary will move into the 21st century. 
DISCUSSION 
The presentation provoked considerable discussion on the formation and real im-
pacts of tax policies. When the point was made that tax policy is fundamentally 
a political question, Dr. Fortin lamented that one of the major disadvantages of 
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the U.S. tax system is that its principle purpose is to reelect incumbents. Every 
four years there are major new tax laws, but the difficult questions are rarely ad-
dressed. 
One participant argued that the most important thing the government could do 
for industry was to reduce their tax burden. The person continued by stating that 
although businesses were in favor of R&D tax credits, there is no evidence these 
credits encourage R&D. Dr. Fortin countered that there is heavy pressure on the 
U.S. Congress by research managers to keep the credits whenever they are set to 
expire. Another participant believed that there is a greater linkage between the 
credits and R&D in small firms than in large ones, adding that President Bush 
supports making the R&D tax credits permanent. Continuing on the theme of 
causal relationships, one participant felt that the change in U.S. tax policies in the 
1980s had a positive impact on the growth of venture capital. 
In light of the complexity and political nature of the U.S. fiscal and tax policy, 
there was some question whether it was an appropriate model for Hungary. When 
Hungary's problem of bringing the second economy into the open was men-
tioned, Dr. Fortin related similar problems in the U.S. of unpaid taxes. If the 
compliance rate in the U.S. was at the same level as it was in 1980, there would 
be no budget deficit. In order for compliance rates to rise, the population must 
understand the tax system and accept it as fair. 
Another participant wondered whether the tax and fiscal policies of the newly 
industrialized nations in Asia would be a better model for Hungary. The markets 
of these countries are less "free" than those of the United States, but their fiscal 
and tax policies are effective in guiding resource allocation. 
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The Capability and Willingness 
of Hungarian Firms to Innovate 
• 
GÁBOR HOVÁNYI 
MTA Research Institute of Industrial Economics 
INTRODUCTION 
When Robert Oppenheimer left the room, the remaining four chaps with the faint 
idea of the atomic bomb caught each other's eye. After a necessary scientific 
break, one of them, Leo Szilárd, said to the others: "Guys, at last we can speak 
Hungarian!" The other three were Eugene Wigand, Edward Teller and John Neu-
man. Every Hungarian scientific greenhorn knows this story, which proves the 
first axiom of this paper: 
Hungarians are able to produce innovations, especially abroad. 
Now for the second axiom. An innovation more explosive than the atomic 
bomb can flash through the mind of a Hungarian even at home. This happened 
to Mr. Rubik when he invented his damned cube. But who could carry out this 
world famous innovation - including the lion's share of the profit? The skillful 
manufacturers in Hong-Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. So the second axiom says: 
If a Hungarian innovator is clever enough to have a fine new idea at 
home, he also has to be clever enough to sell it abroad. 
After this short introduction, let me honor our scientific seminar with a more 
scientific, i.e. really boring, approach to the given topic. I will outline the capa-
bility and willingness of Hungarian enterprises to innovate from two point of 
views. First, I shall list the well-known Western requirements to stimulate inno-
vation within the firms and describe how these requirements have functioned in 
Hungarian enterprises during the last 40 years. Second, I shall enumerate the 
characteristics of the present Hungarian scene which are real barriers to the full 
innovation processes at home. 
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STIMULATING INNOVATION FROM WITHIN THE FIRM 
The following are the Western requirements to stimulate innovations at the firm 
and the Hungarian answers to these Western challenges: 
1. For innovation, managers need people who want to accomplish something 
in their work, who have brave new ideas and who take the risks of untried ap-
proaches. During the last forty years, the Hungarian employee had to fulfill the 
plans of the company as specified by the Planning Office. Quite soon he learned 
how to be a gray man without any revolutionary idea, because the socialist 
guillotine—in contrast with the well-proven French one- -worked not in the verti-
cal, but in the horizontal direction. 
2. To stimulate innovation you must imbue the whole firm with information 
about the technical and economic environment, and create a free communica-
tion within the company that breaks through the barriers of classical functions 
and hierarchies. In Hungary, all information about the firm flowed up to the top. 
Once there, the managers prevented it from leaking back down, creating an infor-
mation monopoly. 
3. For a good innovative climate with the company, you need incentives (finan-
cial and others) which are proportional to the profit realized by the innovation. 
Following the brave old models of Maslow and Herzberg, the less financial the 
incentives, the more efficient they are in a wealthy society. But money comes first 
for the Hungarian innovator, who struggles with financial problems. Unfor-
tunately for him, the money comes only in drops, because in an egalitarian socie-
ty it is not the realized profit that determines the scale of performance, but the un-
gifted and lazy colleagues. 
4. Western innovation experts emphasize that company management must pro-
vide time to the potential innovators to dream, risking that sometimes manage-
ment itself will also dream about prospective innovations. Under the old Hungar-
ian system, working hours were never for dreams. Everybody had to pretend to 
work eight full hours, although there is no question that during 30-40% of work-
ing time there was no output at all and worker productivity was only the half that 
of neighboring Austria. Of course, to imitate hard work and dream about new in-
novations at the same time was too much for the Hungarian workers, particularly 
at Hungarian wages, which are half (in real terms) of Austrian wages. 
5. A manager, receiving a suggestion to start an innovation process, has to 
make timely decisions. This is not only because changes in the technical and 
economic environment occur quickly, but also because every decision, whether 
positive or negative, must strengthen the innovative spirit of the employees. But 
if the responsibility for decision-making is not clear, overcentralized, or a strug-
gle against internal power centers (as it happened in Hungary), the decision will 
come too late and management will be viewed as completely disinterested in in-
novation. 
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6. Accepting an idea for an innovation is not enough; nor is paying a high fee 
for a good idea enough. An innovator wants to see his idea realized, and the more 
noisily the idea is realized, the more charming the music is to encourage the next 
innovation! This is an easy lesson for a society with capital surplus, where 
profitable ideas can easily meet the capital needs for their implementation. But 
in Hungary, a country with a "debts surplus", a country only supported by nearly 
exhausted companies, thousands of accepted ideas lie closed in the desk drawers 
of managers. 
7. To implement the accepted ideas for innovation, at least in cases of product 
and technology innovations, mixed teams or task forces are needed. The basic 
requirement for those is flexibility of the company structure and team spirit in the 
individuals. But if the individual's professional existence is not based on profes-
sional skill but on the benevolence of the boss and on the incompetent potentates 
of company management, even the best professional does not dare to leave his 
seat for a second. And suffering in this defenselessness, the best professional is 
used to communicating much more about his fellow sufferers behind their backs, 
than discussing the common professional problems with them. 
8. Innovation is also stimulated by in-house competition. At last, an idea be-
loved by state enterprises, the so-called "socialist work competition"! But this 
was largely measured in tons, yards, or minutes, not in carats of gray matter. 
Later gray matter was more appreciated, but by then the stupid theory of "no 
losses caused by the parallel use of resources" had put brakes on the competition 
of innovation endeavors. 
9. Briefly to the macro-economy level, innovation needs national and interna-
tional competition. Based on the above- mentioned theory of "no losses caused 
by the parallel use of resources", competition was destroyed within COMECON 
as well as domestically. As a consequence, firms in "socialist" countries worked 
in the artificial conditions of a greenhouse. No innovation was necessary as low 
quality and old-fashioned goods were easily sold; the importer had no intention 
to pay a higher price for an improved product anyway. The greenhouse effect 
caused more and more out-dated technology. 
10. Only one competition existed in the planned economy: the murderous com-
petition of business partners active in the same vertical line of production and trade. 
In trying to gain advantages from each other (such as higher profit margins and exclu-
sive information) and from the government (special subsidies and credits), these 
business partners prevented the existence of the vertical innovation chain. As a 
result, many good innovation ideas and even processes were mishandled. 
11. Western experts know the important role of small- and medium-size enter-
prises in innovations. In the over-concentrated company structure of the Hungar-
ian economy, there were practically no small- and medium-sized enterprises 
generating innovations and supporting innovations in cooperation with large 
companies. 
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12. Last but not least there was no government support for innovation. R&D 
targets were financed without considering the vital interest of the implementing 
institutions/companies and without these institutions/companies taking part in 
the risks of the innovation processes. No one dreamed about such up-to-date sup-
ports as special credits, taxes, customs, or the creation of innovation parks to in-
crease the capability and willingness of entrepreneurs to innovate. 
CURRENT SPIRIT OF INNOVATION IN HUNGARY 
Given this short overview of the last 40 years from the point of view of innovative 
spirit in Hungarian enterprises, let us turn to the present. First, consider some 
basic remarks: Hungary's economy is now in a phase of transition from a planned 
to a real market economy—a unique process that has never occurred during the 
turbulent history of economics. But sometimes it is easier to change the basic 
economic system than to change the mentality and attitude of people. 
After a one-year period of hesitation and lack of concepts on part of the new 
Hungarian government, the transformation of the economic system now means a 
real race with time, where the loser has to face the possibility of heavy social and 
political unrest. 
Returning to the problems of innovation, a distinction must be made between 
the large Hungarian companies and the small-and medium-sized size enterprises. 
For large Hungarian companies, scientific institutes, and universities, an in-
creasingly threatening phenomenon is brain-drain. The wages of young scientists 
in Hungary is about 2500-3000 per year, the research facilities have become 
more and more outdated, and young people must fight very hard against the 
privileges of the former generations. The brain-drain means a fateful decrease in 
the most valuable human factor of innovation capacity. 
At large companies innovation is blocked even now by the rigid hierarchy of the 
companies and the deficiencies in the organization of the innovation processes. 
Even well organized processes deteriorated under the effects of the shortage 
economy. 
To implement innovative ideas, new technology is needed as the existing tech-
nology is outdated. However, Hungarian companies do not have funds for invest-
ing, partly because 85% of their profits go to the government. Borrowing is un-
feasible because the interest rate is too high, even for an economy with a 40-50% 
inflation rate. 
Last but not least, the everyday management of companies is slow. If a Western 
company thinks in terms of minutes, the average Hungarian company thinks only 
in hours. This is a consequence of poor management, low wages, poor working 
attitude, and overstaffed company structures. Slowness not only means diminish-
ing the efficiency of the planned innovations, but it also kills the innovators' 
creativity. 
91 A P P L I E D E C O N O M I C RESEARCH 
Small- and medium-sized enterprises face many of the same problems as large 
companies, though there are difficulties particular to small and medium firms. In 
order to start a small- or medium-sized firm in Hungary, an entrepreneur needs 
an extraordinary entrepreneurial spirit. To keep it going, he must continuously 
employ his creative powers to overcome all of the unforseen difficulties in this 
hostile environment. Usually the entrepreneur's weakness is in his knowledge of 
economics and managerial skills. They are simply not acquainted with Western 
managerial techniques, which examine marketing possibilities and calculate real 
profit/cost ratios, ROI indices, and the limits of risk taking. 
Even promising human factors is not enough in itself. In most cases, innova-
tion still needs investment. Very few new entrepreneurs have the money and 
when asking for credits, they must consider the very high interest rates. The aver-
age small business cannot start with prices reflecting costs, taxes, a reasonable 
profit, and a 40-50% interest rate on loans. 
The last innovation problem of the Hungarian small- and medium-sized enter-
prises is the unfriendly economic attitude of the government. Government slo-
gans encourage entrepreneurs to start businesses, but taxes are high, credits are 
expensive, and government regulations are vague and ever changing. Therefore, 
entrepreneurs generally only flourish in sectors where there is a fast return on in-
vestment. The government policies prevent the establishment of small- and 
medium-sized enterprises in industry, which would alter this overcentralized sec-
tor. As small- and medium-sized enterprises are the most innovative sphere of in-
dustry, the dearth of new small- and medium-sized enterprises in Hungary 
retards the innovation capability of industry as a whole. 
While blaming the hesitating and confused attitude of the government, I must 
also show the other side of the coin. The Hungarian economy is now in a very 
delicate situation, one in which the driving force behind growth and efficiency is 
privatization. However, it is surrounded by a "fateful diamond" (Figure 1), 
whose Vertexes represent disastrous contradictions. The future capability and 
willingness of Hungarian enterprises to innovate will be highly influenced by the 
aptitude and firmness of the government in balancing the contradictions of this 
"fateful diamond". 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude this overview of the innovation capabilities of Hungarian companies 
and enterprises, let me summarize my views in a third axiom: 
A Hungarian has an innovative spirit by character, because he is an 
individualist with rich imagination; and he can be hindered only by 
his own government, which although freely elected has a very poor 
imagination. 
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Figure 1. 
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DISCUSSION 
The beginning of the discussion focused on the importance of education in creat-
ing an entrepreneurial spirit. The paper by Nádasdi and Dányi mentioned that the 
Hungarian education system is being reformed from the top down. However, it is 
critical to change education so that it encourages innovation and creativity in the 
early years instead of indulging in pure memorization. One NAS participant con-
curred, noting that in the United States there is an increased awareness of the im-
portance of education in the early years. 
Later responding to a question on whether Hungary will overcome its difficul-
ties in 3-5 years. Dr. Hoványi first turned to the needs of large enterprises. They 
need technology, capital, management skills, and marketing skills, which will 
only come through joint ventures. So, the recovery will be a long process. If the 
question is how long will it be until Hungary reaches the level of Western Europe, 
the answer is 15-25 years. 
Finally, one NAS participant argued that the "fateful diamond" was flawed, 
because the problems of innovation are more like a pearl, cloudy and circular. He 
continued that it was also a mistake to look at innovation as a national problem, 
as challenges and solutions come from all over the globe. No government can be 
expected to solve all of these problems. 
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Fost-Communist Privatization: 
Efficiency, Justice and Anti-Trust Issues 
• 
BEN SLAY 
Bates College 
PRIVATIZATION: ISSUES IN IMPLEMENTATION 
Fostering research and development in Hungary requires the privatization of its 
industries. Different strategies exist for privatizing state enterprises, and they 
must be viewed in a broad socio-economic context that considers the consequen-
ces for capital and labor allocation. These strategies can be grouped into the fol-
lowing five cases: 
Capital Privatization: The state transforms the enterprises it owns into 
joint-stock companies and then sells the stock or, in some cases, gives 
it away. 
Spontaneous Privatization: The state does not play a direct or guiding 
role in the privatization process. The transfer of property rights to priva-
te agents occurs on the basis of non-market, "law of the jungle" criteria 
(most frequently connections, favoritism and "squatters' rights"). 
Asset Privatization: The state sells the assets of state firms to priva-
te actors, either in whole or in part. This approach may take the legal 
form of enterprise liquidation, but may be applied to profitable firms 
as well. 
Worker Ownership: Property rights to state enterprises are sold or 
transferred, in a conscious and general way, to the firms' workers. 
Reprivatization: Property expropriated after 1945 is returned to the 
original owners or their heirs. 
Evaluating the efficacy of these strategies requires judgments about their costs 
and benefits in terms of various normative criteria (the selection of which is also 
a normative matter). If, however, rapidity of privatization, efficiency of the 
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resulting capital markets, and social justice are taken as normative criteria, the 
following conclusions emerge.1 
CAPITAL PRIVATIZATION 
While capital privatization may be the most ambitious (and, depending upon 
one's views about the groups slated to become the privatized firms' new owners, 
the fairest) strategy, it is also the most artificial. If effective, capital privatization 
is the strategy most likely to create an efficient, Western-style stock market by 
dispersing ownership shares as quickly and as widely as possible. Unfortunately, 
the absence of pre-existing capital markets poses serious problems in estimating 
the value of state enterprises since there are no comparable stock offerings ac-
cording to which the "market" value of a given firm's stock can be determined, 
and no well-functioning debt markets to generate discount rates. Furthermore, 
both over- and underestimating a firm's value ran have negative consequences. 
The government will likely encounter difficulties when selling the shares of an 
overvalued firm, which both prevents the complete transfer of ownership rights 
and can be politically embarrassing. Undervaluation, by contrast, can cause the 
stock offering to be oversubscribed and leave the government open to charges of 
"giving away" the national wealth. So while the lack of capital markets may not 
keep this strategy from working, it does render capital privatization problematic. 
In addition to the absence of capital markets, none of the institutional compo-
nents of this strategy (including the stock market, brokerage houses, under-
writers, and government regulatory bodies) exist prior to the start of the process. 
The government must either create these actors from scratch or, to the extent pos-
sible, entrust (surrender) these functions to foreigners. As the Polish experience 
with capital privatization shows, this method can generate high transactions costs 
(in both a financial and temporal sense) that tend to defeat privatization's original 
purpose.2 Moreover, the population's money holdings may be insufficient to 
purchase shares in the companies offered. 
1
 As used in this paper, "social justice" refers to the desire to: prevent "excessive" 
changes from the relatively equal distributions of income and status between managers 
and workers in the traditional system; and remove the members of the communist 
nomenklatura from positions of power and privilege, or at least those members of the 
elite unqualified to hold their present positions. 
2
 A related problem with capital privatization lies in determining who the new owners 
will be. If, as the logic of this approach suggests, stock in the privatized firms is to be 
distributed on a universal basis, then property rights may be too widely dispersed for the 
new ownership to effectively control the firms' management. Redressing this requires 
creating institutional investors (e.g. mutual funds) able to pool the resources of small in-
vestors into larger blocks of stock. But this requires the appearance of yet another type 
of actor—the institutional investors that either must be created from scratch or brought 
in from abroad. Kornai describes the weaknesses of the former approach (Kornai, J., 
The Road to a Free Economy, New York, 1990, Norton ), while the latter approach 
raises national-security issues. 
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SPONTANEOUS PRIVATIZATION 
In contrast with capital privatization, spontaneous privatization is not ambitious; 
nor is it likely to be either efficient or just. It is, however, a more organic process 
in which ownership rights to state enterprises are transferred to private actors in 
a decentralized manner, largely outside the purview of state regulation. 
In the post-communist economies, spontaneous privatization is likely to en-
franchise the nomenklatura. The new owners may not be the best qualified either 
in terms of efficiency ("who ran these firms into the ground in the first place?") 
or equity ("I thought we fought a revolution to get rid of these people"). In fact, 
the popular reaction against the initial wave of spontaneous privatization in Hun-
gary and Poland (prior to the 1990 creation of the State Property Agency and 
Ministry of Ownership Transformation in the two countries) was so strong that 
the concept of privatization itself became somewhat tainted in the public's eyes. 
On the other hand, spontaneous privatization avoids the valuation problems, 
since market criteria do not necessarily play a direct role in the transfer of 
property. Moreover, since ability to pay is not a central point, the relationship be-
tween the demand for ownership rights and the firms' book value is not an issue. 
Spontaneous privatization is also rapid. Finally, to the extent this approach 
genuinely enfranchises workers (or bodies representing worker interests at the 
enterprise level, like workers' councils) spontaneous privatization may have 
desirable implications for labor. 
ASSET PRIVATIZATION 
Asset privatization is a functional, building-block strategy to privatization. By 
emphasizing the sale of enterprise assets, asset privatization avoids the valuation 
problem as only those components of the firm are sold for which markets (and 
market prices) already exist. If a firm's market value can be determined simply 
by summing its component assets, firms can be sold in their entirety by this ap-
proach as well. Moreover, by deepening those capital markets already in exis-
tence, asset privatization helps lay the foundation for more complex, aggregated 
capital markets (i.e. stock markets for purchase and sale of entire firms), thus 
paving the way for capital privatization in the future. And since assets are sold at 
market values, asset privatization is likely to be efficient, ceteris paribus. 
As with capital privatization, however, asset privatization may be hindered by 
gaps between the firms' book value and the population's wealth. Asset privatiza-
tion is also a slow, deliberative process unable to quickly transform ownership re-
lations. 
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WORKER OWNERSHIP 
Worker ownership is the privatization strategy most consistent with the egali-
tarian ethos prevailing in many Central and Eastern European countries. Privati-
zation that leads to worker ownership can be understood in a number of ways. To 
the extent working-class movements played important roles in overthrowing the 
old system, worker ownership can be seen as a reward for labor's political sup-
port in the struggle. It can be perceived as the extension of participatory 
democracy into the workplace, as well as compensation for the sacrifices 
workers made during the decades of the "construction of socialism". Worker 
ownership can also be seen as a guarantee for labor of at least a modicum of 
security and dignity during (and after) the hardships of the transition to 
capitalism. 
The efficiency and equity aspects of a worker-ownership approach to privatiza-
tion are ambiguous. Social democratic advocates of participatory institutions be-
lieve that enfranchising workers with ownership and managerial rights and 
responsibilities will create more consensual labor-management relations and a 
more sophisticated, modern work force. Social democrats point to the extensive 
codetermination mechanisms present in Germany and Sweden, and credit these 
mechanisms with maintaining labor peace and relatively good labor-market per-
formance. Economic liberal critics of worker ownership emphasize the disas-
trous results associated with the Yugoslav self-management experiment, as well 
as the need for a genuine capitalist owner able to resist wage demands and impose 
tough, unpopular solutions. As Leszek Balcerowicz, Poland's leading economic 
liberal, puts it, worker ownership is an "experiment", and the countries of East-
Central Europe have had enough experiments. There is only one system which 
has been shown to work, Balcerowicz says -capitalism. 
The fairness of the worker-ownership approach is also debatable. Arguments 
that workers deserve enfranchisement do not take into account the random fates 
worker ownership would visit upon different firms and their workers. As a jour-
nalist put it: 
"Why should miners at a particularly productive mine, for example, get 
to keep their wonderful facility when miners at a much less productive, 
largely tapped-out mine down the road (miners who have worked at least 
as long and hard as their neighbors) get stuck with that junk pile? Is 
there any justice in that?"1 
1
 Weschler, L., "Reporter At Large: Shock", The New Yorker, December 10, 1990, pp. 
86-136; p. 99. 
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In other words, the rents workers in different factories would receive upon 
becoming owners would be essentially random, and inconsistent with any 
systematic definition of justice. 
On the positive side, however, a worker-ownership strategy can be im-
plemented rapidly. Stock in the privatized firms could be distributed for free 
or for a nominal fee to the workers employed in those firms, creating the 
broad dispersion of shares across small investors necessary for a stock mar-
ket to function. After the initial allocation of shares, workers as owners 
would be well-suited to obtain information and form expectations about the 
future performance of their firms, thus creating differentiated demands and 
prices for different stocks. 
REPRIVATIZATION 
Reprivatization, in the sense of returning property expropriated by the com-
munist governments to their previous owners (or their heirs), is a similarly 
ambiguous proposition. While the stereotype of the emigre businessman 
returning home to set his old firm to rights may be an alluring one, reality is 
likely much more complicated. First, some of the pre-1945 owners of 
nationalized property are objectionable on moral grounds (i.e. some collabo-
rated with the Nazi occupiers during the Second World War). Second, given 
the widespread confusion and destruction associated with the war and its 
aftermath, local and national borders were often changed, property demarca-
tions blurred, and property destroyed, thereby complicating the task of prov-
ing title to property. Third, since fewer and fewer pre-1945 owners remain 
alive, the legal issues pertaining to heirs and inheritance introduce additional 
complexities. 
The high transaction costs and length of time associated with resolving 
these issues raise questions about the efficiency and rapidity of repriva-
tization. Issues of war-time culpability raise questions about the reprivati-
zation's fairness. By returning expropriated assets to their former owners, 
reprivatization also means the state transfers property ownership without 
receiving compensation in return, which may be especially onerous for 
countries with large monetary overhangs or for countries desperately in need 
of foreign exchange. For these reasons, reprivatization would only be a 
relevant option for a fraction of state enterprises in most countries in the 
region. 
Evaluated in terms of efficiency, rapidity and justice, privatization is no 
panacea for the Central and East European economies; a conclusion in 
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creasingly accepted in the region. In fact, privatization poses other problems that 
have not yet received significant attention. These include the link between 
privatization and demonopolization efforts, joint ventures, and labor issues. 
PRIVATIZATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM4 
The problem of monopoly in socialist and post-socialist economies has only re-
cently been recognized. While its nature differs from monopoly under capital-
ism, some important similarities are present. According to neoclassical theory, 
monopoly is a major cause of market failure, with the partial exception of natural 
monopoly. By producing less and charging higher prices than would be the case 
under perfect competition, monopolies cause allocative inefficiency. Also, short-
run disincentives to select cost-minimizing production methods and long-run 
disincentives to innovate and invest in new technologies can be linked to monopo-
ly behavior. More generally, neoclassical and other schools of thought connect 
monopoly with undesirable concentrations of economic and political power. 
Socialist ideology traditionally ascribed the problems of monopoly to capital-
ism and imperialism, implicitly denying its relevance for socialism. Central 
planning was supposed to prevent enterprises from independently determining 
prices and quantities, preventing monopolies from misallocating resources away 
from "optimal" uses as identified by planners. Instead, the captains of socialist 
industry regarded monopolies as useful for two reasons: 1) they were seen as in-
struments for capturing economies of scale and scope, thus promoting economic 
development; and 2) the task of centrally planning and managing a small number 
of large units was thought simpler than planning and managing a large number 
of small units. This view resulted in the creation of large, vertically- and 
horizontally-integrated monopolies. 
Because of their size and importance to the national economy, monopolies un-
der traditional central planning possessed considerable bargaining power. 
Representatives of large state enterprises held seats in the party Central Commit-
tee and the parliament, thereby enjoying an inside track in the bureaucratic bat-
tles for investment capital and other resources. Monopolies often oppose eco-
nomic reforms, since consistent implementation of reform principles might 
bankrupt these organizations endowed with significant capital stock and employ-
ing thousands of workers. Moreover, reforms that decentralize authority for price 
and output decisions to the enterprise level provide monopolies with market pow-
er that can be used to restrict output and raise price, thereby permitting the tradi-
tional problems of capitalist monopoly to reappear. 
4
 For more on this see Slay, В., "Monopoly and Marketization in Polish Industry", Jahr-
buch der Wirtschaft Osteuropas, vol. 14/1, 1990. 
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The monopoly problem under socialism is therefore more than an efficiency 
issue—it is a problem of large organizations not subject to effective social control 
through either the plan or the market. To the extent that a rapid transition from 
socialism to capitalism is impossible, the monopoly problem remains a pressing 
one in the post-communist economy. While capitalist monopolies may worry 
about bond ratings, stock prices, and the appearance of potential (international if 
not domestic) competition, these controls are not present under either traditional 
socialism or during the early stages of the transition. The absence of capital mar-
kets in these economies prevents the formulation of "objective"- -external judg-
ments on the value or efficiency of monopolies. It also deprives decision-makers 
of information about alternative methods of organizing production and supply 
through mergers, acquisitions and, more importantly, divestitures and disso-
lutions. 
PROBLEMS OF ENACTING ANTI-TRUST POLICIES TO 
END MONOPOLIES 
Privatization in Poland, Hungary and other countries in the region has proceeded 
largely in the absence of, and at times in conflict with, anti-trust (or anti-
monopoly) policy. In their haste to sell privatized firms at the highest possible 
price, policy-makers are tempted to forget that monopoly power and monopoly 
rents increase the market value of an enterprise without creating commensurate 
social benefits. Investors, by contrast, prefer to buy a monopoly, even if the econ-
omy is stronger without the monopoly. 
Anti-trust policy can work at cross purposes with privatization. Although the 
authorities could launch anti-trust proceedings against a monopoly after it has 
been sold, such tactics could cast a pall over all future sales of state enterprises. 
Waiting to demonopolize the economy until all firms with monopoly power have 
been privatized implies suspending active anti-trust policy for the foreseeable fu-
ture. However, breaking up a state-owned monopoly may do more than reduce 
the income that privatizing the firm will generate for the state treasury; it can also 
deprive the country of a possible player in the international economy. When joint 
ventures are involved, breaking up domestic monopolies also has technology-
transfer implications in that dissolution may reduce the attractiveness of local 
firms to foreign partners, the sources of much-needed capital and technology. 
No country in the region has a comprehensive, integrated approach addressing 
the interrelationships between these issues. In fact, only Poland and Hungary 
have even established anti-monopoly agencies and begun to develop the founda-
tions for anti-trust policies. 
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PRIVATIZATION AND LABOR ISSUES 
Privatization raises old and new questions about relations between capital and 
labor. Workers under Soviet-style socialism effectively concluded a Faustian bar-
gain with the state: in return for job security and benefits provided by the state as 
manager/owner, labor surrendered claims to participate in enterprise governance 
and the right to form trade unions independent of the party-state nomenklatura. 
In breaking this bargain, enterprise privatization puts labor-management is-
sues at the center of the transformation process. Worker ownership is perhaps the 
most obvious manifestation of this. Worker ownership aside, creating new in-
stitutional structures to articulate and protect worker interests also constitutes an 
important element of the enterprise- transformation process. 
Despite obvious and important differences between workers, labor in the tradi-
tional Soviet-type economy was characterized by a greater degree of homogenei-
ty than in many capitalist countries. Trade union structures were highly central-
ized, government policy measures often contained uniform treatment for all 
workers, and the prevailing ideology emphasized the commonality working class 
"solidarity" and "culture". This homogenizing process can be seen in what 
might be called the "Soviet-type socialization" of work: the spread of the "they 
pretend to pay us, so we pretend to work" ethos throughout the working class. 
Worker-class struggles against the traditional system did not encourage greater 
individualism: Solidarity in Poland also emphasized unity in the struggle against 
the common enemy. 
The collapse of traditional socialism is likely to reverse this homogeneity and 
fragment the unity. As pointed out above, worker-ownership privatization 
bestows differential rents on different groups of workers in an essentially random 
fashion. Even if worker ownership is not pursued on a broad basis, the redistribu-
tion of rents across firms and industries that accompanies the transition will en-
rich some workers and pauperize others. Combined with macroeconomic stabili-
zation, which is likely to depress real wages, the resulting social and 
working-class dislocation could be extensive. 
In such an environment, a more individualistic ethos is likely to replace the 
emphasis on group solidarity. Workers interests would presumably be more 
closely linked to the branch, region, or firm in which they are employed. A de-
centralization and regionalization of the institutions devoted to articulating and 
protecting worker interests is therefore expected. 
The growth and development of genuine trade unions and workers' councils 
are suggested by this process. Trade unions responsive to their rank and file offer 
workers a measure of economic and job security, but their nature also encourages 
adversarial labor-management relations. If the worker management option is not 
taken and the new capitalists take a "hardball" approach to labor relations, a rad-
ical, confrontational, and populist trade union movement could result. While in 
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the short run such structures may protect the rights and positions of workers, the 
resulting labor-management acrimony and instability could make everyone 
worse off in the long run. To the extent that privatization takes the worker-
ownership route, or if state labor policies and the new owners seek to develop in-
stitutions of worker participation and codetermination, conflict and instability 
may be less likely. On the other hand, workplace democracy also has its costs, 
such as reduced managerial flexibility, difficulties in making and enforcing un-
popular decisions, and problems in interacting with an international economy 
comprised largely of firms without such institutions. In any case, policies to ease 
labor's transition to the new system and increase labor mobility (e.g. job retrain-
ing programs) would be desirable. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Socialism cannot be transformed into capitalism without transferring the owner-
ship of state firms to private actors. But the process itself is fraught with diffi-
culties, and none of the possible privatization strategies seems particularly 
promising in terms of speed, efficiency, and justice. Moreover, the efficiency 
consequences of any privatization scheme are made even less clear by the con-
flicts between privatization and demonopolization. 
The labor implications of these conclusions are similarly unclear. While the 
combination of privatization and macroeconomic stabilization policies is likely 
to impoverish many workers and fragment institutions for articulating and pro-
tecting worker interests, new possibilities are appearing for building consensual, 
participatory labor-management/ownership mechanisms. While primary atten-
tion may be focused on the specifics of privatization and the development of capi-
tal markets in Central and Eastern Europe, it must be remembered that every 
twist in the privatization road has implications for these countries' emerging 
labor-market institutions as well. 
DISCUSSION 
The presentation provoked a number of remarks regarding methods of privatiza-
tion and the applicability of the experiences of other countries. Asked about the 
feasibility of distributing shares of a development fund. Dr. Slay explained that 
although it may be a just and efficient solution, there are still potential problems 
associated with it: Who controls the fund? What happens if it goes bankrupt? 
Where does the money come from in the first place? Dr. Slay expressed his own 
preference for worker ownership, but admitted he could not make an airtight case 
for this option. 
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As members of the audience sought comparative privatization experiences, Dr. 
Slay stressed that the East European undertaking is fundamentally different. The 
only example of significant privatization was Chile in the mid-1970s. Chile, 
however, only transferred 400 firms (mostly to previous owners), had a function-
ing stock market, and had a complete banking system. In terms of development, 
Dr. Slay acknowledged that the experiences of the "Asian tigers" could provide 
Hungary with valuable lessons. 
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Labor Implications of Industrial Restructuring* 
The labor market constrains efforts on industrial restructuring. Looking at the re-
cent experiences of Romania, Poland, and East Germany, one can see the validity 
of this statement. Specifically, industrial restructuring has a negative impact on 
three areas: unemployment, poverty, and the fall of real income. 
The early attempts by Eastern Europe's governments have assumed that there 
is a causal relation between the three. However, it now appears that the correla-
tion is not as strong as originally thought. For example, the unemployment rate 
of the poor is high, but the poverty rate of the unemployed is surprisingly low. As 
there are not many newcomers into the ranks of the poor, meaning they must have 
been poor for a long time, the poverty is not caused by the risen unemployment 
rate. Each problem must be examined in its own context. 
JÁNOS KÖLLŐ 
MTA Institute of Economics 
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS SYSTEM 
As illustrated by Table 1, unemployment has been rising rapidly. 
Table 1 
The Unemployment Rate 
December 1986 
December 1987 
December 1988 
December 1989 
December 1990 
February 1991 
April 1991 
0 .1% 
0.2% 
0.4% 
0.7% 
1.2% 
2.7% 
3.1% 
Short version of the lecture. 
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The regions with the highest unemployment are either those with a high con-
centration of heavy industry or those that suffer from traditional rural under-
development. The unemployment rate by region is shown is Table 2. 
Table 2 
The Unemployment Rate by Region 
Szabolcs-Szatmár 7.7% 
Nógrád 5.8% 
Borsod A-Z 4.8% 
Békés 4.5% 
Heves 4.2% 
Tolna 3.8% 
Győr-Sopron 1.6% 
Vas 1.1 % 
Budapest 0.4% 
Unfortunately, there is no good data on the average duration of unemployment, 
which makes it difficult to design unemployment benefits. It is estimated, 
however, that the average duration of unemployment is 15 months. 
The implication of this data is that unemployment benefits system should be a 
generous insurance based with a maximum time limit. Some economists from 
the World Bank have recommended that Hungary implement a system of unlimit-
ed time duration. There would be four problems with such a system. The first is 
that the cost of maintaining it could rise dramatically in the next 1-1.5 years. Se-
cond, many who would be covered by the system would have never paid into it. 
Youth unemployment, for example, is currently at 35%. There could also be 
categories of people who pay but then are not covered, and people who do not pay 
and are not covered, but need the benefits. 
The third problem of the current system is that it grants unemployment benefits 
based on the person's last salary. In the first year, a person receives 70% of their 
last income, in year 2 it is 50%. There is a cap on benefits, which is now set at 
three times the minimum wage. This means that high-paid persons who become 
unemployed will earn more than many workers. Finally, with the high rate of in-
flation, it is likely that the real value of the benefits will decrease as the govern-
ment will not be able to keep pace with inflation. 
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MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION 
There is growing pressure to raise the minimum wage, which is now at 7000 ft. 
Chart 3 shows the percentage of person working below the minimum wage in var-
ious sectors. 
Table 3 
Minimum Wage 1991 
as claimed by accepted in tripartite 
unions agreement 
(8000 Ft) (7000 Ft) 
Workers below the respective 
minimum wage in per cent: 
Agriculture 52.7 40.2 
Industry 32.8 17.6 
Trade 33.3 18.1 
Construction 15.8 6.9 
Transportation 36.1 20.1 
All firms 31.5 17.0 
There are a number of sources of the pressure to raise the minimum wage. One 
is the increase in the wage differentials, illustrated by Chart 4, which shows the 
Lorenz-curve of gross monthly wages in 1984 and 1990. Another source is the 
connection between wages and the standard of living, which is falling. Still, the 
poverty level is determined by empirical, not normative, criteria. The current 
poverty line is 27,000 ft a month for a family of four. 
UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE SECOND ECONOMY 
It is difficult to discuss what is happening in the second economy as there is little 
reliable data. However, there are a number of factors that benefit those working 
in the second economy. For employers, they do not have to pay taxes and wages 
are considerably lower. Persons who are officially unemployed could supplement 
their benefits with jobs in the second economy and live rather well. One thing 
known about employment in the second economy is that it is growing, and this 
is largely because of the growing numbers of illegal immigrants. 
FINANCING PRIVATE SECTOR ACTIVITIES 
Financing Entrepreneurial Activities 
and the Growth of Small Business in Hungary 
• 
ZOLTÁN ROMÁN 
Hungarian Small Business Association 
In order to provide information on how entrepreneurs and small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SME) see their present situation, at the end of 1990 we con-
ducted a survey of 214 SMEs with industrial activity. Table 1 presents the 
responses on the rankings of problems confronted.1 
The assessment of the enterprises/entrepreneurs reflects the extent of problems 
with financing, high taxes, social insurance contributions (54.5%), inflation 
(about 35%), interest rates (about 40%), and banking. Although some tax relief 
and preferential credit schemes have been introduced recently, the funds are 
limited, the conditions offered are not attractive enough, and the procedures are 
too complicated. In addition, Hungarian banks (also in a transitional stage) are 
not very interested in SME's, although this attitude is changing slowly. Finally, 
access to venture capital is extremely constrained. 
In Hungary, as in the other centrally-planned economies, private business had 
only been tolerated and restricted to a marginal role. This did not change much 
after the economic reform of 1968. In 1977 the role of private small business was 
again redefined as to meet the population's demand in services and repair. Spe-
cial individual licences were needed for start-ups and the number of employees 
was limited to 6 persons, including family members and three apprentices. Pri-
vate enterprises were discriminated against in terms of material supplies, con-
tracting state-owned enterprises, and export. Finally, business success was usual-
ly accompanied by an increasing number of inspections. 
1
 The responses were evaluated according to two methods. First, points were assigned 
to the 4 possible answers: it causes no problem—O; small problem—1; moderate 
problem-3; heavy problem-6. Then the number of points were aggregated and the dis-
tribution of points calculated. Second, the distribution of the "it causes heavy problem" 
responses were determined (Total B). 
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Table 1. 
Ranking of the problems confronted by SMEs 
Problems Micro-firms 
Small 
firms 
Medium 
sized-
firms-
Total Total 
В/ 
Inflation 10,32 12,94 12,15 11,91 12,90 
Interest rates 10,65 11,56 12,26 11,64 14,20 
Social insurance contribution 14,20 13,94 10,63 12,53 14,50 
Taxes 12,55 12,69 12,48 12,54 14,60 
Credit possibilities 9,28 9,30 8,78 9,06 9,20 
Government regulation 10,51 7,79 8,89 8,99 7,90 
Too much paperwork 8,77 7,58 8,51 8,37 6,40 
Realizing sales 6,71 6,99 8,34 7,52 6,80 
Shortage of parts and materials, domestic 9,28 8,37 8,34 8,60 7,40 
Shortage of parts and materials, imported 4,54 4,56 4,25 4,42 3,10 
Availability of qualified manpower 2,70 3,64 4,92 3,96 2,40 
Other 0,48 0,64 0,45 0,46 0,51 
Total 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 
From 1981 on licencing became more liberal and the employee limit was 
gradually raised; to illustrate the slow changes: 1981 - 9 persons, 1983 - 12, 1988 
- 30, 1989 - 500, 1990 - no limit at all. The prohibition turned to benevolent toler-
ance. Now instead of administrative measures, only the financial conditions and 
the lack of infrastructure kept back the growth of small business. Until the free 
election in March/April 1990, there was also a lack of confidence regarding start-
ups and expansion. 
From 1981 to 1989, impressive developments in small enterprises can be seen, 
especially in retail trade, catering, and transportation. Table 2 illustrates the 
rapid growth in private small businesses after the political changes. 
Table 2. 
Number of private entrepreneurs / small business owners 
31 December 31 December 31 December 
1981 1989 1990 
Industry (including construction and services) 112 176 212 
Retail trade and catering 15 42 75 
Other activities 22 28 
Total 127 240 315 
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At the end of 1989, private small businesses employed about 100,000 persons 
in addition to 40,000 family members. At the same time, 20,000 licences were 
used by pensioners and 54,000 as second jobs. This means employment in private 
small business was less than 10% while in market economies this share is about 
50%. 
In 1988 the Parliament approved Law VI, which widened the choice of the le-
gal forms of the state-owned enterprises, allowing the formation of unlimited 
partnerships, deposit (or limited) partnerships, unions, joint enterprises, limited 
liability companies, and companies limited by shares (joint stock companies). 
The law also opened the gates for enterprises with mixed (state, foreign, private) 
ownership and Law XXIV/1988 on Foreign Investments made foreign invest-
ments in Hungary more attractive. Another important act, Law XIII approved by 
the Parliament in the spring of 1989, regulated the transformation of the enter-
prises from one statute to another. 
From 1989 on, the establishment of joint stock companies and limited liability 
companies has greatly multiplied, as shown in Table 3. According to these 
figures, the number of cooperatives, state-owned enterprises, and other econom-
ic organizations did not change significantly, but this hides the fact that many 
cooperatives became limited liability companies and many subunits of state-
owned companies had also been transformed into this legal form. Most of the 
limited liability companies are small firms; from the 38122 "economic organiza-
tions" in Table 3, more than 80% have less than 50 employees. 
Table 3. 
The number of economic organizations according to new and 
"traditional" legal forms 
31 Dec. 31 March 
1988 1989 1990 1990 
Joint stock companies 116 304 646 777 
Limited liability companies 451 4 485 18 317 26 837 
Co-operatives 6 880 7 076 7 132 7 160 
Other economic organizations 3 298 3 301 3 375 3 338 
Total 10 745 14 869 29 470 38 122 
The Hungarian Central Statistics Office (CSO) provided data on enterprises 
primarily by ownership form and to a limited extent by size; the CSO has started 
to adjust its services to the systemic changes, but was not able to follow them in 
time. Therefore, the aggregate figures on the size of small businesses are not 
available and only estimates can be made. 
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As Table 4 illustrates, at the end of 1989 there were 3686 industrial organiza-
tions (state-owned enterprises and cooperatives), 49,934 private firms, and 13,115 
sub-units of non-industrial organizations engaged in industrial activities. 
Table 4. 
The share of SME's engaged in industrial activities 
(end of 1989) 
Small 
enter-
prises 
(-100) 
Medium 
sized 
enter-
prises 
(101-500) 
SME's 
(-500) 
Large 
enter-
prises 
(501-) 
Total 
Industrial organizations 
Private firms 
Non-industrial organizations 
Number of enterprises 
2 080 979 
49 934 
13 115 
3 059 627 3 686 
49 934 
13 115 
Total 
Percentage 
65 129 
97,6 
979 
1,5 
66 108 
99,1 
627 
0.9 
66 735 
100,0 
Industrial organizations 
Private firms 
Non-industrial organizations 
Number of employees 
60 473 220 750 281223 
78 912 - 78 912 
217 557 - 217 557 
1 075 204 1 356 427 
78 912 
217 557 
Total 
Percentage 
356 942 220 750 577 692 1 075 204 1 652 896 
21,6 13,4 35,0 65,0 100,0 
Including the semi-autonomous industrial subunits of the non-industrial or-
ganizations indicated in Table 4, which, with a few exceptions, have less than 100 
employees, already in 1989 the share of small businesses in industrial employ-
ment amounted to 21.6% and the share of SMEs 35%. Without these semi-
autonomous sub-units, these figures were 9.7 % and 25.1 %. So, the share of small 
and medium-sized enterprises in Hungary was and still is significantly less than 
in market economies (this share in the EC is 67.1%), but it is higher than in the 
other Eastern European countries. 
In the structural adjustments in 1970s and 1980s, the urgent need to change the 
pattern of production by branches and products was emphasized. Now in the 
framework of the on-going systemic changes, two other kinds of structural ad-
justment come to the fore in all Eastern European economies. These are the radi-
cal modification of the size and ownership patterns of enterprises. 
Several objective trends and necessities point to the necessity of reversing the 
proportions SMEs and large enterprises. Some areas are listed below without 
ranking in terms of importance: 
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• Technical progress diminishes the minimum efficient scale of production 
in most branches. 
• With higher incomes, the demand for the special products and services of 
small business is increasing; it first takes place in the export sector, but 
gradually occurs in the domestic markets, too. 
• There is a growing need for autonomous work and entrepreneurship in 
these countries, and small business offers more possibility for them. 
• Many large unprofitable or even loss-making state-owned enterprises can 
be reorganized by breaking them down into smaller units. 
• Unemployment is increasing in these countries and it can be partially ab-
sorbed by the growth of small business. 
• In most branches, the flexible production and marketing system is based 
on the balanced proportion and on the cooperation of small-, medium, 
and large-sized enterprises. 
• According to historical trends, the share of sectors where plant sizes is 
smaller is increasing. 
• Democratic societies need a strong middle-class and market competi-
tion, which presupposes a significant SME sector. 
The strengthening of SMEs implies a number of aims. These include increas-
ing their competitiveness and their contribution to the implementation of all 
major targets of the economic policy. From this point of view, we must take into 
account that—like the other the Eastern European countries—Hungary faces a 
number of tasks to be performed simultaneously: 
• To implement the changes in the political and economic systems 
• To increase their competitiveness by "doing things better" 
• By "doing better things" which means to accelerate structural adjustment 
• To manage foreign indebtedness and the state budget deficit 
• To handle inflation, unemployment, and poverty. 
These tasks are closely interrelated. The timing of the steps, forecasting the 
possible negative side-effects, and looking for synergic impacts are of utmost im-
portance. An OECD Economic Outlook publication (June 1990, p. 48.) present-
ed data on per capita GDP. The OECD average was 14,637 and the estimates for 
the East European countries ranged from 4,117 (Rumania) to 9,361 (GDR), while 
Hungary was at 6,491. Since employment is higher in all these countries, the 
differences indicate a substantial gap in productivity. According to other calcula-
tions, this gap is wider than these figures, particularly when the quality and relia-
bility of the products and services are taken into consideration. 
In a shortage-economy without market competition, poor quality and reliabili-
ty is a general phenomenon. In such an environment small businesses can and 
frequently do excel with better quality, but in a quasi-monopolistic situation they 
F I N A N C I N G PRIVATE SECTOR A C T I V I T I E S 111 
can also survive without it. There was seldom competition among the subcon-
tractors and until recently SME's were isolated from export markets. Quality im-
provement, therefore, is a first order imperative for both for small, medium and 
large enterprises—particularly with the preparation for the Single Market 1992. 
All the measures aimed at training, consultancy, easier access to credits, in-
frastructure, up-to-date technology and equipment, and preferential treatment 
for the SMEs should pay special attention to competitiveness, quality, and 
productivity. Trade associations, which are building new structures and redefin-
ing their tasks, should not only be interest groups in the narrow sense; they must 
enhance the competitiveness of their members by joint actions, services, and net-
working. Also, the experience and assistance of the market economies can be a 
significant benefit. 
This leads back to the problem of financing. Usually preferential credit and 
guarantee schemes for small business will be elaborated and introduced in order 
to promote start-ups. Less attention will be paid to assist modernization, buying 
new machines, adopting new technologies or new managerial methods to im-
prove quality, efficiency, and cost-competitiveness. Thinking about the need to 
increase the role of entrepreneurs in privatization, financial assistance for buying 
the state-owned assets will usually be offered. However, the requirements to res-
tructure the company and modernize its production capacities will be forgotten. 
Therefore, the access to capital should be facilitated, its costs reduced, and its 
risk shared, but special consideration also must be given to the needs for moder-
nization and upgrading competitiveness, a prerequisite for survival and growth in 
an international market environment. For this purpose, separate funds, schemes, 
and institutions will also be needed. 
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Financing Entrepreneurial Activities 
from Within the Firm 
LOWELL STEELE 
Innovation is the topic at hand—a continuation of our theme of change and tur-
moil. It is important to distinguish between "good trouble" and "bad trouble." 
Good trouble can generate stress and anxiety, but it has the potential to lead to 
good results. Based on our discussion, I believe that Hungary is experiencing 
good trouble. 
Much, if not most, entrepreneurial activity involves innovation—the introduc-
tion of change. Innovation is inherently risky because there is no way to demon-
strate a priori that the change will be beneficial, is needed, or will be successful. 
It is important to recognize that no management technique or method of analysis 
can eliminate these risks. 
I helped General Electric (GE) innovate for over 25 years, and I have conclud-
ed that innovation is a very local phenomenon. One can find innovative and non-
innovative businesses in the same enterprise, and, in a similar fashion, a business 
that has been innovative can cease to be so. Innovation ultimately results from a 
happy merger of market opportunity and an individual or groups of individuals 
who have the vision and courage to seize that opportunity. Management can cre-
ate a climate that encourages innovation, but it cannot make it happen. Innovation 
is somewhat like motherhood—study and analysis are poor preparation. 
Innovation includes a wide spectrum, from incremental improvements in a 
product or process to the use of new capabilities that supplant existing ones but 
perform the same general function to entirely new products or systems. Most at-
tention is given to dramatic discontinuities, such as transistors, lasers, and Xe-
rox. It is arguable, however, that the continuing refinement and improvement of 
existing capability is, in the aggregate, of greater importance. The steam engine 
benefitted from 100 years of improvements, without which its impact would have 
been much less. 
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THE ODDS OF SUCCESS 
Despite the publicity associated with successful innovations, most innovations do 
not succeed. Certainly less than 5 % of efforts succeed-some would say less than 
1 %. Most innovations fail because they do not offer sufficient advantage to war-
rant the risk and cost of introducing them. Therefore, performance and cost bar-
riers to success perform a useful function, because they protect the economy 
from the upset of uneconomic change. Since most fail, managers can be lured 
into the trap of always rejecting innovation because failure is the most probable 
outcome. 
Successful management has two faces. One face seeks certainty, works to 
preserve order, and resists change. Only by such rigorous behavior can predicta-
ble, efficient performance be sustained. Another face accepts risk, encourages 
innovation, and nurtures a certain creative disorder, because only by such action 
can the innovations that assure the survival of the enterprise be nurtured. 
FINANCING INNOVATION 
Financing innovation requires establishing a specific plan and budget for this 
aspect of management's work; i.e., a strategic budget to finance change. For ex-
ample, Texas Instruments prepares separate operational and strategic plans and 
has a specialized management system to deal with each. A number of techniques 
can be used to provide financing mechanisms with no inherent advantage for any 
single one: separate line items representing uncommitted funds to be spent op-
portunistically; a special corporate growth fund; a requirement for a certain per-
centage of the engineering or R&D budget to be spent on new products or 
processes; the creation of a separate new business development component 
whose sole objective is to create new businesses. 
Because of the expense and risk involved, a number of techniques have evolved 
that help spread the risk of innovation among companies: venture capital pools, 
special limited partnerships, joint ventures and consortia, and intimate relation-
ships with selected vendors. 
A number of issues emerge as more or less universal problems that must be ad-
dressed in financing innovation, e.g. corporate- level vs. operating-level control, 
sole responsibility vs. mixed with other duties, patience vs. generosity in provid-
ing funds, gentle vs. tough demands for performance, reward vs. penalty for suc-
cess and failure. The choices made regarding these options will strongly affect 
the chances of success. 
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MANAGING INNOVATION 
In general, the closer to operations that an innovation can be located, the greater 
its chances of success. Sooner or later an innovation must begin to act like an on-
going business and if it has been nurtured in an overly protected environment, the 
transition to reality can be painful. 
Innovation suffers a virtually fatal handicap if it is assigned to people who have 
other responsibilities. It requires almost fanatical commitment to succeed and 
the diversion from other responsibilities often prove fatal. 
"Patient money" is often invoked as a requirement for success. In my ex-
perience, demanding appraisal of results is equally, if not more, necessary. The 
market is a demanding taskmaster and living in a forgiving environment is poor 
preparation. 
Innovation requires such intensive dedication that those involved become poor 
judges of the prospects for the innovation. One painful but necessary function 
that management must perform is to monitor progress against agreed-upon goals 
and to determine when to terminate an effort. 
Since innovation is such a risky undertaking, great care must be exercised to 
see that the rewards are not only be financial. Promotion to a position of greater 
responsibility can be a valuable incentive for innovators in an ongoing business. 
The opportunity to create a new enterprise can in itself be a powerful incentive 
for independent entrepreneurs. 
For an established enterprise, one difficult but important responsibility of 
senior management is to distinguish between an adequately managed attempt at 
innovation that was simply fated to fail and one in which inept management was 
an important contributor to the failure. In the former case, it is important that the 
failure does not damage the careers of those involved. 3M is an excellent example 
of a persistently innovative company that protects people associated with failed 
innovations. 
DISCUSSION 
Members of the audience were interested in further details on the origin of inno-
vation. 
• One participant asked if innovation more commonly originated from wi-
thin the firm or from the firm's sales force that related market demands 
back to the researchers. Dr. Steele responded that the standard classifica-
tion of demand-driven and supply-driven innovation is a great oversim-
plification. Still, he explained, the big breakthroughs are usually techno-
logically driven, but the majority of innovations are demand driven. By 
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definition, an innovation that succeeds finds a market demand but great 
ingenuity and persistence may be needed to identify and energize that 
demand. 
• One participant noted that the presentation began by stating innovation is 
local and ended with an emphasis on external funding and globalization 
of R&D. Dr. Steele explained that research is local, development is 
global. Also, one should distinguish between doing R&D and creating an 
innovation. They are related, but very different kinds of work. R&D cre-
ates opportunities for innovation, but it does not exploit them. 
• There were also questions regarding the psychological profile of a good 
R&D manager. Dr. Steele explained that the profile is not obvious. One 
common trait, however, is that they tend not to criticize the work of others 
themselves. Their position of power makes them too threatening. Rather, 
they send proponents of new ideas to others for critical review in the early 
stages. He continued that it is easy to sort potentially good managers from 
good researchers very early in their careers, often within their first year 
with a firm. 
• The discussion concluded with an inquiry about the role of government 
in R&D, citing the Concorde as a project with a strong government role. 
Dr. Steele felt that in general the government is ineffective in guessing the 
demands of the marketplace and in targeting funds for specific projects. 
Regarding the Concorde, while it was a technical success, it was an eco-
nomic and social failure: it never achieved its goal of changing the way 
people travel. 
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Hungarian Experiences with Joint Ventures 
TAMÁS BENEDEK 
Institute of Industrial Economics 
In Hungary the possibility of forming a joint venture (J V) has existed for nearly 
20 years. However, only in the second half of the 1980s, particularly after the 6th 
and 24th Law of 1988, has the number of JVs grown rapidly. In 1989 the total 
number of JVs registered in Hungary was 282. By November 1989 this number 
had increased to 803 and by mid-1990 the number nearly doubled to 1500 Most 
of these companies (ca. 60%) are small with less than FT 5 million (ca. 70.000) 
in capital and most are in the service sector (ca. 70%). According to some esti-
mates and the data of Central Statistical Office, there are about 4000 companies 
in Hungary with some level of foreign participation. 
There are 3 main ways for foreign capital to invest in Hungarian firms. The eas-
iest method is to buy shares of a Hungarian company. Until recently, however, 
very few Hungarian companies were joint-stock companies. A 1989 law details 
how state-owned firms may transform themselves into a joint-stock company, but 
a license from the State Property Agency is needed. 
The second way, which is quite common, is when Hungarian and foreign en-
trepreneurs (either a company or a private individuals) decide to establish a new 
firm. This newly established firm can easily be registered within one month. 
With regards to Hungarian regulations and laws, it operates as a normal Hungari-
an company, although it may be granted some special allowances, such as a tax 
holiday and free profit repatriation. 
The third way of establishing a JV is when a foreigner buys part or all of an ex-
isting Hungarian company. The result of this is generally a new Limited Liability 
Company (Ltd), in which common ownership exists among the foreign partner, 
the Hungarian State, and some private Hungarians. 
There are several factors that influence the foreign entrepreneur's decision on 
whether to invest in Hungary. The following factors are based on interviews and 
hypotheses: 
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• New market possibilities is one of the most important concerns, especial-
ly in the case of the large and well- known multinational companies. Hun-
gary is a relatively small market, but many entrepreneurs and Western 
companies feel that with experience in Hungary and with an office there, 
they would be prepared to enter the markets of other previously socialist 
countries. 
• Profitability and monopolistic market situation is also a positive aspect, 
especially for the small- or medium- sized companies. 
• Geographical location of the country is good, and the climate and the 
general conditions can be quite pleasant. 
• Nostalgia and other emotional aspects could play an important role in the 
decisions. 
• The political situation and the cultural life are accepted. 
• The quality and the price of manpower are positive. 
• Legal and regulatory frameworks are not bad for running a business. 
• Liberalization is growing, competition among the Hungarian suppliers is 
stronger than before, and selection among the partners is not too difficult. 
• Importation has been almost completely liberalized and profit repatria-
tion in hard currency is possible. 
Besides the advantages of the Hungarian market, there are many weaknesses 
and problems that frighten away foreign entrepreneurs and companies. As it was 
noticed by one of the managers of DIGITAL, which has established a J V in Hun-
gary, ".. .the footprints of the 40 years communism can be seen everywhere in the 
daily life." The following is some of these "footprints": 
• The entire infrastructure is weak, but there are particular problem with 
the telecommunications system and the energy sector. 
• Bureaucracy is still high. It is difficult to find competent partners and to 
follow the laws and regulations. Because of the uncertainties in the econ-
omy and the legal structure, risk taking and decision making are still a 
problem. 
• Taxation and the entrepreneurial laws (6/1988) are better than it was or 
than they are in the competing countries, but they are not similar to 
western regulations. 
• Language and communication as well as the performance of workers 
could be a problem. 
• The currency is not convertible, and intlation is high. 
Summarizing the situation, there are three main economic factors that could 
frighten or encourage the foreign capital: laws and regulations, infrastructure, 
and competitive advantages. All three factors must work together in a complex 
system. While laws and the infrastructure can be developed within a relatively 
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short period, creating competitive advantages cannot be. These are the key fac-
tors of the future of Hungarian economy. 
While on one hand many Hungarian economists are trying to discover how the 
country could be more attractive for foreign capital, politicians, some 
economists, sociologists and other prominent persons are involved in a perma-
nent debate on the positive and negative effects of allowing foreign capital into the 
Hungarian economy. 
There are two extreme views on the possible effects of foreign capital in the 
Hungarian economy. The proponents of the first platform claim that foreign capi-
tal is the "one and only" medicine for the very sick economy. This argument 
points to joint ventures and foreign capital imports as the only solution for 
privatization, economic growth, competitiveness, and repayment of the 22 bil-
lion debt. The other party cries that this is the way of the destruction, that these 
"anti-Hungarian" movements are the main tools of selling out the country. 
All of these extreme arguments have one important common characteristic: the 
ideas have some examples to back them up, but no research or data as proof. To-
day, even with over 4000 JVs, joint ventures only play a peripheral role in the 
economy. Nobody could find any significant economic field where their share 
would be 5-10%. However, their attractiveness and continuing growth makes 
them the center of curiosity. 
For the creative and research oriented economist, this show on the "Hungarian 
stage" illustrates some important conclusions. First, one should not debate 
without researched and proven arguments. Secondly, one should strongly fight 
for introducing research projects that can closely follow the economy, analyze 
statistical data, and forecast. 
There are questions typically at the center of these debates that should be an-
swered sooner or later. The answers are needed not only for the above-mentioned 
arguments, but more importantly to create an effective strategy to encourage or 
limit foreign capital participation in Hungary. 
To conclude, the typical arguments that urgently need to be researched and an-
swered will be listed. 
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF JOINT VENTURES 
• JVs and foreign capital accelerate the whole economy. 
• They create new jobs, positively affecting unemployment. 
• They help transform the economy from centrally planned status into a 
market oriented one by introducing market behavior and help deregulate 
and liberalize the laws. 
• They help the economic structural change, particularly in industry, and 
can automatically find and develop the competitive advantages of the 
country. 
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• They are the only source in the near future that could stop the recession. 
• They can create and develop competition on the domestic market, they 
would help balance supply and demand, and the monopolistic situation 
would be destroyed. 
• They could help with exporting to competitive markets, which would 
have a positive effect on the balance of payment problem. 
• They would provide opportunities for the import and adaptation of 
advanced technology and advanced methods of marketing and ma-
nagement. 
• They are the easiest and fastest tool for privatization. 
• They have a direct, positive impact on democratization. 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST FOREIGN CAPITAL PARTICIPATION 
• Enjoying the profit repatriation possibilities, they take out Hungarian na-
tional income in hard currency. 
• They destroy the balance of payment and the balance of trade. 
• Familiar within market oriented circumstances, they abuse Hungary's 
underdeveloped laws and regulations. 
• They take skilled and talented manpower away from Hungarian firms. 
• They create more environmental degradation. 
• They export everything in Hungary with value. 
• They create anarchy and do not want to introduce any kind of social 
support. 
• They only introduce the "second hand" technology and their contribu-
tion is only unsalable products. 
• They do not want to help, but rather want to hinder the competitiveness 
of Hungarian products on foreign markets. 
• Most of the entrepreneurs coming to Hungary are unsuccessful, untalent-
ed people who were unable to survive in existing market economies. 
• They accelerate inflation, they do not pay taxes, and they are only trying 
to make a high profit in the short-term. 
The arguments could be continued, but these are the most important. Again, 
Hungary's most important task is to analyze the economy. Then, with the help of 
correct and clear information, Hungary can determine: "How could or should a 
country with an economy like ours apply or refuse foreign capital?" 
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DISCUSSION 
The discussion continued the debate on the positive and negative aspects of joint 
ventures. One NAS participant commented that the alternative to joint ventures 
may be no business, as foreign firms will be such a critical source of resources 
and expertise. Dr. Benedek explained that many Hungarian firms are under the 
illusion that their products would be competitive on Western markets if only they 
could enter these markets. 
Turning more specifically to whether JVs have brought tangible benefits to 
Hungary, the NAS participant argued that JVs are creating wealth in Hungary. 
One of the MTA participants provided two additional reasons why Hungarians 
have negative attitudes towards JVs. First, there have been a number of highly 
publicized scandals involving JVs. Secondly, most of the JVs are in the service 
sector, and many people still believe that these non- productive enterprises do not 
contribute to the economy. 
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Venture Capital's Role in 
Industrial Strategies and Policies 
for Economic Growth 
• 
VINCENT H. TOBKIN 
Sierra Ventures 
SUMMARY 
Collaboration between Western venture capitalists and East European scientific 
institutes holds significant promise for economic growth. Although the condi-
tions necessary for such collaboration are currently rare, they are becoming 
more prevalent. One such U.S.-USSR collaboration in the field of molecular bi-
ology is enjoying early success. Sierra Ventures, a California-based venture capi-
tal firm, and the Institute of Protein Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences 
began collaborating early in 1990. What follows is a review of this particular un-
dertaking and its implications for economic development for other scientific 
research institutes in Eastern Europe. 
BACKGROUND 
RiboGene is a start-up company in the field of molecular biology jointly formed 
by Sierra Ventures and the Institute of Protein Research. The objective of this 
California company is to commercialize the cell free protein synthesis technolo-
gy developed by the Institute of Protein Research. The Institute of Protein 
Research is a major shareholder in RiboGene, collaborates with RiboGene on 
research and development, and is represented on both RiboGene's Board of 
Directors and its Scientific Advisory Board. The Institute's main representatives 
at RiboGene are its Director, Alexander Spirin, and its Deputy Director, 
Vladimir Filimonov. 
This pioneering collaboration was undertaken because of the world-wide im-
portance of the Institute of Protein Research's discoveries. Very briefly, the Insti-
tute has discovered techniques for enabling ribosomes, the source of protein as-
sembly in cells, to continuously and economically produce proteins in a cell-free 
122 F I N A N C I N G PRIVATE SECTOR A C T I V I T I E S 122 
environment. Their insights are based upon a comprehensive understanding of 
the mechanisms by which proteins are assembled by the ribosomes. The initial 
commercial significance of these discoveries is the ability to improve the speed, 
purity, and cost of synthesizing a wide variety of proteins, especially drugs. In the 
longer term, the Institute's discoveries may serve as a means of producing both 
naturally occurring proteins not manufacturable using conventional technology 
and protein-like compounds not currently present in nature. 
PREREQUISITES 
Sierra Ventures undertook forming RiboGene with the Institute of Protein 
Research because several necessary conditions existed. Foremost of these is a 
truly world-class scientific discovery. We estimate that RiboGene now has a one 
to two year lead over competitors in the United States, Japan, and Europe. Sierra 
Ventures was able to recruit a California-based start-up team capable of under-
standing and enhancing the Institute's work. This team is headed by Dr. K. P. 
Wong, Dean of Science, California State University at Fresno and Adjunct 
Professor of Biochemistry and Biophysics, University of California, San Fran-
cisco Medical School. The Institute, following the advice of scientific colleagues 
in the West, had also sought world-wide patent protection for its discoveries. Fur-
thermore, Sierra Ventures was able and willing to undertake the international 
negotiations and secure the government approvals required for RiboGene's for-
mation. Finally, the Institute of Protein Research was willing to let a Western 
partner set the pace and direction of future collaboration. 
This set of conditions is likely to be required for comparable collaboration in 
other fields. Social and governmental changes in Eastern Europe should facilitate 
the creation of these conditions. Sierra Venture's success with RiboGene has in-
creased awareness of and interest in such collaboration among other U.S. venture 
capitalists. 
CURRENT STATUS 
RiboGene has met with both scientific and financial investors as it begins com-
mercializing its technology. Several California venture funds are close to invest-
ing in the company and initial reactions of target customers have been extremely 
favorable. Scientific investigation also continues, and RiboGene's recent discov-
eries suggest that cell-free protein synthesis technology will be widely ap-
plicable. 
The Institute of Protein Research and the USSR Academy of Sciences are 
receiving several benefits from this collaboration, which should encourage fu-
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ture economic development in the USSR: the Institute's scientists have more fre-
quent and more extensive interaction with their Western counterparts, RiboGene 
is subsidizing the Institute's hard currency budget for equipment and reagents, 
and the value of the Institute's stock in RiboGene has increased handsomely. In 
the longer run, the Institute hopes to license from RiboGene's customers the right 
to make their newest drugs for use within the Soviet Union. Success here would 
result in a world-class drug industry within the USSR, meeting both the current-
ly unserved health needs of the Soviet people and creating numerous high-
technology jobs. 
Ministerial and Academy leaders who approved the Institute of Protein's col-
laboration also hoped that personnel involved with RiboGene would become 
familiar with the economic and managerial tools used by the Western venture 
capitalists. Skills in the areas of market assessment, project management, 
product definition, international negotiation, corporate partnering, and cor-
porate finance are badly needed by Soviet industry and science to improve both 
the efficiency of their domestic activities and the competitiveness of their inter-
national activities. Acquiring these skills is particularly important for those insti-
tutes now allowed to conduct limited production of products previously monopo-
lized by production ministries. These skills are being transferred to the Soviets 
collaborating with RiboGene. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER INSTITUTES 
This example of successful collaboration suggests several means by which scien-
tific institutes can serve as the initiators of economic growth. Direct involvement 
with Western venture capitalists should produce comparable successes in other 
fields when prerequisite conditions are present. The institutes may also be able 
to engage in related collaboration with existing companies in venture capital 
portfolios. However, in these cases the institute's technology must be synergistic 
to the technology already pursued by the companies. Still, attracting the attention 
of the management of these small companies may be difficult. Expanding exist-
ing relationships with major Western corporations also may be possible. Closer 
collaboration with major corporations and increased participation in business 
decision making could provide additional benefits to scientific institutes. 
Finally, continued collaboration with Western venture capitalists, their portfo-
lio companies, and even major corporations will convincingly contribute to fu-
ture economic development. First, collaboration over many years should con-
tribute to higher levels of scientific and business competency and international 
competitiveness within East European societies. The resulting efficiencies in 
research and development, product design, production start-up, and use of finan-
cial resources should carry over into other enterprises through transfer of person-
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nel, publicity of success, and business education. Second, the development of 
several successful collaborations should reduce the perceived risk of Western in-
vestment in Eastern Europe. Several Western financial organizations are already 
in discussions with Sierra Ventures about using our experience in their investing 
activity. 
DISCUSSION 
The discussion illuminated the following important additional aspects: 
• Ventures vary in their political risk as well as economic risk. Least risky 
along both dimensions would be establishing a Western sales subsidiary. 
Somewhat more risky would be a Western-sponsored startup based on 
East European technology. Most risky, both economically and political-
ly, would be a joint venture focused on internal East European markets. 
• Projects involving venture capitalists can be expensive and take a long 
time to develop. For example, Sierra Ventures negotiated with the Insti-
tute of Protein Research for eighteen months before the Institute agreed 
to the deal. To date Sierra Ventures has invested 400,000 into RiboGene 
and expects to spend 10 - 15 million before it sees any return on the in-
vestment. 
• There were questions on whether world-class biotech advances were be-
ing created in Hungary. The Hungarian government invested FT 400 mil-
lion on biotechnology research from 1987 through 1990, but some work-
shop participants felt the money was poorly spent. Still, Hungarian 
researchers have been involved in important work in the biotech field, but 
they lack the funds and the knowhow to either develop discoveries or sell 
them. Currently domestic banks are unprepared to make the necessary 
risky investments. If Western funds are to be attracted, a healthy dialogue 
at both scientific and business levels will be necessary. Mutual trust must 
be developed, and both parties must perceive potential benefits. 
• Much more than promising new technology is required to turn a scientif-
ic discovery into an economic success. Venture capitalists bring skills in 
strategy, finance, marketing, and business planning, as well as additional 
skills from the West in science and technology. Furthermore, venture 
capitalists are deeply and actively involved in managing a new enterprise. 
Their relationship to the news enterprise is much broader and more inti-
mate than that traditionally associated with bankers. They represent a 
potentially important resource in efforts to revitalize the Hungarian 
economy. 
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• The key role of new venture firms is not their effect on employment, be-
cause that will be minuscule. Venture firms will probably only make up 
1% of new joint ventures. However, jobs in those new ventures will be 
very attractive in terms of skill levels and pay. A much more important 
benefit will result from Hungarian partners learning about Western busi-
ness practices and management. The value of the learning acquired by 
Western partners is at this stage less clear, but activities are still at a very 
early stage. 
CASE STUDIES 
Enterprise Crisis, Privatization and 
International Challenges: 
The Case of a Major Hungarian Electronics Company 
• 
ÁDÁM TÖRÖK 
MTA Research Institute of Industrial Economics 
The Hungarian electronics industry has plunged into the deepest crisis of its his-
tory. The reasons for this are many, but perhaps the most important is this sector's 
former privileged status in the centrally planned economy. The crisis has been 
deepened by the fact that most firms in the field opted for a survival strategy 
strongly dependent on further financial commitment by the state. 
The company in this case study has been one of the major employers of the 
Hungarian engineering industry and is the biggest electronics firm. Its employ-
ment peaked at 20,000 in the best year of its history, 1988. The extent of the firm's 
crisis is shown by the downward trend in employment that crossed the 10,000 
mark in June 1991. 
The company has been a "15 million firm" in terms of exports to the West and 
a "70 million firm" in terms of total output. Its current main product lines have 
been consumer electronics, computer products, and military products. In the 
area of consumer electronics, product mix was wide in order to compete with 
practically all Western imports on the Hungarian market. The market was heavi-
ly protected, but even under the conditions of an import-licensing system the effi-
ciency of protection is conditional upon the availability of domestically produced 
goods. This production had the home market as its main outlet. In the company's 
best years, it also included about 15 million worth of exports to the West. 
Computer equipment was a typical case of product and technology develop-
ment aimed at the Soviet market. A product line still available in 1989 was based 
on a French license bought in the mid-1970s. The firm could become "incum-
bent" on the Soviet market with extensive sales and servicing networks there 
primarily owing to this product line. The Soviet buyers insisted on the same 
product in its unchanged form even in the 1980s, because the Soviets used the 
Hungarian computers for country-wide networks, such as railways and pipeline 
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systems, where the use of imported equipment was limited. As imports were allo-
cated by annual chunks, the Soviets used the computers to build up each network 
on a piecemeal basis and they thought compatibility could best be achieved if the 
key product remained unchanged. 
More than 70% of the military products were also directed to the Soviet mar-
ket. This kind of military telecommunication equipment was produced by semi-
skilled workers who were well-paid because of the classified character of their 
work and not because of the quality of their work. Furthermore, military trade 
between the Soviet Union and Hungary was carried out separately from civilian 
trade and did not figure in public statistics. No deficits were allowed on either 
side of bilateral military trade when annual clearing accounts were closed. This 
means that when the Hungarian government decided after 1988 to cut the defense 
budget further and further, the corresponding part of Hungarian exports lost their 
orders from the Soviet Union. 
THE CRISIS: "PSEUDO-PRIVATIZATION" AND 
"FINANCIAL OVERSTRETCH" 
In 1988, the privatization strategy the firm's management opted for was still based 
on the old Austro-Hungarian corporate law from 1875. The basic idea was to 
separate state ownership from direct financial and administrative control by the 
government. The hypothesis was that a holding-based group of enterprises using 
the same brand name would be able to capitalize on the existing competitive 
edges of the firm. Direct state ownership, however, had to be limited to a holding 
company operating on the basis of the 1977 Law on State Enterprises. The hold-
ing had to be a senior partner in all the 25 enterprises of the group, but these had 
to be formally independent firms. All 7 members of the Board of Directors of the 
holding, however, held several posts on each of the individual boards of the com-
panies within the group. 
The holding then became a special interface between the government, by 
which it was directly and completely owned, and the subsidiaries, in all of which 
the holding was a majority partner. Thus, the holding could behave either as a 
state firm, asking for government funds in case of financial trouble, or as a leader 
of a pack of formally private companies with no direct dependence on the 
government. 
The control of the holding over the firms was assured through legal guarantees 
as well as by a special form of financial dependence. This was secured through 
individual leasing agreements between the holding and the subsidiaries. The cor-
porate agreements of most subsidiaries stipulated that most of the machinery and 
equipment to be used by them had to remain property of the holding. Leasing fees 
were fixed at a rate 30-50% above the market level because of the holding's 
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serious debt situation. Therefore, the subsidiaries had to carry a dispropor-
tionately high burden of operating costs even when they were formally debt-free. 
There have been a few interesting details of "pseudo- privatization", many of 
which revolve around the composition of ownership. First, there have been only 
a few Hungarian partners other than the holding company in these subsidiaries 
and their share of equity has never exceeded 20% in any member of the group. 
Also there have been some interesting cases of "cross-ownership" within the 
group. For example, subsidiary A owns 20% of the shares of company B, while 
the latter has 10% of the shares of company A. 
A number of interesting phenomena also exist in the area of foreign participa-
tion. There has been foreign direct investment in more than half of the members 
of the group with all the tax advantages to be expected from this situation. More 
than 90% of the approximately 20 million of foreign-owned stock capital came 
from one German retail firm with several subsidiaries across Europe. This Ger-
man company received financial help in the form of a low-interest loan from the 
electronics firm in the early 1980s. This loan has not been repaid, but the amount 
of foreign investment by the German group in the subsidiaries of the Hungarian 
holding in 1988 and 1989 is very close to the value of this "forgotten" credit. 
Finally, an interesting loophole in the Hungarian joint venture regulation was 
exploited by the firm. Tax advantages were linked to the share of foreign stock 
ownership, usually with a minimum of 20%. As Hungary had an increasing trade 
surplus in non-convertible currencies after 1986, it was counterproductive to 
have investment from the Soviet Union. But tax incentives were not conditional 
upon the currency of the investment. Therefore, the holding sold part of the 
shares of its most important subsidiary to a Soviet firm for rubles. These rubles, 
valued at 1 million, were then exchanged into forints by the National Bank of 
Hungary and the amount of frozen Hungarian ruble assets increased further. 
TYPES OF ENTERPRISES IN HOLDING COMPANIES 
There are three types of enterprises in the holding companies. The first is the 
leading subsidiary, which has about 80% of total employment and the bulk of 
production. It retained the key products of the former three divisions: computers 
(informatics), color TVs (consumer electronics), and non-civilian telecommuni-
cations products (military division). Part of the privatization and restructuring 
strategy was that this major subsidiary would itself be divided later and its own sub-
sidiaries would be created. The strategic purpose was that this subsidiary should 
gradually be transformed into a "second-degree" holding with no production in it. 
In this case, two "interfaces" would already have been created. The purpose of this 
idea was partly to put military production into the background and thereby make 
the "front" holding an acceptable investment target for Western firms. 
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Secondly, there were the other productive subsidiaries, which had products of 
less strategic weight but nevertheless had an appropriate marketing perspective. 
These subsidiaries have included firms manufacturing hi-fi equipment, CDs, ro-
botic products, thicklayer-based components, telephone equipment, and soft-
ware. Most of these subsidiaries were more financially sound than the holding or 
the major subsidiary. Due to their small size, however, they could not have any 
significant impact on the overall employment and sales picture of the group. 
Lastly, there are subsidiaries with logistics or other supporting functions. This 
sub-group has included firms which did not have significant sales outlets outside 
the group. Their role has been to provide the group with one key element, namely 
"Related and Supporting Industries" of the famous Porter-diamond.' The basic 
idea was that due to the instability of the domestic market, most suppliers should 
be brought under the umbrella of the group. They had to be kept under the hold-
ing's control in order to avoid their turning towards "outside" markets. A system 
of transfer pricing with high transfer prices has been maintained for subsidiaries 
with less capital-intensive activities and/or those with which the holding was for 
some reason unable to conclude leasing agreements. This sub-group included 
service and infrastructure firms, such as foreign trade, domestic sales and after-
sale services, manufacturing of tools, manufacturing of PCs and other compo-
nents for internal use, housing and transportation services, and factory main-
tenance. 
The term "financial overstretch" was coined for this paper. Not coincidentally 
does it strongly resemble historian Paul Kennedy's term "imperial overstretch"2 
(or "military overstretch"). Kennedy's term is applied to any politico-military gi-
ant (the Roman Empire, 16th century Spain, 19th century England, Third Reich 
Germany, the USSR etc.) that is financially overcommitting itself in order to 
preserve its "superpower" status and then must accept a substantial loss of global 
political weight and influence due to its growing economic ailment. 
The Hungarian electronics firm had been a strong "power" on the domestic 
economic scene for various reasons. First, it was and still is the most important 
employer in a "heavyweight" industrial region. Second, it had achieved a key 
status in Hungarian civilian and military exports to the Soviet Union and had 
therefore become involved in political and trade bargaining between the two 
governments. Third, it had acquired "high-tech" reputation by East European 
standards. It no doubt became capable of incorporating up-to-date technologies 
from leading international firms. It also developed an ability to independently 
produce impressive R&D results. Finally, the firm could always be presented as 
a success story in the electronics industry as no other East European firm was a 
promising partner for Western investors. This success story was meant to show 
1
 M.E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, The Free Press, 1990.,pp. 100-107. 
2
 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Random House, 1987. 
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the ability of the "semi-market" type Hungarian economy to match world market 
standards outside of traditional "smokestack" industries. 
"Superpower" aspirations of the firm within the Hungarian industry were sup-
ported by the government and this is where the "financial overstretch" most like-
ly originated. The firm accumulated large debts from the government, banks, 
and other enterprises. 
The debt to social security and to the state budget consists of unpaid social 
security contributions, personal income tax payments, and customs duties. Ac-
cording to various estimates, these obligations have totaled FT 1-1.5 billion. Un-
paid social security and income tax bills carry a more than 10% real interest per 
annum. Also, any firm with unpaid customs duties is not allowed to be served by 
Customs from January 1991. All these obligations can be waived only by 
Parliament. 
Banking debts totaled FT 3.3 billion (approximately 45 million) plus accumu-
lated interest. Most of this debt is from a 1985 credit agreement on a military 
telecommunications equipment production project. The management felt that 
this would lead to a huge financial disaster due to the expected Hungarian defense 
budget cuts, so the credit was rerouted into several consumer electronics 
projects. 
Finally, the company was unable to pay its debts to other enterprises, a 
phenomenon know as "queuing". In Hungary in 1989 the total amount of unset-
tled inter-enterprise debt had reached FT 200 billion (about 3 billion ). "Queu-
ing" had its origin in the severe credit crunch initiated by the government in early 
1988. A series of enterprises got into liquidity trouble and their only plausible 
reaction was to delay payment of their bills to other enterprises. This unleashed 
a chain reaction and whole "loops" of non-payment (i.e. involuntary credit) were 
formed among several dozen enterprises in each loop. Very few if any "queuing" 
cases were taken to court, partly because of the lack of appropriate receivership 
legislation and partly because many producers feared losing their most valuable 
domestic clients. 
This electronics firm has indulged in one of the most spectacular cases of 
"queuing". The amount of inter-enterprise debt unpaid by the holding and its 
subsidiaries reached FT 5 billion (90 million) by the end of 1990. The "queuing" 
claims of the group totalled FT 3 billion at the same time. These credits and debts 
could not be swapped, of course, due to their completely different enterprise 
structure. 
Approximately 40% of the holding's "queuing" liabilities as well as two-thirds 
of its assets are obligations within the group. Net creditors are mostly the "sup-
porting" firms, whereas the biggest debtor is the major subsidiary. This firm's 
exports to the Soviet Union are still not completely paid and their consumer elec-
tronics products have suffered a dramatic decline of their domestic market shares 
due to extensive import liberalization; for example, their color TVs have fallen 
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from 60% to under 30% of the market share in two years. In addition to its stock 
of unsold finished goods, it has been carrying an inventory of unused components 
worth more than FT 1 billion (15 million). These components had been ordered 
for military exports, but they are incompatible with almost all non-Soviet elec-
tronics product. 
The size of the financial disaster of the firm (or the group) is clearly much be-
yond its own scope for action. It became a "value-subtractor", although not really 
in the McKinnon sense3 because it is a loss-maker even without considering the 
cost structure of its products. Interest on the group's current debt increases by 
roughly FT 10 million each day. This means the net book value of assets is slowly 
approaching zero. 
"ASSET-SUBTRACTION" AND PRIVATIZATION 
The experience drawn from the case of the "asset-subtracting" firm might help 
to clarify a few important elements of the necessary and feasible industrial strate-
gy for Hungary. Three main issues can be brought to the fore. 
The first issue is the government's general attitude with respect to "asset-
subtractors". The existence and the very bad perspectives of "asset-subtracting" 
firms cannot justify the comeback of interventionist industrial policies. As a rule, 
the government should aim to privatize most of these firms in the long run. It has 
to see, however, what could be done immediately in order to stop these compa-
ny's assets from shrinking. Direct financial help to reduce their debt burden is 
usually out of the question. The government could, however, provide effective 
support in designing, financing, and carrying out regional programs to help in-
dividuals create small "supporting" enterprises around larger, but rapidly dwin-
dling firms with considerable job losses. These concentric circles of small "sup-
porting' firms might soon become export-oriented, as shown by the fast 
development of Spanish and, to a lesser extent, Portuguese and Greek subcon-
tracting firms.4 
However, the dynamism of these firms was partly attributable to the beneficial 
effects of micro-level European economic integration. 
The second issue is trade policy. Hungarian consumer electronics firms were 
hit very hard by a quick and comprehensive dismantling of the protection system 
based on import licensing. This trade liberalization took place between 1988 and 
1990. Now the Hungarian consumer electronics market is only protected by low-
3
 R. McKinnon, "Financial Control in the Transition to a Market Economy," paper 
presented in Prague, March 1991. 
4
 C. Charbit, J. T. Lavix, and P.M. Romani, "Sous-traitance et intégration industrielle 
européenne", Revue d'Economie Industrielle, No. 55, 1991, pp. 186-187. 
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level tariffs, which average less than 10%. Now Hungary stands out in Europe as 
a country not applying any sort of "new protectionist" measures to protect its 
consumer electronics industry. 
It would probably not be appropriate to suggest the introduction of "informal" 
market protection in this industry, especially because the low-economy of scale 
of the Hungarian consumer electronics market. Moreover, the domestic firms 
now fighting for survival have practically the same product mix as 2-3 years ago. 
So, the government should use the lack of "New Protectionism" on the Hungari-
an side as an argument when bargaining for more trade concessions with EC and 
EFTA officials. 
Another trade policy problem linked to "asset-subtractors" is that of effective 
protection.5 The McKinnon-model of "value-subtracting" firms made reference 
to energy-intensive companies implicitly subsidized through low energy prices 
by the government. McKinnon shows that negative-value created by, for example, 
Soviet firms using artificially cheap energy will not turn into a positive one just 
because the government gives more incentives on the input side (for example, 
further lowers the price of energy) or devaluates the currency.6 Practically the 
same goes for our "asset- subtracting" company as far as the impacts of effective 
protection are concerned. For a numeric example: if the average tariff rate for 
components used for final product A is 10%, the tariff rate for A is 25%, and the 
share of the imported components in the market price of A is 50%, the rate of ef-
fective protection is (0.25-0.50x0.10)/(l-0.50) = 2/5 = 0.4 or 40%. This means 
that if no domestic components are used, the firm gets a 40% bonus on its value 
added. 
This case becomes rather special if value added turns out to be negative. Then 
effective protection can help to keep an otherwise largely uncompetitive product 
on the market by reducing the "loss margin". The liberalization of Hungarian im-
ports of electronic components resulted in a price decrease of 20-60% for com-
ponents used. Domestic components priced 3-4 times higher than the world mar-
ket level disappeared from the domestic market. This meant the appearance of 
inexpensive components from imports dramatically reduced input costs inducing 
a significant increase in "real" effective protection. "Real" in this context means 
that costs of component imports can be compared only with previous costs of 
component inputs from a time when imports were still practically excluded from 
the market. 
This increase in "real" effective protection has created a "false incentive" for 
our firm to consume its assets by maintaining loss-making production. The usual 
explanation offered by its managers is that incumbent positions on the domestic 
5
 R. E. Caves and R.W. Jones, World Trade and Payments, Little, Brown, and Co., 
1985.,pp.233-235. 
6
 McKinnon, pp. 6-9. 
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(and eventually on the Soviet) market can be preserved only at a price paid 
through financing own loss-making production. According to this approach, the 
declining net book value of assets could be offset by the growing value of the 
group as a whole due to the presence on markets that are gaining importance in 
the eyes of major international exporters. 
SCENARIOS FOR PRIVATIZATION 
The latest developments in the group's crisis have shown that the government has 
not been able to come up with a feasible privatization strategy. The State Property 
Agency and the Board of Control have been successful in blocking the "pseudo-
privatization" process and the creation of the second holding. A major West Eu-
ropean consulting firm was given the task of elaborating an efficient privatization 
strategy and identifying foreign investors ready to acquire at least part of the 
group. Five months and nearly 1 million in consulting fees have not gotten these 
tasks finished. 
In mid-May 1991, the government decided that the group could and should be 
subject only to "piecemeal" privatization. So, the time and money spent to keep 
the group together and the brand name intact were completely wasted. Now the 
ultimate loser from the "asset-subtracting" process will be the holding. It will 
have to disappear like a shipwreck from which everything of some value has been 
taken ashore. 
The holding has most of the group's financial assets and debt. Therefore, its 
well-organized bankruptcy might be enough to save most of the valuable physical 
capacities and those subsidiaries which are or can be made competitive. This 
would be a blend of the two main privatization scenarios. 
The first scenario can be called the "throw-away" option. This means the 
government or the State Property Agency has the priority of avoiding further 
"asset-subtraction", even at the cost of a relatively low sales price of the enter-
prise's assets. There is a tradeoff between the speed of "asset-subtraction" and 
the development of the assets' sales price. An optimum point can probably be de-
fined in the case of each enterprise where the acceleration of the "asset-
subtracting" process is expected at any moment while sales prices still do not 
reflect such expectations. It is very likely that this optimum point has already 
been reached in the case of this holding. 
The other main strategic option can be called the "conditioning" approach. 
This means sales prices have gone much further down than could be justified by 
"value-subtraction". In this case, the government can avoid a major financial loss 
only if it invests in the state enterprise to be privatized. Such an investment might 
pay off unexpectedly well due to its psychological effects. These are linked to the 
perception by the market of the fact that the "throwaway" strategy has not been 
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opted for. Thus, even a relatively minor "conditioning" investment might help to 
optimize the difference between the book value and the market value of the assets 
of the firm. 
It seems that the second approach prevails in the Hungarian government's 
strategy for most of the group's subsidiaries. Although the modalities of the reali-
zation of this strategy are not yet known, it is likely that a merchant bank with 
majority state ownership will acquire the holding's stake in most subsidiaries and 
finance their "conditioning". This will probably mean the reversal of their 
"asset-subtraction" process. 
DISCUSSION 
During the discussion, one of the NAS participants argued that this firm's 
problems have nothing to do with the economy or the government. In the United 
States, Zenith is the only television manufacturer left. The French have been irra-
tional in their fight to stay in the consumer electronics market and the Dutch firm 
Phillips has been battered recently. This sector is dominated by the Japanese and 
Koreans and there is little this Hungarian firm can do. Another NAS participant 
noted that one of the latest Sony plants is completely automated, employing only 
50 workers. So unless the government is willing to subsidize 20,000 employees, 
the Hungarian plant should get out of the business. 
Dr. Török shot back that this Hungarian firm had partnerships with some 
major European consumer electronics firms, which are looking to Eastern Eu-
rope to make up their declining market share in Western Europe. Therefore, it 
would make sense for this firm to hang on and reap the benefits of these partner-
ships also by trying to get access to new markets. 
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Case Study of a U.S. Electronics Firm: 
Increasing Importance of Technology for Services 
• 
GRAHAM R. MITCHELL 
GTE Laboratories Incorporated 
OVERVIEW 
In 1990, GTE had revenues of over 21 billion from businesses in telecommunica-
tions, lighting, and precision materials. The central laboratories in Boston carry 
out the R&D for all the corporation's business areas. During the last decade, the 
focus of this work has shifted from products to services, reflecting both the in-
creasing emphasis of services in the U.S. economy and, in particular, the grow-
ing need for technical innovation in telecommunications as the U.S. industry is 
deregulated. During this transition, researchers have become aware that because 
much of the conventional wisdom on managing R&D and industrial innovation 
has been developed for process and manufacturing industries, many of the 
familiar management assumptions need to be reexamined for the newer and tech-
nologically sophisticated service industries. For example, the core of industrial 
R&D programs in manufacturing companies is often centered on materials, 
product design, and manufacturing processes. By contrast, technical skills in the 
service industries often need to be broader to address physical systems or net-
works, operations, and applications or services. The scientific and technical skill 
base needed for industrial research has to be extended beyond hard physical 
sciences to information technology and even further to include human factors and 
social sciences. 
TECHNOLOGY FOR SERVICES 
Technology for services has received relatively little attention in literature on 
managing technology. This is surprising since the service sector now dominates 
both the developed and developing market economies. In 1987 the service sector 
accounted for 72 percent of the U.S. Gross National Product and 76 percent of 
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U.S. employment. Yet, there is widespread misunderstanding of the character 
and importance of services, and a tendency to significantly underemphasize the 
importance of technology. This tendency is even more extreme in Eastern Euro-
pe. In the U.S., Quinn and Gagnon1 have characterized the attitudes of senior 
management as follows: 
Although they know better, most executives still think of the service sec-
tor in terms of people making hamburgers or shining shoes. 
A better understanding of technology in services is critical to the technical 
management throughout U.S. industry for two major reasons. First, many impor-
tant technical advances with broad relevance to U.S. industry are pioneered by 
services companies. This is particularly true in information technology. (The 
service sector owns 84 percent of the capital stock of information equipment and 
products in the United States.) Second, non-services companies have responded 
to the opportunities for business growth over the last two decades by developing 
or acquiring services operations. There are many examples of manufacturing 
corporations that have, with appropriate acquisitions, translated expertise in 
repair, engineering design, financing, communications, or distribution into 
separate fast-growing services within the corporate portfolio. This usually 
presents the existing technical management with the perplexing question of how, 
if at all, to support these new services businesses. 
STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR SERVICES 
Why is it difficult to understand technology for services? The first step is to ask 
the question, how is the service sector different in a strategic sense from the 
goods producing sector? Unfortunately, many of the most familiar strategic plan-
ning approaches, and the frameworks managers most naturally reach for to sort 
out basic and long-range priorities, provide little guidance on the differences be-
tween services and goods producing industries. This is because these frame-
works analyze business strategy from the perspective of the individual firm and 
largely build on structural relationships common to most corporations. There-
fore, all companies are seen as having characteristic issues and options when 
dealing with generic customers, suppliers, and competitors. This kind of ap-
proach has the virtue that strategies can be developed without reference to 
whether the corporation is in the services, manufacturing, or even the materials 
resource sector. However, precisely because these frameworks obscure the 
' Quinn, James Brian and Gagnon, Christopher E. (November- December 1986), "Will 
Services Follow Manufacturing into Decline?," Harvard Business Review, Volume 64, 
No. 6, p. 95. 
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differences between services and manufacturing businesses as a class, their 
use adds to the confusion over the debate on services rather than helps 
resolve it. 
An important step in clarifying the difference between goods and services is to 
apply the notion of the value chain in considering a segmentation by industry sec-
tor. Different industrial segments may be arrayed in a sequence illustrating the 
added value at each stage. Starting with raw materials, value is added as these 
materials are processed and then turned into components, products, and systems 
which provide services to the ultimate consumers. Successful companies exist at 
all points in the progression and operate with widely varying degrees of vertical 
integration. Steele2 has observed that most corporations assume they must con-
trol operations over a specific length of this chain- -that these are in effect their 
core businesses. 
The value chain simplifies the actual situation as some of the output of the serv-
ices and manufacturing sectors is fed back into earlier stages of the process and 
provides the interlocking infrastructure for the total economy. However, there are 
at least four characteristics of the services sector which come about because of 
its position in the value chain. The first is that the services sector is the major cus-
tomer of manufacturing. This characteristic implies that many services indus-
tries have a generic need to specify, or in other ways control and influence, the 
design of the products they buy. The specification and procurement activities of 
government, transportation, public utilities, communications, and financial 
services industries provide very visible examples of this. The second general 
need in the services industries is to assemble, build, or otherwise integrate these 
products into a system or organization. The third is to run or operate the system 
so that it delivers appropriate services, keeping in mind that the direct customer 
of the services sector is often the general public or individual consumer. The 
fourth characteristic of services arises from the fact that success in banking, 
retailing, transportation, communications, government, and many other services 
depends to a very large extent on an ability to understand and deal directly with 
the general public and individual consumer. Successful service companies place 
great emphasis on understanding the needs of individual consumers. Information 
technology is providing the opportunity to economically tailor services to these 
individual needs, for example in automatic banking, telecommunication enter-
tainment and retailing services, and a host of travel-related and financial 
services. 
2
 Steele, Lowell W. (1989), Managing Technology: The Strategic View, McGraw-Hill 
Engineering and Technology Management Series, Michael K. Badawy. Ph.D., Editor-
in-Chief, McGraw-Hill Book Company. New York. 
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DEFINITION OF TECHNOLOGY 
The language system used to classify industrial research is of critical importance. 
Steele3 has pointed out that it must communicate both the technical character of 
the work and its purpose. It must be understood by the technical community who 
performs the work and by the business and management community with whom 
they interface. In addition, it must allow both groups to jointly allocate resources 
to the highest strategic priorities and track operational progress. 
When asked to define technology, the technical community thinks in terms of 
skills and disciplines, or the input to the process; for example, heat transfer, 
solid-state physics, and circuit analysis. Business management, on the other 
hand, tends to think of technology in terms of products and systems, or the output 
of the process; that is, integrated circuits, computers, or even communications 
systems. As a result, some corporations recognize that in order to build a lan-
guage with which to manage industrial R&D, and to communicate with both 
communities, definitions of technology should combine both skills and applica-
tions. 
Mitchell4 and Bitondo5 have called these kinds of classifications "Strategic 
Technical Areas" (STAs) and have shown that by formally combining skills with 
applications in the definition of technology, technical strategies may be analyzed 
and implemented across multi-business corporations. More importantly, from 
the viewpoint of the present discussion, these STAs are used to manage and set 
the strategy of the corporate laboratory. The precise definition of the required 
technical skills, the selection of the highest priority business areas to which they 
should be directed, and the long-term allocation of resources to them effectively 
define the strategic direction of a corporate research laboratory. 
Once technologies are defined and recognized as having both a skills compo-
nent and an applications component, some of the mystery surrounding technolo-
gy and R&D for services is removed. Scientific knowledge and technical skills 
may be effectively applied along all parts of the value chain; however, these skills 
and expertise must be coupled with the applications reflecting the priorities of a 
particular business area to have something around which to focus strategies and 
build programs. 
1
 Steele, Lowell W. (1975), Innovation in Big Business, American Elsevier Publishing 
Co., Inc., New York. 
4
 Mitchell, Graham R. (Number 2/3, 1985), "New Approaches to the Strategic Manage-
ment of Technology," Technology in Society, Volume 7, p. 227. 
5
 Bitondo, Domenic S., "Technology Planning in Industry: The Classical 
Approach," Chapter 4, Interdisciplinary Planning: A Perspective for the Future, 
M. J. Dluhy, K. Chen, (eds ), New Brunswick: Center for Urban Policy Research, 
Rutgers University. 
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EXAMPLES FROM THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 
One of the clearest ways to understand the difference in the role of R&D for 
products versus services is to observe the contrasting responses of managers in 
products businesses as opposed to managers in services to the same successful 
laboratory experiments. When presented with a research breakthrough in, for ex-
ample, fiber optic transmission capability, a manufacturer of transmission equip-
ment immediately raises the question, "How can I incorporate these advances 
into the next generation of equipment design?" Other technical issues covering 
access to the components, patent or know-how protection, and product obsoles-
cence are typical initial concerns common to product manufacturers in many in-
dustries. 
For a telecommunications services company, such as a telephone or data net-
work operator, the implications of the same research advance may be very differ-
ent. A possible conclusion could be that bandwidth is going to be both plentiful 
and inexpensive in the near future. The most critical question for the provider of 
services is, What will customers do with this new bandwidth? What new 
services-video, data, or voice will we need to create and market? Not only is the 
question different, but the subsequent priorities and actions follow a very differ-
ent path. To pursue these questions, skills in human factors and psychology are 
needed along with more familiar engineering software and physical science ex-
pertise. In addition, the services company may also have to establish R&D pro-
grams to address other technical issues that follow directly from the advance in 
transmission components; programs to cover the design, evolution, and opera-
tion of networks; and even whole systems incorporating the new transmission 
equipment. 
IMPACT ON R&D AT GTE LABORATORIES 
The difference between R&D for products versus R&D for services is clearly il-
lustrated at GTE Laboratories by the formal definitions of technology used to 
manage the corporate research program. GTE Laboratories serves both products 
and services businesses, and these different perspectives need to be understood 
in some depth by the researchers. Mitchell6 has shown that in defining research 
areas (STAs), formally coupling (1.) disciplines, techniques, and skills to the (2.) 
applications and market area accomplishes this goal. Three examples of this ap-
proach are described below. 
6
 Mitchell, Graham R. (No. 3, 1988), "Options for the Strategic Management of Technol-
ogy," International Journal of Technology Management. Volume 3, p. 253. 
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A typical definition used to target R&D to telecommunications equipment 
manufacturing shows how GTE expects to transform skills in fundamental physi-
cal sciences into products. The area is Integrated Circuit Processing. 
(1.) The principal skills include lithographic techniques (photo, x-ray, 
electron beam) for defining fine geometries on semiconductors, as well 
as high-temperature solid-state chemistry and thin-film processing. (2.) 
These are applied to the fabrication of semiconductor integrated cir-
cuits, which are used in a wide range of switching and transmission 
products throughout the telecommunications industry. 
For the services provider, applications have to extend well beyond the individu-
al product. A typical description of what might be included in an STA that ad-
dresses Network Planning is the following: 
(1.) Major mathematical disciplines include decision, queuing and game 
theory, simulation, regression analysis linear programming, as well as 
algorithmic techniques applicable to the solution of computationally 
large network problems. (2.) These are used to develop network and en-
gineering design tools and systems for public telecommunications 
networks. 
The multidisciplinary nature of R&D for Network Services, which has to reach 
beyond the physical system and address consumer needs directly, may be defined 
as the following: 
(1.) Major disciplines include statistics, market science, signal process-
ing, human factors, as well as hardware, software and communications 
systems engineering. (2.) These will be applied to develop techniques 
for the creation of interactive services for specific customer applications 
on the public network. 
In all three examples, the particular expertise required by the researchers is 
identified at the beginning. The second part is needed to complete the definition 
of technology by clarifying how the expertise will be used. Taken in sequence, 
the definitions illustrate a progressive shift from manufacturing to services as the 
focus of application moves along the value chain from components and products 
through systems to consumers. 
Strategy for GTE Laboratories is managed through 15-20 STAs. When a 
majority of programs within the GTE portfolio were directed to products, major 
portions of the telecommunications R&D program were characterized as elec-
tronics/photonics, software, and telecommunications systems, reflecting the 
well-understood and intuitively recognized linkage between these skills and their 
application in telecommunications products. However, as more of the program 
addressed services, increasing dissatisfaction was expressed with this classifica-
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tion as it became clear that electronics, photonics, and software were ubiquitous 
in telecommunications services and were not useful concepts around which to 
build strategic priorities or communicate with business management. Even 
though a need existed for many of the technical skills required when the program 
was directed more heavily toward telecommunications manufacturing, new 
names were needed at the highest level of aggregation to capture the overall shift 
in focus of the entire portfolio down the value chain. 
Ultimately, 
• networks and systems 
• operation of networks 
• applications and services 
emerged as more closely portraying the purpose of the R&D program for 
services. 
TECHNICAL STRATEGIES FOR THE SERVICES SECTOR 
What is true for GTE and the telecommunications industry is relevant to the serv-
ices sector in general. Technical strategy for communications, transportation, 
banks/financial services, and even some wholesale/retail businesses is implicitly 
focused towards three generic targets: the physical system, operation of the sys-
tem, and applications or products (that is, services). 
The physical system, or equipment, is usually supplied by manufacturers and 
assembled by the service company. For example, the analog of the network for 
telecommunications systems is the airline fleet and communication systems in 
the case of airlines; computer networks and information systems for banks/ 
financial services; generation, transmission, and distribution systems for an 
electric utility; and the network of wholesale and retail outlets, together with 
their information systems, for trade. 
The degree to which the services company needs to be technologically 
sophisticated and carry out R&D into the physical system depends on several fac-
tors. One is the number and diversity of individual components for the system. 
When the system is built from a large number of different elements supplied from 
many manufacturers, as is clearly the case in many large systems for transporta-
tion, communications, and financial services, the burden on the services compa-
ny to design, specify, and integrate the elements into a working system is sub-
stantial. 
The second generic focus of technology strategy in services is operations, in-
cluding the development of efficient procedures and information systems for 
maintenance and control. Often these systems become a source of strategic ad-
vantage for services companies and may even provide a separate source of 
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revenue, as with reservations systems in airlines, mutual fund management sys-
tems in banks, and directories in telephone companies. A wide range of mathe-
matical and computational skills are often required, and Larson7 has illustrated 
that Operations Research has provided added value in industries as diverse as 
government services, railroads and transportation, banking, electrical power and 
many others. Not surprisingly, top management in the services companies often 
exhibit considerable sophistication in information technology. 
The third area of strategic focus in services is applications or products of the 
system; that is, the actual services. The technical skills required need to ensure 
close coupling to the customers wishes and needs. Many of these skills are poorly 
represented in more traditional industrial research laboratories, where physical 
sciences and engineering disciplines often dominate. The overall need for this 
research is strongly influenced by the range, variety, and technical sophistication 
of the output or products of the services company. In telecommunications and 
airlines, as well as in banking and financial services industries, deregulation is 
leading to an explosion in the variety and number of new services products. As 
the services infrastructure grows, the cost of introducing new services escalates. 
Technical programs that attempt to simulate radically new services can resolve 
true consumer needs and responses before major investments are made. This 
kind of program lowers the risks and accelerates the introduction and deployment 
of the new services. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The U.S. economy can be considered to consist of four interlocking and vital sec-
tors: agriculture, mining and material resources, manufacturing, and services. 
The largest sector, services, is in many ways the least understood, and in particu-
lar the role of technology is only slowly being recognized. Much of the literature 
on innovation and R&D is drawn from our history in the process and manufactur-
ing sectors, and these familiar paradigms often contribute to the confusion over 
technology in services. Over a transition period of less than 10 years, GTE 
Laboratories has had to manage its corporate R&D portfolio as it has moved from 
a major focus on products to a program dominated by R&D for services business-
es. Because this has occurred in a single laboratory with a reasonably stable en-
vironment, management, and research staff, the experience offers a longitudinal 
experiment on the inherent differences between technology strategy for manufac-
7
 Larson, Richard C., "Operations Research and the Services Industries," Managing In-
novation: Cases from the Services Industries (1988), National Academy of Engineering, 
Bruce R. Guile and James Brian Quinn, (eds.), National Academy Press, Washington, 
DC., p. 115. 
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turing compared with services. The experience suggests that as technical skills 
and resources are applied toward the end of the value chain, i.e., to the service 
sector, generic needs such as the design and building of the physical system or 
network, operation of the system, and the services products-of-the-system in-
evitably form the R&D program's focus. 
This experience also suggests that the technical sophistication of human 
resources in the service sector is increasing, thereby creating parallels with 
manufacturing. Not only is the sector providing increasing competition for infor-
mation professionals, but the operating role of information executives increasing-
ly resembles that of traditional R&D managers as they fit internal program 
resources to the strategic priorities of their corporations. 
DISCUSSION 
Several important points surfaced during the discussion. 
• One participant noted that the presentation illustrated where Hungary 
should go, but left no clues as to how Hungary should get there. Dr. Mitchell 
responded that the first key was education. In the United States, if you ask some-
one for what s/he is training a child, the answer is college and eventually work 
in the service sector. In the near-term, a participant commented that Hungary's 
first step should be to overemphasize the development of telecommunications, 
because the service sector is so heavily dependent on telecommunications 
systems. 
• Dr. Mitchell emphasized Hungary can learn many lessons from America's 
transition from an industrial to a service economy. Hungary cannot go the same 
route, but should recognize the value of the service sector and the importance of 
information technology. Too many people seem to treat the service sector as 
some big levitation trick, something with no lasting value. 
• One participant noted that it is exceedingly difficult for a company with a 
tradition of hardware to transform itself into a service firm, much less for an en-
tire country to undergo this transformation. As Hungary looks to the future, it 
will either choose manufacturing, which is a shrinking part of the world econo-
my, or services. But it is important to redefine services and manufacturing. For 
example, in the United States only 2-3% of the work force is farmers, but the 
agricultural sector involves much more, such as the agro-chemical industry and 
marketing services. The same is true in manufacturing. Providing statistics on 
California, one participant noted that manufacturing was only 18% of the state 
economy, but the sectors related to manufacturing total 75%. 
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• Continuing the theme of links between services and manufacturing', it was 
argued that the relationship was even more complex. One must differentiate 
between high-value (knowledge intensive) and low-value products. Even within 
high-value, a difference exists between economies of scope and scale, and ideas 
and creativity. Even if Hungary or the United States was good at high-value/crea-
tive products, it may not be able to compete in the area of economic scale. 
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Biotechnology R&D at Monsanto Company: 
a U.S. Case Study 
• 
ROBERT W. ELTZ 
Monsanto Company 
This discussion touches on the nature of industrial research and development 
(R&D) in biotechnology in U.S. firms. Although it focuses on Monsanto Com-
pany, a large diversified chemical company, the points herein are largely generic 
to R&D in all manufacturing companies. 
Biotechnology is the application of modern biology to a number of useful ends. 
Since the late 1970s, biotechnology R&D has exploded, especially due to advan-
ces in biochemistry, genetic engineering and protein chemistry as well as to con-
comitant and complimentary advances in analytics, computation, information 
sciences, and other fields. Biotechnology applications currently under develop-
ment include animal/plant breeding, human "gene therapy", industrial proces-
ses, new industrial products, forensic medicine, and new methods and materials 
for fundamental biology (e.g., differen tiation, evolution, disease mechanisms). 
THE BUSINESS CONTEXT 
Hundreds of U.S. companies, large and small, are actively pursuing a wide array 
of biological interests. Labeling any of these companies as "biotechnology 
firms" is often inappropriate or misleading, either because some also use many 
other technologies, or, more importantly, because they must sooner or later add-
ress, and internally organize for, the specific external regulatory and market en-
vironment in which their products compete. Hence, they are better identified by 
their specialization (i.e. pharmaceutical firms, seed producers, agro-chemical 
firms), understanding that they happen to pay high attention to the techniques of 
modern biology. 
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Monsanto Company can be introduced with some rounded 1990 figures. It pla-
ces among the top five U.S.-based chemical companies with sales of 9 billion dol-
lars, 42% of which are outside the United States. Technically based on processes 
and equipment to make, purify, and formulate chemicals, it is largely oriented to-
ward industrial and professional customers rather than ordinary household con-
sumers. Its 41,000 employees worldwide are decentralized into many profit cen-
ters focusing on specialized markets in specific geographic areas. These 
businesses are clustered into five major units: Monsanto Agricultural Company 
(19% of sales; crop chemicals, seeds, animal feed ingredients); Monsanto Che-
mical Company (45%; industrial chemicals and materials); Fisher Controls In-
ternational (10%; process equipment); NutraSweet Company (10%; food ingre-
dients); and Searle & Company (16%, drugs). The company is broadly owned by 
the private sector; 62,000 individuals, funds or institutions own a total of 126 mil-
lion shares which are traded on 10 exchanges in the U.S., Europe and Japan. 
Monsanto Company devotes fairly intensive efforts to technological innovati-
on, spending 7% of sales on R&D and another 0.7% on engineering, commercial 
development and patenting, for a total of 692 million in 1990. That compares with 
750 million on capital expenditures and 546 million net income after taxes. Inter-
nal R&D is used along with divestiture, in-licensing, acquisitions, and venture 
capital investments to achieve its strategic goal of a diversified business portfolio 
that collectively (a) produces high value-added products with good proprietary 
positions (b) yields at least a 20% return on shareholder's equity, (c) is reaso-
nably cushioned against raw material and energy cost perturbations and the usual 
business cycles, and (d) has high regard for and by shareholders, employees, ne-
ighbors, suppliers, customers, and the environment. 
Monsanto's R&D includes a high, but certainly not a singular, interest in bio-
technology; it is integrated with other chemical and material sciences. The bio-
logy programs emphasize productivity enhancers for plant and animal agricultu-
re, industrial chemicals, drugs, food, and improved crops. In plant breeding, 
insect- resistant cotton and a number of other transgenic plants are under deve-
lopment. Industrial bioprocessing has centered on fine and specialty chemicals 
such as somatotropins (for cattle and hogs), aspartame, atrial peptide, tissue 
plasminogen activator, and N- butyl-deoxy-nojirimycin (an experimental AIDS 
drug). However, making fuel-grade ethanol and treating wastes biologically are 
also of interest. Biotechnology is also important at Monsanto in providing power-
ful methods and newly available materials needed in the discovery of new drug 
and agro-chemical, even if later made non-biologically. For example, significant 
quantities of a human enzyme can be generated microbiologically for extensive 
laboratory study as a potential target against which a new therapeutic agent might 
be designed or discovered. 
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THE MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE 
As with other technologies, companies successful in modern biology applica-
tions will likely be those that understand the technical innovation process in in-
dustry and how to meet its requirements, especially in specific market places. As 
shown in Chart 1, that process passes through the stages of conception, research, 
development, commercialization, and commercial operations. In each stage, ap-
propriate refinement is required in seven aspects: product, market, process, eco-
nomics, patent, engineering/ manufacturing, and "company fit". Each aspect in-
volves a considerable checklist of items for attention. For example, "product" 
means defining the final product form and includes everything involved in meet-
ing regulatory requirements; "company fit" means assuring top business 
management's true interest and ability to commercialize and operate the project-
ed venture. These seven aspects require inputs from distinctly different function-
al groups or expertise, preferably from at least the start of the development phase, 
if not sooner. 
Chart 1 
Phases of technical innovation 
PHASE I PHASE 2 PHASE 3 P H A S E 4 PHASE 5 
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Over the past 15 years, many U.S. firms have started or greatly enlarged their 
"biotechnology" R&D. In the American pluralism of large and small enterprises, 
universities, and government, a large number of creative alliances have been 
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forged to help manage and enable innovation. The top managers have had to deal 
successfully with the following five broad concerns: 
1) Establishing a critical mass of resources (money, technical and 
business knowledge/skills (= people), facilities, equipment) to ad-
dress all the aspects of Chart 1. Some of these skills are not peculiar 
to "biotech". Some may be available via alliances with outside parties. 
All must be available. 
At Monsanto, a new Life Sciences campus was established in the early 
1980s to house about 1200 people in biology-oriented laboratories, 
greenhouses, and bioprocessing facilities. New research farms were es-
tablished. Companies were also acquired in the pharmaceutical, food 
ingredient, and seed businesses. Over the same period, businesses were 
sold in petroleum/ natural gas production, petrochemicals, silicon 
wafers, and a few other areas. 
2) Exercising skillful judgement for each project in assuring that 
each aspect in Chart 1 is making progress commensurate with the 
progress in all other aspects. Managers must avoid overspending for 
refining any one aspect while another aspect remains in "early 
darkness". 
3) Changing to different types of project leaders (coordinators), 
reviews, and reviewers as projects progress through the phases and 
migrate from technical to business emphasis. 
In Monsanto, the business managers of the profit centers are interac-
tive by at least the development phase. 
4) Sustaining the critical mass of resources through high and low 
loads. Project concepts will die; some will get repackaged into more 
viable forms. The early phases inherently require a large number of 
project concepts to generate the much smaller number of successful 
commercial innovations. An organization with only one or two projects 
may be unsustainable. The expensive resources needed in later phases 
may be sustainable only with a large number of internal concepts, or by 
acquiring projects from external sources, or by sharing these resources 
with other parties. Conversely, when too many concepts instantaneously 
exist for the size of the affordable internal pipeline, advantageously 
"selling" immature projects for others to develop may make sense. 
At Monsanto, the scouting phase of drug innovation efforts are heavily 
supplemented by supporting university projects in biomedical science, 
most notably at Washington University and Oxford University. An occa-
CASE S T U D I E S 149 
sional project is also started under collaborative research agreement 
with a federal government laboratory. Monsanto has been active in 
funding new start-up companies via venture capital firms as a window 
on new fields and new product concepts. Universities are often very im-
portant in the development phase, for example in the clinical evaluation 
of new drug candidates. The molecular biology and bioprocessing units 
at Monsanto benefit from participating in a wide array of projects in 
several business areas, and in all the research, development, and com-
mercialization phases. On the other hand, when certain very specialized 
expertise is occasionally required, for example in the genetic manipula-
tion of certain organisms, contracts are established with outside 
providers, which are often comparatively small firms. Similarly, an ear-
ly arrangement was made with Genentech to jointly explore the animal 
somatotropin field, and toll manufacturing in Europe has been contract-
ed for certain products. More recently, a number of alliances are being 
established with outside seed companies to commercialize various 
transgenic plants. Indeed, each profit center must seek the most favora-
ble route of commercialization. 
5) Balancing their project portfolios with respect to risk and tim-
ing. For new small companies, adequate funding must be assured, espe-
cially where, as in pharmaceuticals, there are several costly years to 
financial return. Some "small return/low risk" venture(s) may be need-
ed along with "high return/high risk" ventures in order to earn income 
and to establish and sustain the critical masses mentioned above. Often 
these sources of income are contract research and out- licensing (for 
royalties). 
Monsanto R&D is funded by a large number of existing businesses, 
many of which are not biotechnology-based. Many of the "biotech" 
projects involve long and sophisticated paths in highly regulated busi-
nesses. The successes of biotechnology must increasingly fund this 
R&D in the future. 
THE GOVERNMENT INTERFACES 
The several roles of U.S. and state governments have been amplified in the earlier 
papers of Dr. Schillinger and Dr. Shields, but a few remarks peculiar to biotech-
nology are noteworthy. As shown in Chart 2, the various government agencies 
primarily serve two functions with regard to innovation: promotion and regu-
lation. 
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Regarding this promotional role, it is striking that the expansion of "biotech" 
activities was largely stimulated by federal funding of basic research in biology, 
primarily with a long-term view toward health targets such as cancer and infec-
tious diseases. Today, similar efforts continue, especially toward publicly- ac-
cepted missions in areas like health, defense, environment, and safety. Separate-
ly, the federal government is promotional in granting patents, protecting 
trademarks, and granting "orphan drug" status (for target diseases of low inci-
dence). State and local governments have often provided tax and other incentives 
to attract new companies or operations, such as small "biotech firms", which 
create new jobs and revenues. 
The focus on regulation consists of protecting the public from undesirable in-
novations, such as unsafe or ineffective products, as well as worker safety and en-
vironmental pollution. The focus of regulation is not the socialist concept of 
planning production, quality, or distribution, although treading somewhat into 
those areas, as in international trade and agricultural production, is not without 
precedent or great public controversy. Biotechnology products and practices are 
regulated primarily by the several federal agencies shown in Chart 2. For the spe-
cial case of bioprocessing to manufacture drugs, Chart 3 shows the primary fed-
eral interfaces. 
Chart 2 
Government Agencies 
U.S. 
Federal Promote Regulate 
Patent/Trademark Office 
Food & Drug. Admin. 
Occupational Safety & Health 
Environmental Protection 
U.S. Dept. Agri. 
National Institute of Health 
Natl. Sei. Foundat. 
U.S. Dept. of Energy 
U.S. Dept. Transpt. 
U.S. Dept. Defense 
States (50) 
Local (community, township, 
city, village) 
+ 
+ (orphan drug) 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ (advise) 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
ex U.S. 
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Chart 3 
Bioprocessing/ pharmaceuticals 
Protecting 5 Aspects: 
Agencies Involved 
Product 
Process 
Workers OSHA, NIH, DOT 
EPA, USDA, NIH, DOT 
Patent 
FDA 
FDA 
Environment 
Organism/ Intellectual Property 
For the most part, progress in biotechnology has posed new and sophisticated 
technical challenges and loads for the regulatory agencies: the U.S. Patent Office 
recently had a backlog of 18,000 cases in this field. Monsanto and most other 
firms in the field have voluntarily abided by biocontainment rules promulgated 
for federally-funded laboratories. In addition, all firms have participated in open 
public debate on establishing new policies and standards. 
Especially valuable to U.S. companies in this rapidly evolving field, with its 
considerable technical and financial risks, has been the ability to operate in the 
large U.S. economic community, with the added hope for success in other world 
markets. Despite the difficulties for the U.S. Patent Office and the federal regula-
tory agencies/advisers to keep pace, we have more-or-less succeeded in coor-
dinating and setting policy and standards at a single federal level (for over 250 
million people), rather than within each of our 50 states or with the even larger 
number of local governments. The sheer cost to taxpayers of handling both the 
load and the sophistication at each lower government level would be staggering. 
As it is, there is still a considerable cost in time and money for Monsanto and 
others to deal with all the separate countries where manufacturing and/or mar-
keting will occur. The trend toward larger common market regulatory groups is 
generally welcomed and will probably hasten the availability of biotechnology 
innovations in smaller countries. 
152 CASE S T U D I E S 
Role of Government in Biotechnology Innovation 
VERONIKA FRIGYESI 
MTA Research Institute of Industrial Economics 
INTRODUCTION 
In Hungary, there is a broad debate on the role of the government in the economy. 
Under a centrally planned economy, the government's main task is to control the 
economy at any price. This form of government economic management is at the 
opposite extreme of complete "laissez faire" economic policies, which many 
Hungarian economists now propose. Taking the middle road, some economists 
believe that the government should serve the economy, but not control it. Hun-
gary is certainly in the process of learning. 
The government's role in the field of biotechnology development is an interest-
ing case study because of its growing economic importance and because of the 
degree of regulations associated with it. In the last decade, biotechnology has be-
come an area of particular attention in Hungary as well as in COMECON and the 
developed industrial countries. 
GOVERNMENT BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICIES 
The governments of both the East and the West endeavour to exploit biotechnolo-
gy's scientific and technical potential. Based on new achievements, they expect 
that biotechnology production will increase and profitable new undertakings will 
arise. 
Although there are no clear patterns in government biotechnology policy, the 
general principles are identical. Biotechnology is regarded as an important factor 
in structural economic change and international competitiveness, so its develop-
ment is a priority in national economic policies. Individual government biotech-
nology policies, as well as institutions destined for enhancing biotechnology de-
velopment, widely differ from one country to the other. The factors influencing 
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biotechnology development are organic parts of political, economic, and cultural 
traditions. The following factors are considered by governments in developing 
biotechnology- related programs and institutions: 
• The possible sphere of government action in biotechnology development 
• The level of development of traditional and new biotechnology bases 
• The sectoral structure of the economy, the state of development, production 
traditions in industries exploiting new results of biotechnology 
• The role of new biotechnology accomplishments in solving actual economic 
and social problems, such as protecting the environment and improving 
health care 
• The international competitiveness of biotechnology 
• The possible volume of government resources on biotechnology de-
velopment 
• the state of cooperation between universities, laboratories, firms, and in-
stitutes engaged in biotechnology research; 
• the development of infrastructure; 
• biotechnology specialists in the country. 
BACKGROUND ON BIOTECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT IN HUNGARY 
In several specific areas, Hungary's biotechnology has a good international repu-
tation and has achieved promising results. An example is the pioneering work at 
József Attila University in elaborating the protoplast fusion technique and im-
proving the productivity of industrial microbial strains. The Biological Center of 
Szeged (SZBK) is also a pioneer of Hungarian biotechnology. 
SZBK was founded in 1971 with the aid of the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP). It comprises 5 research institutes and employs 300 people. In 
its first years the research conditions were very good. Also, the average age of 
researchers was 30, all of whom were sent to foreign research institutions where 
their research topics were further cultivated. SZBK spent considerable sums on 
research and part of the UNDP allotment was given to the researchers in hard for-
eign currency so that they could obtain necessary materials. This effort had its re-
wards as SZBK became a forerunner in many areas of biotechnology, such as 
molecular biology and molecular genetics. 
Despite some positive results, Hungary's research on biotechnology has been 
retarded by a number of factors. First, compared to industrialized countries, 
Hungary's central economic management was late in realizing the importance of 
biotechnology. Another problem was that the Council of Ministers initiated the 
biotechnology development program, not the research institutions or firms. 
Upon the request of the Council of Ministers, in 1982 the MTA formed a commit-
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tee with the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, and the 
National Committee for Technical Development to survey the results and 
prospects for the biotechnology development. The committee concluded that 
Hungary had not yet missed the chance of joining the international competition 
in this field. Unfortunately, this committee's program recommendations were not 
followed by government measures that could have given an impetus to the de-
velopment of biotechnology. Some measures encouraged biotechnology-related 
activities, but others continued to block them. 
FINANCING BIOTECHNOLOGY ACTIVITIES 
After 1982 the volume of resources earmarked for biotechnology R&D gradually 
increased and it was subsidized by various government programs. Venture capi-
tal, which would suit the credit requirements of biotechnology activities better 
than government funding, has been used rarely. 
As part of the 1983 National Medium-Term Research and Development Plan, 
a central biotechnology R&D program (called A/16 and after 1986 G-3) was 
launched. Between 1983 and 1985, FT 140 million was earmarked for this pur-
pose, while FT 1.8 billion was allocated for the period 1986-1990. Biotechnology 
R&D was also financed from other medium-term R&D programs as well as from 
the National Scientific Research Fund. Programs launched by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food also have included biotechnology research projects, and 
the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health each have supported several 
biotechnology projects as well. One sub-program of the Ministry of Industry's 
T-3 program aimed to advance the domestic manufacturing of biotechnological 
equipment. 
Between 1986 and 1990 a total FT 4.5 billion was spent on biotechnology pur-
poses, 70% of which came from central sources (the state budget and the central 
technical development funds of economic organizations). This sum was much 
larger than the comparable expenditures of the previous five years, but still did 
not reach the critical volume required to bring breakthroughs in biotechnology 
development. 
The two bodies most involved in the development of biotechnology, the Minis-
try of Industry and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, formed scientific con-
sulting teams and contributed to the establishment of biotechnological research 
centers. Unlike other countries, the Ministry of Health (i.e. the medical sciences) 
did not join the major biotechnological programs. This has been a grave short-
coming of Hungary's biotechnological program. 
In the last decade, there have been changes in the distribution of research and 
development resources, but more modifications are needed. There have been 
some steps away from simple institutional financing towards a competitive grant 
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system. Several elements of this new system, however, have put into question the 
advantages resulting from the transformation of the financing mechanism: 
• Only a part (40-50%) of resources allocated under central R&D programs 
were grants, while the rest were essentially interest-free loans. 
• Considering the size of the domestic research network, it was impossible for 
review bodies to be impartial. 
• Problems of ownership of state-subsidized research have yet to be solved. 
Unlike other countries, research results in Hungary are owned by those do-
ing the research and not by those financing it. For example, the Protein and 
Biotechnology Division of the National Committee for Technical Develop-
ment could not have the right of ownership over results of research backed 
by it even if it covered most or, as in the case of certain university research 
projects, all of the relevant expenditures. 
Research institutes and educational establishments have been increasingly 
forced to conclude research agreements with companies. This cooperation has 
advantages for those institutions and individuals engaged in applied research, but 
at the same time it has adverse impacts on research institutes and university 
departments engaged in basic research. Universities have begun to give priority 
to applied research, which, as neglecting basic research inevitably does, leads to 
lower education standards. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that certain patterns emerged in the distribution 
of money among central R&D programs. Industry, agro-business, and infrastruc-
ture were granted roughly equal sums from the G-3 program. A "remarkable" 
feature of the T-3 program was that the three big pharmaceutical firms were given 
nearly identical sums. Part of the funds distributed by National Scientific 
Research Fund financed the basic needs of institutions. 
In February, a new R&D financing system was introduced by the National 
Committee for Technical Development. There are no separate central develop-
ment programs for specific fields, such as biotechnology and electronics, as 
there is one central R&D program with one central fund, the Central Technical 
Development Fund. However, some biotechnology fields were listed as 
priorities. 
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC REGULATION 
The current economic regulations have failed to effectively manage biotechnolo-
gy or encourage its development. Because of the current fiscal policy, most firms 
have only set short-term goals. However, as the majority of biotechnology invest-
ments only pay off in the long term, few firms are willing to risk investments in 
biotechnology. 
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It should also be noted that biotechnology activities do not enjoy any tax al-
lowances, so research teams and firms pay taxes on their R&D activities just like 
any other economic area. For these reasons, it is not surprising that according to 
a survey, 30% of R&D funds were spent on purposes besides research, such as 
taxes and partial repayment of central subsidies. 
One precondition for providing a sound environment for technical develop-
ment is that companies function as centers of innovation. Despite the long-
heralded economic policy guidelines, companies are still unable to exert them-
selves in the area of scientific research. In most companies, money earmarked 
for development is insufficient even for a simple reproduction. With this level of 
support, not even domestic or foreign demand could guarantee the practical ap-
plication of a promising scientific achievement. The financial positions of some 
biotechnology companies forced them to sell their technology and sometimes all 
or part of the firm, like Meriklón and Chinoin have done, to foreign companies. 
PATENTS 
Parallel with the emergence of new findings and the acceleration of biotechnolo-
gy development, the entire problem of protecting intellectual property gained at-
tention. This issue cannot be solved within the original framework of patent 
rights. There are no special patent regulations related to biotechnology inven-
tions in Hungary, and this means the role of the legal system is too unpredictable. 
Currently the most hotly debated question is about the patent protection of living 
organisms and new biotechnological objects, such as vectors. 
Apart from this, there are other features of the Hungarian patent system that in 
the long run may hamper the development of biotechnology. Currently the patent 
system performs a function it should not. Patents are often used as a means for 
specialists to receive extra income over and above their low wages. As not all in-
ventions are classified as corporate inventions, researchers are paid for their 
patented invention until the protection expires. So, until the patent expires, they 
are not interested in replacing their own inventions with more advanced 
achievements. 
As for the procedure of patent registration, Hungary is one of the most exacting 
countries in the world. Its patent law requires "full examination" of novelty, 
progressive or technical nature, and formal requirements. The administration of 
patents is time-consuming and cumbersome. It may take 5 to 7 years until a bi-
otechnological patent is granted and, considering the pace of worldwide develop-
ment, this can be a serious obstacle for research work in Hungary. 
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MEASURES TAKEN TO COORDINATE SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Because of limitations imposed on the operation of market mechanisms, during 
the last decade central economic bodies played an active role in balancing finan-
cial possibilities and actual funds. Their measures, however, lacked the neces-
sary flexibility, bearing the indelible mark of red tape, or they were often con-
fined to help weaken constraints caused by mechanisms established by another 
official body. Program offices, for example, often undertook coordination tasks 
that should normally have been performed by commercial organizations. So the 
government in Hungary has played an active role in establishing the industry for 
biotechnology inputs. The most meaningful of those measures was the above-
mentioned program of the Ministry of Trade, under which Ft 379 million between 
1986 and 1990 was set aside for establishing the engineering and instrumentation 
background for biotechnological R&D. 
PROVIDING FOR SKILLED LABOR 
In Hungary there are far fewer biotechnology specialists than needed. Neither 
research institutes nor companies can fill their vacancies. Part of the problem is 
that university admission quotas are too low; only 10% of secondary school 
graduate are accepted into universities. The number of biotechnology graduates 
has increased over the past decade, but it is too little and too late. There are some 
examples of successful programs. The Department of Agricultural Chemical 
Technology at the Budapest Technical University provides an example of a good 
response to the challenges posed by biotechnology. As early as 1970 the depart-
ment organized a fermentation research group and began training biologist-
engineers in 1974. In the field of post-graduate education, the National Commit-
tee for Technical Development Finances extension courses for company 
specialists through its G- 3 program. Specialists from companies work and study 
with university research teams for one year and write a report at the end. 
The Biological Center of Szeged has an important role in the educating 
specialists. One of its original aim was to train specialists for universities and in-
dustrial firms. However, this aim did not materialize because industry was un-
willing to either financially contribute to the SZBK or to accept the trained 
specialists. Now, the SZBK has many problems because of its limited financial 
resources (the UNDP contributions ended during the 1980s). The history of this 
research center is very instructive for those who analyze the domestic develop-
ment of new technologies. 
There are also general higher education problems that affect biotechnology 
research. First, basic research institutes were separated from universities, which 
most research workers, university professors, and company experts consider a 
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mistake as research institutes have substantial capacities that could be used for 
educational purposes. Second, the real value of funds allocated for higher educa-
tion has shrunk over the past years. Most universities have expressed the view 
that the funds granted by the Ministry of Education do no more than cover the 
basic costs of education. Finally, the special socialist method of selecting stu-
dents has been practiced in the all educational fields, but this method is at its 
worst in the sciences. 
However, merely streamlining the education system would hardly result in the 
proper number of biotechnology specialists in the right places. It should be noted 
that many specialists left the profession in the 1980s. This is because highly 
skilled people often leave their original job for one calling for lower qualifica-
tions but promising higher incomes, like in entrepreneurial activities. There are 
also more and more people who go to work abroad because of the deterioration 
of domestic income and research conditions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The problems in the field of biotechnology embody the rigidity of the Hungarian 
economy. By international standards, its operation mechanism lacks proper in-
centives, fails to encourage progress, and even contains elements blocking de-
velopment. It is clear that the conditions created by the current system of eco-
nomic regulations and financing institutions do not reflect the declared goals of 
scientific and technical development. 
Without a certain critical mass of positive efforts, there is little hope for 
changes in the development of Hungary's biotechnology. If conditions do not 
change, or at least, if encouraging developments do not soon take place in one of 
the essential fields (know-how, manpower, equipment, economic environment), 
then efforts in other economic fields may also be doomed to failure. 
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Dr. Gusztáv Báger 
General Director, Division of Economic Policy 
Ministry of Finance 
József nádor tér 2-4 
1051 Budapest 
HUNGARY 
Dr. Balázs Botos 
Under Secretary of State 
Ministry of Industry and Trade 
1024 Budapest 
Mártírok útja 85 
HUNGARY 
Dr. Sándor Bottka 
Vice President 
National Committee for Technological Development 
1052 Budapest 
VIII, Martinelli tér 8 
Hungary 
Dr. Bruno Dallago 
Department of Economics 
University of Trento 
Via Inama 
38100 Trento 
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Ms. Ágnes Gasztonyi 
Technical Secretary 
Kőbányai Brewery 
1106 Budapest 
Maglódi út 17 
HUNGARY 
Ms. Katalin György 
Innovation Research Center 
1091 Budapest 
Múzeum utca 11 
HUNGARY 
Dr. Annamária Inzelt 
Európa Fórum 
1088 Budapest 
Múzeum utca 17 
HUNGARY 
Ms. Éva Jáki 
1126 Budapest 
Németvölgyi út 31 
HUNGARY 
Mr. Péter Kardos 
Technology Development Project Unit 
National Office for Technological Development 
1374 Budapest 
Martineiii tér 8 
HUNGARY 
Dr. Judit Karsai 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
1112 Budapest 
Budaörsi út 45 
HUNGARY 
A P P E N D I X III 169 
Dr. Péter Kazár 
Deputy Director 
Policy and Asset/Portfolio Management Unit 
State Property Agency 
1051 Budapest 
Vigadó út 6 
HUNGARY 
Dr. Jenő Koltay 
Director 
Institute of Economics 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
1502 Budapest 
Budaörsi út 45 
HUNGARY 
Ms. Judit Kóczián 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
1112 Budapest 
Budaörsi út 45 
HUNGARY 
Dr. Kund Bandi 
Director 
Foreign Investment and Trade Promotion Agency 
Ministry of International Economic Relations 
1055 Budapest 
Honvéd utca 13-15 
HUNGARY 
Dr. József Marton 
Director General 
Manufacturing Division 
National Committee for Technological Development 
1374 Budapest 
Martinelli tér 8 
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Ms. Erika Nagy 
Economist 
Ministry of Labor 
1051 Budapest 
Roosevelt tér 7-8 
HUNGARY 
Dr. Katalin Nagy 
Deputy Head of Department 
Department of International Programs 
Ministry of Labor 
1051 Budapest 
Roosevelt tér 7-8 
HUNGARY 
Mr. István Németh 
Managing Director 
Kőbányai Brewery 
1106 Budapest 
Maglodi út 17 
HUNGARY 
Mr. Lajos Nyíri 
General Director 
Head of Department of International Relations 
National Committee for Technological Development 
1052 Budapest 
Martinelli tér 8 
HUNGARY 
Mr. Géza Simon 
Department of Informatics 
Ministry of Industry and Trade 
1024 Budapest 
Mártírok útja 85 
HUNGARY 
Mr. Gyula Tellér 
Member of Parliament 
1034 Budapest 
Szomolnok utca 5 
HUNGARY 
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Dr. Sándor Tóth 
Senior Counsellor of Government 
Prime Minister's Office 
Secretariat for Science Policy 
1357 Budapest 
Kossuth Lajos tér 1-3 
HUNGARY 
Dr. Judit Ványai 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
1112 Budapest 
Budaörsi út 45 
HUNGARY 
Dr. Erzsébet Viszt 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
1112 Budapest 
Budaörsi út 45 
HUNGARY 
Mr. János Vincze 
Innovation Research Center 
1091 Budapest 
Múzeum utca 18 
HUNGARY 
Mr. Artur Wieland 
Director of Biotechnology 
Protein and Biotechnology Division 
National Committee for Technological Development 
1052 Budapest 
Martinelli tér 3 
HUNGARY 
Dr. Győző Zemplén 
General Director 
Secotex Textile Factory 
1033 Budapest 
Szentendrei út 89-93 
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